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When an argument becomes overheated, is it better to insist on arguments until 
the other submits, or is it better to withdraw until both parties cool off? When a work 
team makes a decision, are the ideas offered always better than the ideas held back? Just 
as “the squeaky wheels get oiled,” conflict communication research has focused on 
communicative strategies in dealing with conflict, and the non-communicative strategy of 
avoidance has rarely been examined. Avoidance has been largely viewed as a passive and 
ineffective conflict strategy.  
The goal of this dissertation is to develop and assess a cognitive model of conflict 
avoidance. A typology of conflict avoidance and a typology of goals in conflict situations 
are developed. Twelve hypotheses about how conflict goals determine individuals’ 
likelihood of using specific avoidance strategies are proposed. 
 In an experiment, the importance of a goal or a combination of goals was 
manipulated, and the likelihood of using specific avoidance strategies was measured. 
Twelve goals or combinations of goals were induced in a role-playing situation. Each 
goal induction was placed in one of two hypothetical scenarios (an interpersonal conflict 
in a group project in school and a similar conflict at work). With two scenarios and 12 
goal inductions, 24 experimental conditions were created. A total of 352 student 
participants were randomly assigned to the 24 conditions. Participants imagined 
interacting in the hypothetical conflict scenario, which was presented in writing; they 
then provided their responses on a questionnaire. 
 Results indicated that avoidance has various forms, some of which were caused 
by different levels of importance placed on different goals. Avoidance strategies were 
shown to have two components: communication avoidant strategies (withdrawal, passive 
competition, exit, and outflanking) and issue avoidant strategies (pretending and 
yielding). The former strategies were predicted by competitive goals, whereas the latter 
were predicted by cooperative goals. Interpretations and implications of the results, the 
limitations of the study, and future directions were discussed.    
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“Hi, Sam, why did Chris get the promotion and not you? Everyone knows you 
-are more qualified.” 
“Well, what can I do about it? Chris and our boss graduated from the same 
college, and they are good friends.” 
 “Why don’t you argue about it? It’s unfair!” 
 “I don’t want to offend him; I want to keep my job, Tom.” 
 “If I were you, I would definitely talk to him.” 
 This conversation is not unusual. Conflict is inevitable in interpersonal 
relationships. In the above situation, Sam has chosen to avoid talking to his boss 
about the perceived unfairness of a promotion because he fears he may lose his job, 
whereas Tom advises confrontation. Which method is better? Is avoidance or 
confrontation more beneficial to the employee’s job security? And which is more 
beneficial to the employee’s relationship with his boss? Under what circumstances do 
people choose avoidance over other ways of resolving conflict? In a society that 
stresses verbalization and directness such as the United States (Hall, 1959; Kim, Shin, 
& Cai, 1998), the answers to these questions likely would be biased against 
avoidance. Roloff and Ifert (2000) criticized research in interpersonal conflict for its 
failure to explain avoidance. Kim (2002), in discussing non-Western perspectives on 
communication, stated that avoidance had been largely overlooked by the mainstream 
research on conflict management strategies in the past four decades. Early research in 
conflict management such as by Blake and Mouton (1964) and by Filley and House 
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(1969) equated avoidance with inaction and considered avoidance to be a lose-lose 
strategy; their works have influenced students in conflict and communication to focus 
on conflict strategies other than avoidance (Kim & Leung, 2000). In the hypothetical 
conversation on page 1, however, is Sam’s decision wrong to avoid the conflict with 
his boss?  
 In some situations, avoidance may be an effective or desirable strategy, such 
as when the cost of confrontation is too great or when there is insufficient justification 
to take action (Roloff & Ifert, 2000). In their situational theory of non-apologies, 
Bavelas, Black, Bryson, and Mullett (1988) and Bavelas, Black, Chovil, and Mullett 
(1990) argued that when all potential actions seem to bring negative consequences, 
individuals are likely to avoid the situation. Guerrero (1992) and Tavris (1982) found 
that individuals reported a tendency to use non-communicative acts such as holding 
grudges or trying to ignore angry feelings to prevent their partners’ aggressive or 
violent behaviors in interpersonal relationships. Lewin (1935) compared a person’s 
approaching or avoiding actions to an object experiencing attraction or repelling 
forces in a physical field. He argued that a positive stimulus pulls the person in (i.e., 
the person approaches the stimulus), whereas a negative stimulus repels the person 
(i.e., the person avoids the stimulus). When faced with two equally undesirable 
stimuli, the person is likely to take an avoidant action from both stimuli. The avoidant 
action may be leaving the field or doing something unrelated to the two negative 
options (Lewin, 1935).  
 Studies of interpersonal avoidance have begun to increase recently. Most of 
these studies focused on topic avoidance (e.g., Afifi & Guerrerro, 2000; Caughlin & 
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Golish, 2002; Daily & Palomares, 2004; Roloff & Ifert, 2000). In examining conflict 
management through topic avoidance in close relationships, Roloff and Ifert (2000) 
stated that, “conflict avoidance deserves more attention than it has been afforded. 
Perhaps achieving successful relationships requires a balance between confrontation 
and avoidance” (p. 153). Afifi and Guerrero (2000) advocated the explorations of 
relationship-based, individual-based, and information-based motivations to 
understand people’s topic avoidance in close relationships. Research in topic 
avoidance has provided a good starting point to a systematic investigation of conflict 
avoidance.  
Increased discussion of avoidance is also found in the research in cross-
cultural comparisons on conflict styles (Cai & Fink, 2002; Kim & Leung, 2000). 
Although mixed results have been found regarding cultural differences on preferred 
use of avoidance, Cai and Fink indicated that an overall generalization is that 
“collectivists are more likely to be non-confrontational whereas individualists are 
more likely to be confrontational” (p. 71). Using a multidimensional scaling analysis, 
Cai and Fink demonstrated that this generalization is untrue: Individualists avoid 
more than collectivists do. Others have found that avoidance is a common strategy 
used in certain situations, about certain issues, and with people in certain relationships 
(e.g., Leung, 1988; Lu, 1998; Nicotera, 1993; Oetzel, Ting-Toomey, Yokochi, 
Masumoto, & Takai, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2001; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Roloff 
& Ifert, 2000; Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). Leung, Koch, and Lu (2002) argued, “Asch’s 
(1956) famous experiment on conformity and social influence has been replicated in 
many Western cultures, suggesting that conformity and conflict avoidance are 
4
universal social phenomena and not solely the province of East Asian societies” (p. 
216). Leung (1997) further advocated the study of cognitive processes in conflict 
research by stating that “the recent years have seen rising interest in the impact of 
cognitive factors on conflict behavior. For instance, the impact of cognitive biases on 
conflict processing has been widely documented (Bazerman & Neale, 1992)” (p. 
562). 
 The research on avoidance about topic disclosure and cross-cultural 
comparisons on conflict styles suggested examining the cognitive processes of 
conflict avoidance in understanding people’s conflict behaviors. People use avoidance 
to achieve multiple goals (Afifi & Guerrero, 2000; Knobloch & Carpenter-Theune, 
2004; Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). For example, Afifi and Guerrero (2000) found that 
topic avoidance was motivated by relational, identity, and information management 
goals. Leung (1988) found that material goals and relational goals predicted people’s 
decisions about confrontation or avoidance. Because a strategy is motivated by a goal 
or a group of goals (Greene, 1997; Wilson, 2005), an individual's likelihood of using 
avoidance in handling an interpersonal conflict should reflect the goal(s) behind it. 1
The major purpose of this dissertation is to examine the links between goals 
and avoidance strategies in interpersonal conflict situations through a cognitive 
model. Before the links are examined, a typology of avoidance strategies and a 
typology of goals are developed. Because the study investigates the likelihood of 
using avoidance strategies through a goals approach, which is one of the ways to 
study cognitive processes (Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 1997), the assumptions for 
cognitive research apply to this study.  
5
Wilson (2005) summarized four assumptions that cognitive theorists usually 
make. First, the individual is the unit of analysis. This study examines the goals that 
an individual uses for avoidance in an interpersonal conflict situation; the focus is 
placed on the actor's goals and strategies, not the other party’s. Second, individuals 
interpret the environment and respond to it actively (Wilson, 2005). This study 
examines interpersonal conflict, and thus the goals activated by characteristics of 
interpersonal conflict situations are the foci. Personality or dispositional variables are 
not discussed. The active response to the environment also implies that conflict 
strategies to pursue the goals are more relevant in this study than are conflict styles,
which are more appropriate to be discussed when the focus is to understand 
dispositions (e.g., Conrad, 1991).  
 Wilson (2005) defined a strategy as "an abstract category of behaviors that 
share a common feature or quality and that appear to pursue a goal" (p. 27). A 
conflict strategy is used to pursue goals arising from a conflict situation. A conflict 
style refers to the recurrent approaches to managing conflict across situations and is a 
socialization product, or in other words, a learned behavior for managing conflict 
(Ting-Toomey, 1994). Roloff and Ifert (2000) argued that avoidance can be an 
effective communicative choice and that the strategic use of avoidance does not make 
a person an avoider. Wang and Chen (2004) found that conflict strategies varied 
across situations and were not always consistent with conflict styles. Because the 
main purpose of this dissertation is to identify the goals that predict avoidance in a 
conflict situation, the dissertation examines avoidance as a strategy rather than a style.  
The third assumption that cognitive researchers have made is about limited 
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cognitive capacity for understanding and responding to the environment (Wilson, 
2005). This assumption applies to this study. The focus of the dissertation will be on 
the goals most relevant to interpersonal conflict. The goals that the actor may not be 
conscious of are not discussed. In other words, this study tests avoidance strategies as 
a means to achieve the ends that the actor has planned consciously.  
Finally, the dissertation builds a cognitive model that may apply to various 
interpersonal conflict situations (Wilson, 2005). The dissertation does not examine 
the prior relationship between the actor and the other party or prior conversational 
episodes between the two. Attention is directed to goals that motivate avoidance 
strategies (i.e., the link between goals and avoidance strategies). Any variables that 
may influence the formation of goals or that may be affected by avoidance strategies 
are beyond the scope of this study. The link between goals and avoidance strategies 
should be found in various interpersonal conflict situations.  
The following chapter reviews the literature on avoidance and goals. A 
rationale is provided to link goals to avoidance strategies in a cognitive model. 
Chapter 3 describes the pilot studies and the method used to test the model. Chapter 4 
provides the results. Chapter 5 summarizes the study, interprets the results, and 
discusses the limitations of the study, directions to future research, and the 
significance of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
Linking Conflict Goals to Conflict Avoidance 
Conflict Avoidance in Two-Dimensional Models of Conflict Behaviors 
In interpersonal communication, conflict occurs when an individual perceives 
incompatibility between his or her own personal goals, needs, or desires and those of 
the other party (Pruitt & Rubin, 1987). Such experience can be emotion-laden (Ting-
Toomey & Oetzel, 2001). In dealing with conflict, people use different strategies to 
accomplish their goals. Blake and Mouton (1964) proposed the managerial grid, 
which used two dimensions to predict conflict management styles by managers in 
organizations: the degree of concern for production and the degree of concern for 
people. When the degree of concern for production is high and for people is low, the 
actor is predicted to use domination, a strategy of acting like an authoritarian who 
tells the other party what to do and pushes his or her own way over the other party. 
When the degree of concern for production is low and for people is high, an 
individual is predicted to use accommodation, a strategy of giving in to satisfy the 
other party’s needs (Blake & Mouton, 1964). 
Moderate amounts of concern for both production and people predict the use 
of compromise, a strategy of finding concession or a common middle ground that 
both parties can accept. High degree of concerns on both dimensions predicts the use 
of integration, a strategy of maximizing gains by exploring both parties’ needs to 
achieve an agreement beneficial to both. According to this managerial grid, low 
concern for both production and people predicts avoidance, a non-confrontational 
strategy of taking no action (Blake & Mouton, 1964).  
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Blake and Mouton’s (1964) managerial grid is the foundation of other two-
dimensional models that predict conflict management behaviors. Later revisions of 
the grid have maintained the dimensional structure and the spatial positioning of the 
five conflict styles (e.g., Kilmann & Thomas, 1977; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; 
Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt & Rubin, 1987; Rhodes & Carnevale, 1999; Ruble & 
Thomas, 1976; Thomas, 1976; Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). 
For example, Thomas and Kilmann (1974) used cooperativeness-noncooperativeness 
(to satisfy the other’s needs) and assertiveness-nonassertiveness (to satisfy one’s own 
needs) as two dimensions to generate the space for five conflict styles (dispositional 
orientations rather than strategies). Pruitt and Rubin (1987) reworked Blake and 
Mouton’s (1964) managerial grid for the purpose of predicting negotiator’s behaviors 
based on the negotiator’s concern for self-outcomes and concern for the other’s 
outcomes; again, a space of five conflict styles was similarly proposed as Blake and 
Mouton’s managerial grid. Pruitt and Rubin’s (1987) model is aptly referred to as the 
dual-concern model (also see Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999).  
Across the two-dimensional models of conflict behaviors, avoidance has 
retained the same position it was placed by Blake and Mouton’s (1964) managerial 
grid. (One exception is in the works of Ting-Toomey and colleagues discussed 
below.) Avoidance has been predicted by low levels of assertiveness and cooperation 
(Thomas & Kilmann, 1974), low concerns for self and other outcomes (Rhoades & 
Carnevale, 1999), or low concerns for people and production (Blake & McCanse, 
1991; Blake & Mouton, 1964). These models have suggested that avoidance is an 
inactive and lose-lose strategy (e.g., Filley & House, 1969).  
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However, the association of avoidance with low levels of concerns for 
people’s outcomes proposed in the two-dimensional model (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 
1964) may have overstated the instrumental outcomes and ignored the possibility that 
people often use avoidance to achieve relational goals (Kim & Leung, 2000; Leung et 
al., 2002). Avoidance can be a motivated and desirable strategy to maintain 
relationships in some interpersonal contexts. Research on conflict communication in 
close relationships has found that under certain circumstances, the strategic use of 
avoidance helps maintain relational harmony and closeness (Caughlin & Golish, 
2002; Dailey & Palomares, 2004). Avoidance is also positively linked to relational 
satisfaction and perceived closeness in intimate and acquaintance relationships 
(Dailey & Palomares, 2004; Pike & Sillars, 1985). In a sample of varied degrees of 
individualism-collectivism, Cai and Fink (2002) found that avoidance is the second 
most preferred conflict style along with accommodation (the most preferred style is 
integration). Therefore, avoidance is not necessarily a lose-lose or undesirable 
strategy.  
In addition, the two-dimensional structure used to predict the space for the 
five conflict styles (e.g., Pruitt & Rubin, 1987) was not empirically supported. Cai 
and Fink used multidimensional scaling to test whether the five conflict styles 
proposed in the two-dimensional model (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 1964) would indeed 
form a two-dimensional structure. The five conflict styles were measured by Rahim’s 
(1983) Organizational Conflict Inventory II. Results did not support a two-
dimensional structure. The first three dimensions explained 50% of the variance in 
the space formed by the five conflict styles, and the remaining dimensions explained 
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the rest 50% of the variance. Seven dimensions were found to explain more variance 
than a single measurement item (Cai & Fink, 2002). An important implication in this 
study is that multiple rather than dichotomous dimensions predict conflict strategies.  
Finally, the link between low concerns for one’s own and the other’s 
outcomes and high likelihood of avoidance has not received empirical support. In a 
hypothetical role-playing experiment, Rhoades and Carnevale (1999) manipulated 
low levels of concern for both self- and other-outcomes to motivate avoidance, yet the 
condition failed to produce avoidance as expected. Instead, participants reported a 
preference for discussion when the hypothetical other was described as using 
avoidance and a preference for accommodation when the other was described as 
using domination. In another hypothetical role-playing experiment, van de Vliert 
(1997) found that high concern for the other’s outcomes increased the likelihood of 
avoidance. These findings suggest that avoidance is not a product of low concerns of 
one’s own and the other’s outcomes; high concern for the other’s needs may also lead 
to it. 
The positive link between high concern for the other and the likelihood of 
avoidance has received support in a number of cross-cultural communication studies 
in interpersonal conflict management (e.g., Gabrielidis, Stephan, Ybarra, Pearson, & 
Villareal, 1997; Oetzel et al., 2001; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003). A theoretical link 
between the motivation to satisfy the other’s needs and the likelihood of avoidance 
has been established in Ting-Toomey’s (1988) face-negotiation theory (also see Ting-
Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). 
In face-negotiation theory, Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1998) defined face as a 
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person’s claim of “favorable social self-worth” (p. 187) that the person wants others 
to see. People’s face needs predict conflict strategies they would use (Ting-Toomey 
& Kurogi, 1998). Whereas high self-face concerns predict domination, high other-
face concerns predict accommodation, avoidance, and to some degree, compromise 
(Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001). 
The link between high other-face concern and the likelihood of using avoidance has  
received empirical support in several studies (e.g., Kim, Lee, Kim, & Hunter, 2004; 
Oetzel et al., 2000; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2001, 2003; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 
2001). Therefore, avoidance may occur because of concern for the other party, not 
from a lack of concern for both parties. 
Cai and Fink (2002) examined the relationship between individualism-
collectivism and conflict styles, and found that avoidance was highly associated with 
individualism. In other words, individuals who have higher concerns for their own 
“goals, needs, and rights over the goals, responsibilities, and obligations of the group” 
are more avoidant than those whose priorities are for their groups over their own (Cai 
& Fink, 2002, p. 70). This finding contradicts the findings based on the face-
negotiation theory. However, both Ting-Toomey and colleagues’ studies and Cai and 
Fink’s (2002) study support the idea that avoidance does not necessarily result from a 
lack of concern.  
Can the contradiction of the findings be caused by different types of 
avoidance strategies? For example, avoiding the issue but not the person may reflect 
high concern for the other party; but avoiding the person but not the issue may reflect 
high concern for self. How avoidance may be used to accomplish varying goals has 
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not been tested previously. The following sections first distinguish different types of 
avoidance strategies, and then examine the goals that may motivate these avoidance 
strategies.  
Conflict Avoidance 
Over the last two decades, several studies have examined interpersonal 
conflict avoidance. These studies have focused on topic avoidance in interpersonal 
relationships (e.g., Afifi & Guerrero, 2000; Caughlin & Golish, 2002; Dailey & 
Palomares, 2004; Knobloch & Carpenter-Theune, 2004; Roloff & Cloven, 1990; 
Roloff & Ifert, 2000) or antecedents of conflict avoidance in cross-cultural 
communication (Leung, 1988; Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). These studies have provided a 
foundation for a systematic examination of conflict avoidance.  
Research in conflict avoidance has defined avoidance based either on what is 
avoided (e.g., topic avoidance, Afifi & Guerrero, 2000) or on how avoidance is 
enacted (e.g., conforming vs. outflanking; Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). Instead of labeling 
avoidance as inaction or going away (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 1964), Ting-Toomey and 
Oetzel (2001) defined conflict avoidance as “eluding the conflict topic, the conflict 
party, or the conflict situation altogether” (p. 46). Afifi and Guerrero (2000) defined 
topic avoidance as information withdrawal. Roloff and Ifert (2000) and Corcoran and 
Mallinckrodt (2000) defined avoidance as suppressing arguments or averting the topic 
for perceived inappropriateness. Tjosvold and Sun (2002) distinguished between 
conforming, which involves submissively giving in, and outflanking, which involves 
going sideways (e.g., resorting to a third party) to realize goals. Both conforming and 
outflanking are avoidant behaviors, but are motivated from different reasons 
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(Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). These conceptual definitions of avoidance provide a 
foundation for a typology of conflict avoidance. Such a typology assists theory 
building, operationalization, data analysis, and in general, social science research 
(Bailey, 1994). 
Requirements for Developing a Typology 
Development of a typology requires choosing multiple conceptual dimensions 
that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive to define a space for the targeted concept 
(Bailey, 1994). For example, three dimensions defining the physical world are length, 
width, and height. These three dimensions provide a basis for locating and comparing 
physical objects. Similarly, in the social sciences, studying a concept systematically 
requires the definition of the space in which the concept’s various representations are 
found (Bailey, 1994; Fink, Cai, & Wang, 2006).  
An example of typology development in social science research is found in 
Hage and Marwell (1968). To classify role relationships, Hage and Marwell (1968) 
proposed two general dimensions, elements and quantities, so that any role 
relationship can vary according to elements (i.e., what, who, where, when, and why) 
and quantities (i.e., scope, intensity, integration, and independence). The advantage of 
this approach is that a variety of role relationships can be compared and studied 
systematically in a unified space, unbounded by time and space. For example, doctor-
nurse and teacher-student relationships are two distinctive role relationships. 
Different variables can be used to compare them, such as gender composition, social 
status difference, and degree of obligation. Using this variable-analytic approach, 
often research results from different studies are hardly comparable because 
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researchers may have chosen variables based on their idiosyncratic specific research 
purposes (Hage & Marwell, 1968). But results from studies using two role 
relationships located in a common space generated from the same dimensions can be 
compared because of the commonality of the dimensions. For example, the doctor-
nurse relationship may have less scope and intensity and more independence than the 
teacher-student relationship. An additional advantage of using a unified space is that 
when a novel relationship is identified, it can be easily understood along the 
dimensions of the space and compared with existing role relationships. Similarly, 
although avoidance has various forms, identifying the dimensions for avoidance 
provides the basis for comparing types of avoidance strategies across studies. 
Bailey (1994) suggested one caution in typology development: The 
dimensions could produce superfluous and impractical categories. Multiple 
dimensions could produce a large quantity of concept types (e.g., any M dichotomous 
dimensions results in 2M cells; Bailey, 1994, p. 4). Further, theoretical classification 
could produce null cells (i.e., there may be types absent in actual data; Bailey, 1994). 
To solve these problems, Bailey (1994) suggested that only the cells of practical use 
be maintained. The cells developed theoretically are to be tested empirically. The 
cells that have no responses or no representations are to be deleted, and the remaining 
cells may be both theoretically and practically useful (Bailey, 1994). 
A Typology of Conflict Avoidance 
Borrowing Hage and Marwell’s (1968) method of dimension development, 
three dimensions are used to categorize conflict avoidance. The first two dimensions 
involve Hage and Marwell’s (1968) elements of who and what. To use these elements 
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in defining conflict avoidance, a person dimension (involving who) has polar ends of 
avoiding or not avoiding the other person. An issue dimension (involving what) has 
polar ends of avoiding or not avoiding the issue. These two dimensions are chosen 
also because who and what are two fundamental elements to any human interaction 
and central to communication research (Burke, 2000; Dodd, 1961; Hage & Marwell, 
1968; Marwell & Hage, 1970).  
Although Hage and Marwell (1968) proposed three additional elements, 
where, when, and why in defining role relationships, they are not chosen for 
dimension development in this study. The situational factors, where and when, are 
excluded because the dissertation focuses on individuals’ cognitive processes of 
strategic choices in conflict rather than on context of the conflict episode. Where and 
when may be more important elements for studies with other purposes (e.g., 
interactional analysis in mediation and hostage negotiation; see Fink et al., 2006, for a 
summary).2 The why element is also excluded because finding the goals for avoidance 
is the main purpose of the study; goals will be linked to avoidance in the proposed 
model presented below. 
Along with the two dimensions involving avoiding or not avoiding a person or 
an issue, a third dimension is adapted from Hage and Marwell’s (1968) quantities 
dimension. Hage and Marwell (1968) used scope (frequency), intensity (depth), 
integration (overlapping), and independence (alternative choices) to measure the 
quantities of social interaction between two people in a role relationship. The purpose 
of using quantities is to reflect how much interaction is involved (Marwell & Hage, 
1970). For conflict avoidance, quantity may be viewed from a temporal perspective: 
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A person could choose to avoid a person or an issue in the immediate situation or 
over a long time. The temporal dimension is used because it reflects the amount or the 
duration of avoidance (situational or lasting). Therefore, three dimensions will be 
used to define the space for avoidance: person, issue, and time. 
Across the three dimensions, avoidance of a person (i.e., who) or an issue (i.e., 
what) varies between two possibilities, to be avoided (0) or not avoided (1). To make 
a parsimonious and representational space (see suggestions in Bailey, 1994), the 
temporal dimension is dichotomized to immediate (0) and ongoing (1).3 Thus, eight 
cells (2 x 2 x 2) are created by the typology (Table 1). 
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Table 1 
A Typology of Conflict Avoidance 
 Dimension 1: Person 
Avoided (1) Not Avoided (0) 
 Dimension 2: Issue 
Avoided (1) Not Avoided 
(0) 
































a Null cells: The two cells marked by Xs in the last column represent strategies to not 
avoid the person or the issue short term or long term. In other words, these two 
strategies are to confront the other about the issue and therefore are not avoidance 
strategies. These two cells are excluded in later analyses.4
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Withdraw, passively compete, and pretend. Roloff and Ifert (2000) argued that 
a conflict situation involves a stimulus that arouses the perception of 
inappropriateness or violation. People may end an argument to avoid inappropriate 
responses. When an actor avoids an immediate situation, he or she may choose to 
avoid the person and the issue (to withdraw), the person but not the issue (to passively 
compete), or the issue but not the person (to pretend).  
Consider the following situation and Tom’s responses:  
After dinner, Tom wanted to play a videogame but his wife asked him 
to help her wash dishes. They started to quarrel. Tom decided to stop 
quarreling. 
Response 1: Tom left the house and drove off. 
Response 2: Tom stopped arguing but began to play the videogame. 
Response 3: Tom suggested, “Why don’t we go out and see a movie?” 
 Response 1 exemplifies the strategy of withdrawal because Tom avoided his 
wife and the issue by leaving the scene. Whether withdrawal has a positive or 
negative value is arguable. Pearce and Cronen’s (1980) coordinated management of 
meaning theory suggests that certain messages and behaviors are expected in an 
interaction according to its contextual factors. Ceasing to provide feedback in a 
conversation is a breach of this contract (also see Grice’s, 1975, cooperation 
principles). Overt refusal of further discussion plus leaving the scene suggests an end 
to cooperation (Benoit & Benoit, 1987; Guerrero, 1992; Rusbult, 1987). In this sense, 
withdrawal may be viewed as a negative strategy because it violates interaction 
coordination rules. 
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On the other hand, withdrawal from an argument could also signal a trade-off 
in which the actor is willing to back off from undesirable arguments while retaining 
his or her viewpoint. The actor may temporarily leave the scene or avoid discussing 
the issue with the other party to either remain calm or to hold a grudge (Oetzel et al., 
2000). Therefore, the strategy to withdraw may be assigned a positive or negative 
value depending on the actor’s intention and situational features. 
To passively compete is a strategy to avoid the person but not the issue. As 
exemplified in Response 2, Tom started playing the videogame and ignored his wife. 
Although this strategy differs from a domination strategy in which the actor attempts 
to use verbal tactics to defeat the other (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001), passive 
competition reveals the actor’s goal to dominate regarding the issue. Similar to 
withdrawal, passive competition is also a breach of the interaction contract. 
Nevertheless, to passively compete is more aggressive than to withdraw because the 
actor acts out his or her will regardless of the other’s needs or desires. Passive 
competition differs from passive aggression as described in Oetzel et al. (2000). 
Whereas the former refers to an avoidant strategy to carry out the actor’s goals 
without verbal argument, the latter is a sideways attacking strategy to put the other 
person down rather than an avoidance strategy. An example statement of passive 
aggression is “I gave the person wrong information so he/she gets into trouble” 
(Oetzel et al., 2000, p. 408). 
When an actor decides to avoid the issue but not the person in a conflict 
situation, the strategy is pretending because the actor carries out the conversation and 
acts as though the issue is not a source of conflict (see Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001). 
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Pretending is similar to dismiss, a support-giving behavior described in the social 
support literature (e.g., Barbee & Cunningham, 1995). Dismiss describes an 
individual’s supporting behavior through minimizing the problem or the significance 
of the problem that another person has encountered (Barbee & Cunningham, 1995; 
Burleson & Mortenson, 2003).  In the hypothetical situation above, Tom’s third 
response, switching the topic to an irrelevant issue is an example of pretending. The 
strategic use of pretending is more cooperative than either withdrawal or passive 
competition because the actor makes efforts to continue communication with the 
other party while avoiding the specific issue. The actor may suppress arguments or 
provide artificial agreement to smooth the interaction (Roloff & Ifert, 2000, p. 156). 
Reasons for pretending may include fear of violence or a cooperative goal such as 
protecting the other’s image (e.g., Tavris, 1982; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001). 
Exit, outflank, and yield. Enduring avoidance differs from temporary 
avoidance. Whereas avoidant behaviors in an immediate conflict situation may be 
more based on interactions, long-term avoidant behaviors reflect how the actor 
decides to handle the relationship and the issue involved in a conflict. 
Consider the following example and Andrea’s responses:  
Andrea and Kelly were friends and colleagues in a same organization. 
In a meeting, they disagreed on the plan of a project. After the 
meeting, Andrea decided to resolve the conflict. 
Response 1: Andrea asked the boss to be removed from the project and 
she stopped being Kelly’s friend. 
Response 2: Andrea avoided talking to Kelly about the issue but 
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sought their boss’s support. 
Response 3: Andrea no longer insisted on her own views and remained 
Kelly’s friend. 
The avoidance strategy illustrated in Response 1 is exit, which refers to the 
actor’s strategy to avoid both the person and the issue in the long run. Exit resembles 
the ending of a relationship: The actor decides to quit the issue and the other person 
once and for all. In Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) social exchange theory, a person may 
decide to break a relationship when he or she perceives the current relationship to be 
unsatisfactory and better alternatives are available. Exit can also be considered to be 
the actor’s decision to resign from presently available options (Hirschman, 1970). An 
actor exits if he or she believes that the issue is unsolvable and that the relationship is 
no longer worth continuing (Hirschman, 1970). Examples of exit are job resignation 
or job transfer (Roloff, 1976).  
To outflank implies more competition (promoting one’s own goals on the 
issue) than exit. Outflanking refers to the strategy of avoiding confrontation with the 
targeted person while pursuing the issue indirectly (Response 2). Outflanking varies 
in the amount of effort and the gravity of consequences. Outflanking behaviors such 
as backstabbing, resorting to an authority (Tjosvold & Sun, 2002), and agreeing 
publicly but disagreeing privately (Hwang, 1997-1998) require less effort and fewer 
negative consequences than coalition formation, a process to build up a personal 
supportive network to “overthrow” the opponent to resolve the issue (Roloff, 1976). 
Imagine a student who had asked his or her teaching assistant (TA) to change a group 
grade from C to A but was refused. Because of this refusal, the student decides to 
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avoid the TA. The student could either complain to the course supervisor alone or talk 
other group members into complaining to the supervisor as a group. Compared with 
solo complaints, forming an alliance requires more effort, and group complaints are 
more likely to adversely affect the TA. Therefore, although outflanking is an 
avoidance strategy with regard to the other party, the efforts and consequences of the 
actor’s behaviors regarding the issue make this avoidance strategy far from an 
inactive or passive strategy. 
The third response in the Andrea and Kelly example is yielding, or avoiding 
the issue but not the person. This type of avoidance is an accommodating strategy 
because the actor maintains a relationship with the other party and gives up on the 
issue even if the underlying opinions are hidden. 
Yielding is common in close relationships. Partners in the best relationships 
may hold different views on many things (Roloff & Cloven, 1990). To maintain their 
relationships, people often withhold complaints (see Roloff & Ifert, 2000, for a 
review). Dating partners choose to hide about 40% of complaints about their partners 
(Roloff & Cloven, 1990). The abandoned issues tend to be considered as either trivial 
or unsolvable (Afifi & Guerrero, 2000; Cloven & Roloff, 1994; Roloff & Ifert, 2000). 
Yielding is a gesture of sacrificing personal needs to satisfy the other’s needs. 
Examples of the six types of avoidance strategies (withdrawal, passive 
competition, pretending, exit, outflanking, and yielding) can be found in earlier 
empirical studies. Oetzel et al.’s (2000) study of facework strategies Q-sorted 
participants’ responses to conflict situations. Except for passive competition, all the 
avoidance strategies in the proposed typology can be found in participants’ statements 
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in Oetzel et al.’s study (2000, p. 408): 
(1) To withdraw: “I politely ended the conversation because I didn’t want to 
talk with the other person,” and “I left the scene.” 
(2) To pretend: “I tried to fake that I wasn’t upset,” and “I ignored the conflict 
and behaved as if nothing happened.” 
(3) To exit: “I tried not to see the other person.”  
(4) To outflank: “I wanted to take our problems to our boss so that he/she 
could solve it,” and “I said bad things about the person behind his/her back.” 
 (5) To yield: “I backed down to solve the problem,” and “I accepted whatever 
the other person said.” 
An example of passive competition could be, “I stopped arguing with the 
other person but started doing what I wanted.” 
Significance of the Typology 
This typology provides a theoretical conceptualization of conflict avoidance. 
Researchers can use the typology to pinpoint the difference between any two 
avoidance strategies regarding the who, the what, and the duration. Moreover, some 
avoidance types can be compared with other conflict strategies proposed by the two-
dimensional conflict models (e.g., domination, accommodation, compromise, and 
integration; Pruitt & Rubin, 1987). For example, pretending and yielding may be 
closely related to accommodation because the three strategies are all characteristic of 
giving in. In contrast, passive competition and outflanking may not be, or may be 
negatively related to accommodation because the former two are aggressive strategies 
even if they are not directly confrontational. Passive competition may also be 
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positively related to domination because both are strategies to push one’s own way 
over the other party’s. Thus, this typology may help explain why avoidance and 
accommodation sometimes overlap (e.g., Oetzel et al., 2001) but at other times they 
do not (e.g., Cai & Fink, 2002). 
The differentiation of the six types of avoidance strategies provides the basis 
for understanding the goals that predict each type of avoidance strategy. Different 
avoidance strategies are likely to result from pursuing different goals. The next two 
sections review types of goals pursued in conflict, and then link goals to the types of 
avoidance. 
Goals in Conflict 
Goals, Strategies, and Conflict 
A goal is defined as a cognitively structured end that an actor seeks to achieve 
(Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989). Wilson (1990, 1995) proposed a cognitive rules 
model to describe how goals are activated in an interaction situation. The model 
suggests that knowledge about various types of goals and situational features are 
stored in a person’s network of schemata through socialization and problem-solving 
experience. In a communication situation, goals that match the situational features are 
activated, and such activation becomes salient in directing a person’s actions when it 
exceeds a threshold (Wilson, 1990, 1995).  
A communicative strategy results from the attempt to achieve relevant 
communication goals (Cai & Wilson, 2000; O’Keefe, 1988; Samp, 2000; Schrader & 
Dillard, 1998). A strategy refers to a sequence of planned behaviors to actualize goals 
(Putnam & Jones, 1982). The cognitive process that links goals to strategies are 
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proposed in Schrader and Dillard’s (1998) Goals-Planning-Action (GPA) model and 
Greene’s (1984, 1997) Action-Assembly Theory (AAT).  
Both the GPA model and the AAT specify how goals lead to strategies. 
Briefly, strategies can be considered as representations of how to achieve the actor’s 
goals. Schrader and Dillard (1998) maintained that a primary goal “motivates 
planning and action, [and] explains what the interaction is about: It is what the actor 
is trying to accomplish” (p. 278). Secondary goals are generated by the primary goal, 
and are defined as the goals to help the actor achieve the primary goals while 
attending to other features of the situation (Schrader & Dillard, 1998). A strategy to 
fulfill these goals is then cognitively formed and produced in output presentations 
(Greene, 1997). Greene’s (1984, 1997) AAT detailed the activation of goals, the 
assembly of goals, and the actualization of goals through strategies.  
AAT maintains that situational features generate certain goals. The activated 
goals then lead the actor to create plans to realize these goals. These plans, when 
acted out, become strategies (Greene, 1997). The causal link from goals to their 
relevant strategies proposed in the GPA model and the AAT have received empirical 
support (e.g., Booth-Butterfield, 1987; Cai & Wilson, 2000; Greene, 1984; Greene & 
Cappella, 1986; Greene & Lindsey, 1989; Samp, 2000; Schrader & Dillard, 1998). 
Therefore, by examining strategies that people use, preceding goals can be inferred; 
by understanding the goals activated in a communication situation, subsequent 
strategies can be predicted (Wilson, 2005). 
Past literature has used inductive methods to identify different type of goals 
activated in a conflict situation (e.g., Cody, Canary, & Smith, 1994; Dillard et al., 
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1989; Nicotera, 1993; Samp & Solomon, 1998a). For example, in Samp and 
Solomon’s (1998a) study, 174 participants were asked to write a recent problematic 
event, the subsequent conversations, and participants’ intentions in the recalled 
conversations. Samp and Solomon’s (1998a) pilot study generated 76 goal-relevant 
statements. Then 96 individuals from the same population as the pilot study sorted out 
seven themes (or seven types of goals) from the 76 statements. Two coders re-sorted 
the statements, confirmed the seven themes, and named each type of goal. This 
procedure served as an initial step to identify the universe of goals in conflict 
situations. In the present study, a deductive method is proposed: Theoretical 
dimensions of interpersonal conflict goals are developed, and then types of goals are 
generalized along these dimensions. Frey, Botan, and Kreps (2000) suggested that a 
deductive method complements and evaluates the observations in inductive research. 
The first step to develop a typology of goals in interpersonal conflict (conflict 
goals) is to identify relevant conceptual dimensions (Bailey, 1994). Because conflict 
goals are activated in conflict communication, relevant dimensions can be generated 
from an examination of conflict, and then these dimensions can be used to define a 
universe of conflict goals and generate different types of conflict goals. 
Characteristics of Conflict 
Because this dissertation examines the relationship between the actor’s goals 
and the strategic use of avoidance, interpersonal conflict is examined from the actor’s 
perspective. Interpersonal conflict has three essential characteristics for the actor: 
perceived interdependence with the other party, perceived incompatibility of one’s 
own goals with the other’s goals, and emotional arousal. These three characteristics 
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are found in various definitions of conflict (e.g., Pruitt & Rubin, 1987; Thomas, 1976; 
Thompson, 1998; Ting-Toomey, 1985; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001; Wilmot & 
Hocker, 2000). For example, Thomas (1976) described conflict as an individual’s 
frustrating experience regarding perceptions, emotions, and outcomes. Ting-Toomey 
(1985) viewed conflict as an emotion-laden dissonance between interdependent 
parties caused by incompatible goals, values, and ideas. 
The three characteristics of conflict (i.e., perceived interdependence, 
perceived goal incompatibility, and emotional arousal) have been empirically 
observed. First, incompatibility is demonstrated in Kozan and Ergin’s (1999) study of 
435 participants (55% managers and 45% non-managers) working in public and 
private firms. The most frequently recalled conflict episodes featured perceived 
interferences or incompatibilities on such issues as unfulfilled responsibilities, unfair 
promotions or salaries, and incompatible personalities (p. 257). Second, 
interdependence has been identified as one of the major factors leading to 
interpersonal conflict in various communication contexts in Roloff’s (1987) review of 
conflict literature. 
Third, emotional arousal in conflict has also been documented. The emotions 
frequently associated with conflict are negative emotions such as anger, anxiety, and 
fear. Anger and anxiety tend to occur in goal-incongruent situations (Allcorn, 1994; 
Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; Nabi, 1999, 2002; Planalp & Fitness, 1999), as does fear 
(Roloff & Cloven, 1990; Saarni, Mumme, & Campos, 1997; Sorenson, Morse, & 
Savage, 1999). When unsolvable family conflict endures, individuals tend to 
withdraw from conflict situations, internalize fear, and adopt self-protective behavior 
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(Crokenberg & Langrock, 2001; Saarni et al., 1997). In sum, three common features 
characterize the actor’s perception of conflict: perceived interdependence, perceived 
goal incompatibility, and emotional arousal. The dimensions that define the universe 
of conflict goals should reflect these features. 
A Typology of Conflict Goals 
In an interpersonal conflict, perceived incompatibility of one’s own goals and 
the goals of the other party may arouse competitive motivations, whereas perceived 
interdependence with the other may arouse cooperative motivations. In discussing 
cooperative versus competitive relations, Deutsch (1949, 1973) described cooperative 
relations in conflict as often associated with positive characteristics such as effective 
communication, friendliness, willingness of empowering the other, perceived 
agreement, and coordination of efforts. In contrast, competitive relations in conflict 
tend to be associated with impaired communication, obstruction, one’s own 
empowerment, perceived disagreement, and perceived inability to divide tasks 
(Deutsch, 1949, 1973). Deutsch (1973) argued that an actor’s perception of his or her 
gains in relation with the gains of the other with whom one is on conflict influences 
whether competition or cooperation occurs. If the actor’s gain incurs the other’s loss, 
the actor is likely to compete; if the actor’s gains or losses are in the same direction 
with the other’s gains or losses, the actor is likely to cooperate.  
Similarly, Putnam and Wilson (1982) described distributive conflict strategies 
as competing strategies that diminish the other party’s benefits to increase one’s own 
benefits, and integrative strategies as cooperative strategies that maximize both 
parties’ benefits. Putnam and Wilson (1982) also suggested that strategies that are 
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both competitive and cooperative are sometimes used (also see Johnson & Johnson, 
1989). These competitive and cooperative strategies may be motivated by competitive 
and cooperative goals, respectively. In long-term business relationships, two involved 
parties often compete for resources but coordinate to reach an agreement (Robinson, 
Hewitt, & Harriss, 1999). Therefore, competition and cooperation are two dimensions 
along which conflict goals may vary. 
 Incompatible goals in conflict can be instrumental or socioemotional (see 
Leung et al., 2002; and Nicotera, 1993, for similar ideas). Socioemotional goals are 
goals to achieve emotional needs through social relationships. When a relationship in 
a conflict situation is important, emotions such as love, hate, anger, and fear are likely 
to be involved (Crokenberg & Langrock, 2001; Leung et al., 2002). Instrumental 
goals are the desires to realize material gains (Leung et al., 2002; Weber, 1913/1981). 
One type of instrumental goal is to gain material resources such as money and goods 
(Foa & Foa, 1974), which is easily recognized and tangible. However, not all 
instrumental goals are reflected in direct competition for material benefit. People may 
use relational maintenance to achieve instrumental goals as well. 
 Past literature has typically defined relational goals as goals to maintain or 
improve a relationship (e.g., Afifi & Guerrero, 2000; Leung, 1988). However, an 
individual may keep a relationship because of affection or because of the potential to 
use this relationship for material benefit. If relational maintenance is viewed as a 
means instead of an end (i.e., a goal), and emotional affection or instrumental benefit 
is viewed as the end that relational maintenance serves, the reason that an individual 
maintains a relationship may then be clarified. 
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Socioemotional and instrumental goals can be distinguished by using Foa and 
Foa’s (1974) typology of social exchange. Foa and Foa classified six types of 
resources that people exchange in social interaction: love, status, information, service, 
goods, and money. A goal to exchange love or status may be considered as a 
socioemotional goal, because love refers to fondness, care, affection, or comfort, and 
status refers to esteem, respect, or prestige (Foa & Foa, 1974). A goal to achieve 
money and goods may be considered as an instrumental goal because these resources 
represent material benefit for exchange (Foa & Foa, 1974). Relational maintenance 
can be viewed as socioemotional if love or respect is the goal, and as instrumental if 
material benefit is the goal. Therefore, by adding emotional elements, a distinction is 
made clear about an individual’s underlying purpose to maintain a relationship. 
The competitive, cooperative, socioemotional, and instrumental dimensions 
proposed here capture the essential characteristics of social interaction in a conflict 
situation and hence are used to define the universe of conflict goals.5 A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2
typology of conflict goals is generated based on these dimensions (Table 2). Note that 
the four dimensions vary in degree, but are here treated dichotomously (see Bailey, 
1994). The dichotomy of “Yes” and “No” used here may mean either the presence or 
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a Row A and Column A contain null cells, marked by Xs. Specifically, Row A 
contains four cells in which neither instrumental nor socioemotional goals are present. 
The lack of incompatibility either materialistically or socioemotionally fails to create 
a conflict (Wilmot & Hocker, 2000). Similarly, the cells in Column A indicate no 
competition or cooperation, thus indicating a lack of motivation to pursue a conflict. 
Therefore, these cells do not imply conflict. They are marked by Xs and are 
eliminated from further discussion.
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Enmity, instrumental competitive, and rivalry goals. Column B within the 
table includes three cells high in competition but low in cooperation. In top-down 
order, the first cell, enmity goals, refers to the goals to compete for socioemotional 
superiority or to make the other feel inferior. Consider the following situation. A and 
B are adversaries and are in conflict. A is making a decision that could incur 
monetary gains for both A and B. There are two options. Option 1 says that if A 
agrees to accept $200, then B will get $50. Option 2 says that if A accepts $250, then 
B will get $240. Which option will A choose? If humans make decisions to maximize 
material gains, then Option 2 is preferred (e.g., Weber, 1913/1981). However, certain 
emotional and relational issues could lead to the preference of the Option 1. If A hates 
B, or A is a bitter rival to B, A may choose Option 1 just to deprive A of privileges as 
much as possible.  
A decision based on feelings, which is in the emotion domain (e.g., Damasio, 
1994), instead of maximizing instrumental gains is common. Research on the 
association between message framing and decision-making has found that how a 
message is framed influences the conclusions people reach because framing can 
influence people’s perceptions or feelings (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981, 1983). In a study to test 
physicians’ responses to positively versus negatively framed messages, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1984) found that people are more likely to adopt a positively than a 
negatively framed suggestion, despite that the outcomes of the two messages were 
exactly the same. In addition, people insist on their decisions even after they knew the 
messages were identical, and in some occasions, insisted on adopting the positively 
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framed message when they knew that the negatively framed message would bring 
more material benefit (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Instrumentality is not 
necessarily the determining force. Individuals often choose the option that makes 
them feel better even they know that the other option brings more instrumental gains 
(Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). 
 The cell below enmity goals represents instrumental competitive goals, which 
score high on the competitive and the instrumental dimensions and low on the 
socioemotional and the cooperative dimensions. These goals represent the desire to 
maximize an individual’s own benefit through a competitive strategy and involve 
little or no socioemotional investment. The low level of socioemotional involvement 
implies that the relationship may be formal, structural, and regulated (Marwell & 
Hage, 1970). One example of instrumental competitive goals is reflected in the 
process of bargaining with a car dealer. The process may not involve relational or 
emotional needs. The core goal may be to get the best product and the best price. 
Some influence goals in a compliance-gaining situation (e.g., Cai & Wilson, 2000; 
Dillard et al., 1989; Schrader & Dillard, 1998) may be examples of instrumental 
competitive goals because the focus is placed on gaining the other person’s 
compliance on the task. 
The last cell in Column B represents goals to compete for both socioemotional 
and materialistic need, and is labeled rivalry goals. These goals indicate that the actor 
hopes to win over his or her rival both materially and socioemotionally. Consider a 
customer who demands a refund for a defective product but meets a store 
representative who projects angry attitude. The customer may raise his or her voice 
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and argue with the representative to obtain both a new product and respect. 
Support, instrumental cooperative, and cooperative goals. As compared with 
the above three types of goals that are all competitive, the three cells in Column C are 
highly cooperative and low competitive. Support goals are high on the cooperative 
and socioemotional dimensions but low on the instrumental dimension. Support goals 
are defined as goals that convey affection or emotional support to fulfill the other 
party’s needs. As indicated earlier, support goals may or may not overlap with 
relational goals (defined as goals with the intention to maintain or protect 
relationships, see, e.g., Afifi & Guerrero, 2000; Cai & Wilson, 2000; Clark & Delia, 
1979; Knobloch & Carpenter-Theune, 2004; Samp, 2000; Samp & Solomon, 1998a, 
1998b, 2005; Schrader & Dillard, 1998; Wilson, 1990; Wilson & Putnam, 1990). 
Support goals reflect the desire to support or help the other for the sake of affection 
needs, whereas relational goals reflect the need to maintain a relationship, which 
could be either affection-oriented or utility-oriented (e.g., maintaining a good 
relationship for future instrumental gains). When relationship maintenance originates 
from emotional support such as care and affection, then a relational goal and a 
support goal may overlap. When relationship maintenance originates from 
instrumental gains, then a relational goal may overlap with the next type of goal, an 
instrumental cooperative goal. 
Instrumental cooperative goals represent high cooperative goals for 
instrumental but not for socioemotional purposes. If a person uses cooperation not 
because of care or affection, but to gain material resources, his or her goals are 
instrumental cooperative goals. The last cell in Column C represents cooperative 
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goals, the goals to cooperate and to achieve high instrumental and positive 
socioemotional outcomes. These goals are desirable because they could precede 
integrative strategies to maximize both parties’ gains and to exchange positive 
socioemotional resources. Cai, Wilson, and Drake (2000) argued that there may exist 
an optimal solution for a negotiation situation, but negotiators do not necessarily see 
this solution. If negotiators have cooperative goals, they may find solutions that 
benefit both parties.  
Certain conditions facilitate the activation of cooperative goals. Ben-Yoav and 
Pruitt (1984) found that the expectation of future cooperation encourages an actor to 
use integrative strategies to satisfy both parties’ needs and preserve a positive 
relationship. Leung et al. (2002) also argued that high needs for both harmony and 
instrumentality predict integrative strategies.  
Intimate reliance, instrumental reliance, and reliance goals. Column D 
contains three types of goals that reflect both competition and cooperation. Intimate 
reliance goals are high in competitive, cooperative, and socioemotional goals but low 
in instrumental goals. These goals are likely to exist in close relationships. Consider a 
couple who exchange their ideas about love. The couple may have different ideas 
about expressing affection. In an argument, they may compete with the other about 
their ideas of expressing love, yet their purpose is also cooperative—to enhance their 
relationship. The outcome may not involve instrumental benefit but only affection 
needs.  
Instrumental reliance goals are competitive and cooperative goals in 
materialistic but not in socioemotional resources. Instrumental reliance goals are 
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found in structured colleagial relationships. For example, in working on a group 
project, group members have to cooperate to have the project done, and their 
cooperation may involve competitive goals to maximize personal contribution. If 
these group members do not have a close relationship, then their competition and 
cooperation is more likely to be instrumental rather than socioemotional. 
Negotiation goals in some business relationships represent instrumental 
reliance goals (see Wilson & Putnam, 1990, for a summary of the combined 
competitive and cooperative strategies between negotiators). Negotiators understand 
that they need to compete for their own interests, but their interests can only be 
realized through cooperation. If a long-term relationship is not a goal, then such 
competition and cooperation may involve more of a instrumental goal than a 
socioemotional goal.  
Wilson and Putnam (1990) discussed three levels of goals: global, regional, 
and local. These three levels of goals may be related to the three elements of 
instrumental reliance goals (i.e., competitive goals, cooperative goals, instrumental 
goals). Wilson and Putnam (1990) defined global goals as the negotiators’ plans of 
what to achieve overall (termed final goals in Donohue, 1990, and consummate goals 
in Benoit, 1990), the regional goals as the negotiators’ plans of what to achieve in 
each encounter (intermediate goals in Donohue, 1990; and contributory goals in 
Benoit, 1990), and the local goals as the negotiators’ plans of verbal tactics within 
each encounter. In each negotiation encounter, negotiators’ local goals may be 
cooperative goals because these goals help regulate the flow of conversation. 
Negotiators’ regional goals may be competitive goals because gaining ground in each 
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phase is important for the eventual outcome of the negotiation. Negotiators’ global 
goals may be instrumental if the main purpose of the negotiation is material benefit. 
Therefore, instrumental reliance goals may be reflected in different levels of goals 
involved in a negotiation process.  
The last cell in Column D represents reliance goals, which are high on all four 
dimensions. These goals have positive competitive, cooperative, instrumental, and 
socioemotional elements. A negotiation situation between two business partners with 
a long-term relationship could activate these goals. Both parties compete for material 
gains, but need to cooperate to realize them; although the goals are mainly 
instrumental, the business partners may want to develop a bond to facilitate future 
cooperation (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). Consider the following situation for another 
example of reliance goals: Colleagues A and B are good friends. They are working on 
a project and the sizes of their contributions to the project will decide who will be 
promoted. In this situation, all four elements are relevant. If one actor, say A, values 
both career opportunity and the relationship with B, reliance goals may be activated.   
Significance of the Typology 
The typology of conflict goals contributes to the cognitive approach to 
conflict communication for at least three reasons. First, previous research has 
generalized a number of goal types based on inductive methods (see Cody et al., 
1994; Dillard et al., 1989; Nicotera, 1993; Samp & Solomon, 1998a). By exploring 
goals through participants’ responses in a conflict situation, Nicotera (1993) 
generalized three types of goals: self-oriented goals, other-oriented goals, and 
emotional-relational goals. Similarly, Samp and Solomon (1998a, 1998b) found seven 
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types of goals based on participants’ responses (i.e., relational maintenance, 
acceptance of fault, managing self-positive face, avoiding addressing the event, 
managing the conversation, managing emotion, and restoration of self-negative face). 
The proposed typology uses a complementary deductive method: The theoretical 
dimensions about interpersonal conflict are identified, and a typology of interpersonal 
conflict goals is developed. The combination of inductive and deductive methods can 
provide a comprehensive understanding of interpersonal conflict goals. The goals 
generated through an inductive method (e.g., Nicotera, 1993; Samp & Solomon, 
1998a, 1998b) may be analyzed along the four dimensions proposed in this study. For 
example, among Samp and Solomon’s seven types of goals, relational maintenance, 
managing the conversation, acceptance of fault, and managing emotion may be 
cooperative goals because the effort is to maintain a smooth interaction; avoiding 
addressing the issue could be cooperative if communication is maintained or 
socioemotionally competitive if both the issue and communication are avoided 
(threatening to exit). Self-face management may be socioemotional and competitive if 
an individual emphasize self-face over other-face. 
Second, the proposed typology allows a systematic investigation of 
interpersonal conflict goals. Deductively generating a typology provides an answer to 
the sampling problem that Fink et al. (2006) discussed. Fink et al. (2006) specified a 
sampling issue about the concept universe. For example, how can results from one 
conflict situation be generalized to other conflict situations? Unless the chosen 
situation is representative, such a claim cannot be made. Fink et al. (2006) suggested 
that researchers should specify the universe of that concept and use a representation 
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of the concept in a study. Doing so allows the researchers to use this representation to 
generalize their results to other forms of that concept. In the current typology, 
relevant dimensions to conflict are created to build a universe of conflict goals. 
Research findings of the conflict goals generated in this universe can be useful to 
generate an understanding of conflict goals in other situations.  
Third, the proposed typology embraces emotion, an important element not 
sufficiently studied in past conflict research. A positive emotional need or a lack of it 
may help clarify people’s cooperative behaviors. Inclusion of socioemotional goals 
allows researchers to recognize underlying purposes of relational maintenance. 
Relational maintenance without affection needs may be a means to achieve an 
instrumental cooperative goal, whereas relational maintenance with affection needs 
may be a means to achieve a support goal. Conflict strategies should not be solely 
determined by instrumental goals (e.g., Leung et al., 2002); rather, conflict strategies 
may reflect a combined effect of instrumental and socioemotional considerations. 
A Cognitive Model of Conflict Avoidance 
The model proposed here incorporates previous researchers’ notion that in 
determining the conflict strategy to use, multiple goals can be present. (e.g., 
compliance-gaining strategies in Cody et al., 1994; conflict strategies in Ohbuchi, 
Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999). Ohbuchi and colleagues (e.g., Fukushima & Ohbuchi, 
1996; Ohbuchi et al., 1999; Ohbuchi & Tedeschi, 1997) used samples from Japan and 
the United States to study the links between conflict goals and conflict strategies and 
found that most participants from both cultures considered multiple goals when 
deciding how to handle conflict.  
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Further, the model proposes that multiple goals are not necessarily carried out 
via multiple strategies. Instead, multiple goals may be addressed through a single 
strategy (Lim & Bowers, 1991). This point was elaborated in Lim and Bowers’s 
(1991) research. A linguistic device may address multiple face needs (Lim & Bower, 
1991). For example, asking for a dance in a question format, “Would you dance with 
me?” reflects the actor’s intention to protect the other’s positive face and negative 
face. Specifically, the request for a dance shows that the other is socially included 
(positive face) and that the other has autonomy to decide whether to accept the 
request (negative face). Similarly, one conflict strategy could reflect multiple conflict 
goals. Ohbuchi et al. (1999) found that a conciliation strategy “to consolidate one’s 
own and the other’s” needs (p. 58) reflected relational goals and economic goals 
simultaneously.  
The current model also proposes that a particular strategy could result from 
different goals or a combination of goals. For example, a subordinate could use 
pretending in an argument with his or her boss to maintain their friendship (a support 
goal) or to gain a promotion (an instrumental cooperative goal); a husband could use 
passive competition to agitate his wife (an enmity goal) or to actualize his autonomy 
(an instrumental competitive goal). Therefore, different goals or different 
combinations of goals may be linked to the same strategy. Leung et al. (2002) also 
argued that one particular conflict management behavior may result from different 
goals. One of their exemplary conflict behaviors is giving or protecting face, which 
could result from the motivation to achieve both instrumentality and harmony, or 
from the motivation to achieve instrumentality alone (Leung et al., p. 213).  
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In Figure 1, relevant conflict goals or combinations of conflict goals are 
linked to different types of avoidance strategies. The rationale of the links is 
presented in the 12 hypotheses in next section. Because the typology of conflict goals 
is developed to reflect all relevant goals in conflict and not specifically avoidance 
strategies, some goals may not predict some avoidance strategies. In the sections that 
follow, the hypothesized relationships between conflict goals and avoidance strategies 
are presented.  
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Figure 1. A cognitive model of conflict goals and avoidance strategies. 
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To withdraw is a strategy to evade both the person and the issue in the 
immediate situation. Withdrawal could be an effort to stop engaging in undesirable 
social interaction (Grice, 1975; Roloff & Ifert, 2000). Although withdrawal reflects 
the actor’s dissatisfaction towards the other party, temporarily giving up an argument 
signals cooperation: Recall the earlier example of Tom and his wife, in which one of 
Tom’s avoidance strategies is to leave the scene. The implied message in withdrawal 
may be that “I don’t want to argue with you right now. Let’s calm down.” Therefore, 
cooperative rather than competitive goals may predict withdrawal. Roloff and Cloven 
(1990) found that a chilling effect, a phenomenon in which an actor refrains from 
revealing dissatisfaction with the other party in a close relationship, tends to occur 
when the actor perceives that the other party has, compared with oneself, more power 
or more alternative choices. Therefore, the actor’s withdrawal is a signal of 
cooperation.  
Depending on the relationship between the two parties, cooperation may come 
from an instrumental or a socioemotional source. If cooperation results from care 
about and affection for the other, support goals are primary. In contrast, if cooperation 
results from the utility of the other, instrumental cooperative goals are primary. A 
combination of support and instrumental cooperative goals may also predict 
withdrawal. The situation in which the interactants are competitors but also good 
friends, for example, represents such combination.  
H1a: The importance of support goals positively predicts the likelihood of 
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withdrawal, ceteris paribus.  
H1b:  The importance of instrumental cooperative goals positively predicts the 
likelihood of withdrawal, ceteris paribus. 
H1c:  The importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood 
of withdrawal, ceteris paribus. 
To Passively Compete 
Passive competition is a conflict strategy to avoid the person but not the issue. 
Passive competition can be considered as a nonverbal version of the domination 
strategy (i.e., employing verbal tactics to push one’s own goals and ignoring the 
other’s needs; see Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001). Passive competition reflects high 
importance of competitive goals and low importance of cooperative goals placed on 
the issue because the actor acts out his or her volition on the issue. The level of 
cooperation is even lower in passive competition than in domination. Although 
domination is a competitive strategy, the use of argument at least provides the other 
with the actor’s reasoning and suggests that the actor is making an effort to engage in 
the interaction. Passive competition suggests that the actor no longer wishes to be 
involved in the interaction process.  
Further, passive competition is a bold face-threatening act, as it reflects the 
actor’s goal to maintain his or her autonomy and ignores the other’s autonomy. Such 
an act, according to Brown and Levinson (1987), requires that the actor use strategic 
linguistic devices such as metaphor, rhetorical questions, or understatement to 
minimize intrusion and to show respect to the other’s autonomy. Passive competition 
violates the other party’s face and uses no linguistic devices to protect the other’s 
45
face. Because face is closely related to an individual’s claimed social image and 
social esteem (Brown & Levinson, 1987), passive competition is also a strategy 
reflecting competitive rather than cooperative goals along the socioemotional 
dimension. Therefore, passive competition reflects high importance of socioemotional 
competition and low importance of socioemotional cooperation. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the combined effect of high importance of rivalry goals 
and low importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the 
likelihood of passive competition. 
To Pretend 
Avoidance of the issue but not the person in a conflict situation indicates that 
the actor’s primary goal is to cooperate with the other. Pretending is a gesture of 
giving up on the issue in the immediate situation, and thus, implies more cooperation 
than competition. Pretending indicates the actor’s effort to maintain a positive 
relationship with the other party. These characteristics together reflect the low 
importance placed on enmity and instrumental competitive goals and the high 
importance placed on cooperative goals. However, whether such cooperation has a 
positive socioemotional basis such as affection or an instrumental cooperative basis 
such as future utility of the other is unknown.  
H3a: The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high 
importance of support goals positively predicts the likelihood of 
pretending, ceteris paribus. 
H3b:  The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high 
importance of instrumental cooperative goals positively predicts the 
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likelihood of pretending, ceteris paribus. 
H3c:  The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high 
importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood of 
pretending, ceteris paribus. 
To Exit 
To exit means that the actor gives up the issue and the relationship with the 
other for the long run. No matter how trivial or unsolvable the issue is (e.g., Afifi & 
Guerrero, 2000), the actor no longer maintains competitive or cooperative goals. The 
actor no longer maintains socioemotional or instrumental goals either, because exit 
means the end of a relationship. Based on these characteristics, exit resembles 
avoidance resulting from low concerns for both production and people (see Blake & 
Mouton’s managerial grid, 1964). In other words, as long as the actor has any 
intention of competing or cooperating in emotion or materials, he or she will not exit.  
H4: The importance of reliance goals negatively predicts the likelihood of 
exit, ceteris paribus. 
To Outflank 
To outflank is an avoidance strategy carried out in the long term and directed 
toward the issue rather than the person. The actor has a clear intention to compete on 
the issue. Trying to achieve his or her goals through ways other than confrontation 
reflects two additional intentions. First, the actor does not want to engage in an 
argument with the other, which reflects the actor’s intention not to damage the 
relationship. Second, such relationship maintenance is likely to be instrumental rather 
than socioemotional, because going behind the other’s back is a behavioral indicator 
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of neglect or lack of affection (Healey & Bell, 1990; Rusbult, 1987). Therefore, 
outflanking is a strategy reflecting high importance of instrumental cooperation and 
competition and low importance of support goals.  
H5: The combined effect of low importance of support goals and high 
importance of instrumental reliance goals positively predicts the 
likelihood of outflanking, ceteris paribus. 
To Yield 
Yielding is avoiding an issue and maintaining interactions with the other in 
the long term. This type of avoidance signals surrender on the issue in exchange for 
continuing the relationship with the other. Consequently, the actor aims at 
cooperation instead of competition. The cooperation implied in yielding indicates that 
the actor does not compete instrumentally or socioemotionally. Again, however, such 
yielding could be relation-oriented or utility-oriented. If an individual gives in to 
satisfy the other person’s needs, such yielding is similar to the term loyalty, referring 
to suppressing arguments and waiting for relational improvement (defined first by 
Hirschman, 1970; adapted later by Healey & Bell, 1990, and Rusbult, 1987). If such 
yielding is to gain future benefits from the other, then the cooperation is instrumental. 
The only difference between pretending and yielding is that pretending is a short-term 
avoidance strategy whereas yielding is a long-term avoidance strategy.  
H6a: The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high 
importance of support goals positively predicts the likelihood of 
yielding, ceteris paribus. 
H6b:  The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high 
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importance of instrumental cooperative goals positively predicts the 
likelihood of yielding, ceteris paribus. 
H6c:  The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high 
importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood of 





This chapter describes proposed stimulus messages and instruments, the pilot 
studies that tested these proposed materials, and the methods of the formal study. 
Four pilot studies were conducted to assess the effectiveness of the inductions and the 
measurements used in the final study. The formal study tested the proposed model 
and the hypotheses. The pilot studies and the formal study were approved by the 
University of Maryland Institutional Review Board on December 18, 2006, and data 
were collected between January and April, 2006. 
Design, Stimulus Messages, and Instruments Prior to Pilot Tests 
Overall Design 
An experimental design was used to test the hypotheses. Overall, the 
importance of a goal or a combination of goals was manipulated, and the likelihoods 
of avoidance strategies were measured. Goal inductions consisted of 12 variations to 
correspond to the 12 hypotheses; each goal induction was then placed in one of two 
hypothetical scenarios. The first scenario described an interpersonal conflict in a 
group project in school, and the second described a similar scenario at work.  
The reason for using two hypothetical conflict scenarios instead of one as the 
basis for goal variations was to exclude possible effects of the features intrinsic to any 
single scenario. Jackson (1992) maintained that a stimulus message used in an 
experimental design bears its own features, which may cause certain effects in the 
dependent variable. To enhance internal validity of the experiment, multiple versions 
of a treatment can be used. Further, the use of multiple versions of a message also 
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enhances the experiment’s external validity because the results are more 
generalizeable than those of a single treatment.  
This experiment used two versions of an interpersonal conflict scenario. With 
12 variations of goal inductions, a total of 24 experimental conditions were created. 
The complete description of the experimental conditions will be presented in the 
method section for the formal study. Table 3 depicts the high importance (marked 
with the “+” sign) and low importance (marked with the “-” sign) of goal manipulated 
in each experimental condition.  
Note that five goals (i.e., rivalry goals, cooperative goals, intimate reliance 
goals, instrumental reliance goals, and reliance goals) are composite goals consisting 
two or more of the other four goals (i.e., enmity goals, instrumental competitive 
goals, support goals, and instrumental cooperative goals). The manipulations of the 
importance of the five composite goals were represented by the manipulations of each 
individual component goal comprising them. For example, rivalry goals have two 
components, enmity goals and instrumental competitive goals. To induce high 
importance of rivalry goals, the importance of enmity goals and the importance of 
instrumental competitive goals were both manipulated to be high. The high 
importance of rivalry goals was thus represented by the presence of high importance 
of both enmity goals and instrumental competitive goals. Refer to Table 2 for the 
components of other composite goals. 
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Table 3
Importance of Goals Induced in the 12 Experimental Conditions to Test Hypotheses
Experimental
Condition
Abbreviated Hypotheses A B C D
Condition 1 H1a: The importance of support goals positively predicts the likelihood of withdrawal. +
Condition 2 H1b: The importance of instrumental cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood of withdrawal. +
Condition 3 H1c: The importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood of withdrawal. + +
Condition 4 H2: The combined effect of high importance of rivalry goals and low importance of cooperative goals
positively predicts the likelihood of passive competition.
+ + - -
Condition 5 H3a: The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high importance of support goals
positively predicts the likelihood of pretending.
- - +
Condition 6 H3b: The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high importance of instrumental
cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood of pretending.
- - +
Condition 7 H3c: The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high importance of cooperative goals
positively predicts the likelihood of pretending.
- - + +
Condition 8 H4: The importance of reliance goals negatively predicts the likelihood of exit. - - - -
Condition 9 H5: The combined effect of low importance of support goals and high importance of instrumental reliance
goals positively predicts the likelihood of outflanking.
+ - +
Condition 10 H6a: The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high importance of support goals
positively predicts the likelihood of yielding.
- - +
Condition 11 H6b: The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high importance of instrumental
cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood of yielding.
- - +
Condition 12 H6c: The combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high importance of cooperative goals
positively predicts the likelihood of yielding.
- - + +
Note 1. A = importance of enmity goals, B = importance of instrumental competitive goals, C = importance of support goals, D =
importance of instrumental cooperation goals.
Note 2. High importance of a goal is represented by a “+” and low importance of a goal is represented by a “-.”
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Hypothetical Interpersonal Conflict Scenarios 
 The two versions of a hypothetical interpersonal conflict scenario that served 
to induce different goals in this study need to meet several criteria. First, the scenarios 
used should be familiar to the participants. Second, avoidance should be a plausible 
strategy to deal with the conflict in the situation. Third, because three of the 
avoidance strategies proposed in the study involve a long-term relationship (i.e., to 
exit, to outflank, and to yield), the hypothetical other party should have the possibility 
of future interaction with the participant; scenarios that allow for one-time interaction 
cannot be used. Fourth, outflanking requires long-term involvement of a third party to 
solve a problem, so the scenarios should allow such a possibility. Finally, the 
scenarios employed should be able to involve competitive, cooperative, 
socioemotional, and instrumental goal elements, as required by the inductions of 
goals proposed in this study. 
 With these criteria, a secondary data analysis was performed on a study 
conducted earlier on conflict and anger (Cai, Fink, & Xie, 2005) to generate the two 
scenarios. In their study, Cai et al. (2005) enrolled 122 students from a large eastern 
university and asked participants to describe an actual situation in which they had 
conflict with another party. Participants were instructed to describe who the other 
party was, what occurred, and how they felt, thought, and behaved. These data 
produced five major types of conflict episodes: (a) 51 episodes with friends, best 
friends, boyfriends, or girlfriends (41.8%), (b) 30 episodes with roommates (24.6%), 
(c) 15 episodes with family members (12.3%), (d) 8 episodes with people at work 
such as colleagues or supervisors (6.6%), and (e) 6 episodes with classmates (4.9%). 
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About 9.8% of episodes were one-time interactions (e.g., conflict with service people) 
or intrapersonal conflict (e.g., being anger at having computer problems).  
 In Cai et al. (2005), roommates, friends, and family members were the most 
frequent interactants with whom conflict occurred. However, close relationships tend 
to involve more socioemotional than instrumental goals (Leung, 1988; Leung et al., 
2002). This limitation could make induction of instrumental goals appear to be 
unrealistic. Therefore, conflict in close relationships was not used for the hypothetical 
scenarios. 
 Conflict with a team member best fits the study’s criteria. Teamwork is not 
unusual for college students. In their conflict resolution guide for students, Burgess 
(2005) stated that group projects are assigned to students in grade school through 
graduate school; working in a group is important because ability in teamwork is 
frequently required in jobs. An instructor is an authoritative third party to whom 
students could resort if they decide to avoid confrontation with a teammate. 
Classmates may have a long-term relationship because they are usually in the same 
class for at least a semester. The four elements of conflict goals (competitive, 
cooperative, socioemotional, and instrumental) are relevant to classmate 
relationships, because (a) a common project involves both parties’ interests, which 
have to be achieved through cooperation, and the process of discussion could involve 
competition, and (b) classmates have at least a certain degree of socioemotional 
connection because they have to maintain interaction to have a project done. 
Therefore, the first hypothetical scenario used an interpersonal conflict with a 
classmate in a group project in school. 
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The second scenario used conflict with a colleague in a group project at a 
workplace. Employment is not unusual for American college students. An annual 
national survey that the Higher Education Research Institute at the University of 
California at Los Angeles conducted among incoming freshmen found that about 
47.2% freshman expected to work while attending college (Farrell, 2005). At a 
workplace, a supervisor functions like a professor at school when an employee seeks 
a third party to handle conflict. In doing a project, team members may have 
cooperative goals such as to produce high-quality teamwork or competitive goals 
such as to maximize personal performance to get a promotion, or both. Just like 
between classmates, a certain degree of involvement has to be maintained between 
colleagues while they are doing a project; such involvement can be socioemotional 
(e.g., friendly) or instrumental (e.g., interest-based). Therefore, the second 
hypothetical scenario used an interpersonal conflict with a colleague in a group 
project at a workplace.  
 Naming the hypothetical other party. In both hypothetical scenarios, a gender 
neutral name was used for the name of the other party. Using a name instead of 
“Person X” should make the scenario more realistic and easier for participants to 
relate to. Using a gender neutral name should also make participates freely relate the 
goals to the strategies, unconstrained by the perceived gender of the hypothetical 
other. A masculine or a feminine name may make the results tainted by cognitive 
processes associated specifically with interaction with one gender. El-Sheikh, 
Buckhalt, and Reiter (2000) found that people perceive different degrees of emotional 
arousal in the hypothetical other based on gender: Men perceive a male fictional 
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character to be more emotionally aroused than women perceive a female counterpart 
to be in a hypothetical situation. Because gender differences are not a focus in this 
study, a gender neutral name is used. 
 To decide the gender neutral for the hypothetical other party, two online 
resources that collect name data from the Social Security Administration were used 
(Baby Names Boy Girl, 2005; The Name Machine, 2005). Because participants in 
this study consisted of college students, the data about the popularity of gender 
neutral names in the 1980s to the 1990s were examined. The top two gender neutral 
names were Jordan and Casey. Both name engines reported that these two names 
were top choices when people were looking for a gender neutral name for their 
babies. Nonetheless, the Name Machine (2005) indicated that Casey was used almost 
equally by babies of both genders in the 1980s (35,931 boys and 27,900 girls), and 
Jordan was used more for boys (57,084) than for girls (13,772). Therefore, Casey was 
chosen for this study. 
 Exemplary descriptions of the hypothetical conflict scenarios. For the conflict 
situation with a classmate, the scenario reads as follows:  
Casey is your classmate. You volunteer to do a project together. The grade of 
the project is important because it contributes 20% to your course grade. Both 
of you really want to do well in this project. However, you disagree on the 
blueprint of the project. 
 For the conflict situation with a colleague, the scenario reads:  
Casey is your colleague at work. You volunteer to do a project together. The 
outcome of the project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate 
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your performance. Both of you really want to do well in this project. 
However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. 
 Following the hypothetical conflict scenario, different goals were induced in 
accordance with the hypotheses. The 12 goal inductions are listed in Table 4.  
 Note that the sentence, “In a meeting, the two of you have argued vehemently, 
but soon you realize that further argument may harm your relationship” was used for 
the hypotheses about three situational avoidance strategies: to withdraw, to passively 
compete, and to pretend. The sentence, “After a meeting in which you two argued 
vehemently,” was used for the hypotheses about three long-term avoidance strategies 
(to exit, to outflank, and to yield).  
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Table 4 
Twelve Goal Inductions Prior to Pilot Studies 
Condition (Hypothesis):  
 
Importance of Goals 
 
Actual Sentences Used in the Induction 
Condition 1 (H1a): To induce 
high importance of a support 
goal in an immediate conflict 
situation.  
 
In a meeting, you two have argued vehemently, but 
soon you realize that further argument may harm your 
relationship. You cherish your friendship because you 
really care about how Casey feels. What will you do? 
Condition 2 (H1b): To induce 
high importance of an 
instrumental cooperative goal 
in an immediate conflict 
situation. 
 
In a meeting, you two have argued vehemently, but 
soon you realize that further argument may harm your 
relationship. You need to maintain a good relationship 
with Casey because you are assigned to another group 
project with Casey. What will you do? 
 
Condition 3 (H1c): To induce 
high importance of a 
cooperative goal in an 
immediate conflict situation. 
 
In a meeting, you two have argued vehemently, but 
soon you realize that further argument may harm your 
relationship. You cherish your friendship because you 
really care about how Casey feels. Besides, you are 
assigned to another group project with Casey. What 
will you do? 
 
Condition 4 (H2): To induce 
high importance of a rivalry 
goal and low importance of a 
cooperative goal in an 
immediate conflict situation. 
 
In a meeting, you two have argued vehemently, and 
soon you realize that further argument may harm your 
relationship. But you don’t really care about how 
Casey feels, and you want to insist on your plan for 
the project. Having a good relationship or working 
with Casey in another project is the last thing you 
want. What will you do? 
 
Condition 5 (H3a): To induce 
low importance of a rivalry 
goal and high importance of a 
support goal in an immediate 
conflict situation. 
In a meeting, you two have argued vehemently, and 
soon you realize that further argument may harm your 
relationship. You cherish your friendship because you 
really care about how Casey feels. You don’t want 
Casey to feel hurt, and as compared with your 
relationship with Casey, insisting on your plan for this 
project is not that important. What will you do? 
 
Condition 6 (H3b): To induce 
low importance of a rivalry 
goal and high importance of an 
instrumental cooperative goal 
in an immediate conflict 
situation. 
In a meeting, you two have argued vehemently, and 
soon you realize that further argument may harm your 
relationship. You need to maintain a good relationship 
with Casey because you are assigned to another group 
project with Casey. You don’t want Casey to feel 
hurt, and as compared with your relationship with 
Casey, insisting on your plan for this project is not 
that important. What will you do? 
58
Table 4 (Cont’d) 
Twelve Goal Inductions Prior to Pilot Studies 
Condition (Hypothesis): 
Importance of Goals To Be 
Induced 
 
Actual Sentences Used in the Induction 
Condition 7 (H3c): To 
induce low importance of a 
rivalry goal and high 
importance of a cooperative 
goal in an immediate conflict 
situation. 
In a meeting, you two have argued vehemently, and soon you 
realize that further argument may harm your relationship. You 
cherish your friendship because you really care about how 
Casey feels. Besides, you are assigned to another group 
project with Casey. You don’t want Casey to feel hurt, and as 
compared with your relationship with Casey, insisting on your 
plan for this project is not that important. What will you do? 
 
Condition 8 (H4): To induce 
low importance of a reliance 
goal in long term. 
After a meeting in which you two have argued vehemently, 
you realize that insisting on your plan for the project is not 
that important. In fact, you don’t want to work with Casey any 
more. You even don’t care to maintain a relationship with 
Casey. What will you do? 
 
Condition 9 (H5): To induce 
low importance of a support 
goal and high importance of 
an instrumental reliance goal 
in long term. 
After a meeting in which you two have argued vehemently, 
you decide that you want to insist on your plan for the project. 
You also realize that you need to maintain a good relationship 
with Casey because you are assigned to another group project. 
However, you know that you don’t really care about how 
Casey feels at all. What will you do? 
 
Condition 10 (H6a): To 
induce low importance of a 
rivalry goal and high 
importance of a support goal 
in long term. 
After a meeting in which you two have argued vehemently, 
you decide that you cherish your friendship because you really 
care about how Casey feels. You don’t want Casey to feel 
hurt, and compared with your relationship with Casey, 
insisting on your plan for this project is not that important. 
What will you do? 
 
Condition 11 (H6b): To 
induce low importance of a 
rivalry goal and high 
importance of an 
instrumental cooperative 
goal in long term. 
After a meeting in which you two have argued vehemently, 
you decide to maintain a good relationship with Casey because 
you are assigned to another group project with Casey. You 
don’t want Casey to feel hurt, and compared with your 
relationship with Casey, insisting on your plan for this project 
is not that important. What will you do? 
 
Condition 12 (H6c): To 
induce low importance of a 
rivalry goal and high 
importance of a cooperative 
goal in long term. 
After a meeting in which you two have argued vehemently, 
you decide that you cherish your friendship because you really 
care about how Casey feels. Besides, you are assigned to 
another group project with Casey. You don’t want Casey to 
feel hurt, and compared with your relationship with Casey, 
insisting on your plan for this project is not that important. 
What will you do? 
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Instruments 
 Manipulation checks. As indicated in Tables 2 and 3, five of the original nine 
types of goals (i.e., competitive goals, cooperative goals, instrumental reliance goals, 
intimate reliance goals, and reliance goals) are composite goals comprising the other 
four types of goals (i.e., enmity goals, instrumental competitive goals, support goals, 
and instrumental cooperative goals). Therefore, in the experimental conditions, only 
the latter four types of goals were manipulated, and items measuring these four types 
of goals were developed. Manipulation checks for the other five types of goals can be 
then inferred from the manipulation checks for the four baseline goals.  
 A total of 12 items were developed to test the perceived importance of the four 
baseline goals, with three items testing each type (see Appendix A). An example item 
is, “I need to make Casey submit to my ideas.” A 0 to 100 response scale was used 
where 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree. The items were tested and 
revised with outcome of Pilot Studies 1 and 2. 
 Note that the manipulation check items have two functions. First, they assess 
the success of the experimental manipulations. Second, they are indicators of the 
importance of the four goals. 
 Likelihood of avoidance strategies. Likelihood of the six types of avoidance 
strategies was measured by 24 items developed for this study or adapted from Oetzel 
et al.’s (2000) and Ohbuchi et al.’s (1999) studies. A 0 to 100 probability scale was 
used where 0 = not likely at all and 100 = definitely. An exemplary item is, “I will 
stop arguing and leave the scene.” The complete list of items is included in Appendix 
B. The items were tested and revised based on outcomes of Pilot Studies 1 and 2. 
60
Likelihood of other conflict strategies. Besides likelihoods of avoidance 
strategies, this study also measured likelihood of other conflict strategies brought up 
in the conflict management literature. In particular, four conflict strategies proposed 
in the two-dimensional conflict models—integration, compromise, domination, and 
accommodation—were also measured in the study (see, e.g., Pruitt & Carnevale, 
1993; Pruitt & Rubin, 1987). Items for these four strategies were adapted from 
Rahim’s (1983) Organizational Conflict Inventory II (ROCI-II). A 0 to 100 
probability scale was used where 0 = not likely at all and 100% = definitely. An 
exemplary item is, “I will bargain with this person to get moderate profits.” The 
complete list of items is included in Appendix C. 
 Summary. This section has introduced the overall experimental design and the 
operationalizations of the relevant constructs proposed for the study: the two 
hypothetical scenarios, the name choice of the hypothetical other, the descriptions of 
the 12 goal inductions, and three instruments—for manipulation checks, the 
likelihood of using each of the avoidance strategies, and the likelihood of using 
accommodation, domination, compromise, and integration. The realism of the 
experimental inductions and the effectiveness of the instruments proposed for this 
study (excluding the instruments adapted from ROCI-II, Rahim, 1983) were tested in 
four pilot studies, which are described below. 
Pilot Studies 
 Four pilot studies were conducted in the winter term (January, 2006) and 
between February 1 and March 10, 2006. Each of the samples in the pilot studies 
consisted of undergraduate students enrolled at a large eastern university. Participants 
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received a small amount of extra course credit in exchange for their participation. 
Students who participated in the winter term pilot studies were informed not to 
participate in the other portions of this research study that would take place in the 
spring semester. Because all the participants had to sign up for the studies through an 
online participant pool program, students’ online identification numbers were used to 
ensure that they could only participate in one of the studies.  
Pilot Study 1: Testing Instruments 
 Purpose. The purpose of this pilot study was to test whether the instruments 
developed for the manipulation checks and for the avoidance strategies were 
effective. 
 Questionnaire. The questionnaire included two parts (see Appendix D). In the 
first part, the four types of goals (i.e., enmity, instrumental competition, support, and 
instrumental cooperation) were labeled as Goals A through D to exclude the effect 
that the actual naming could have on the test items. Goals A through D were defined. 
Three items were used to be indicators of each type of goal, making a total of 12 
items. These 12 items were then randomly arranged and included in a table. Each 
item started a row, and the 12 items formed the leftmost column of the table. The next 
four columns were titled by Goals A through D, respectively. Participants were 
instructed to rate how well each item matched each goal. The rating scale had 0% = 
not matching at all and 100% = perfect match. Such an arrangement may reflect how 
well an item measures the targeted goal exclusively. 
 In the second part of the questionnaire, a similar strategy was used to test how 
well the items matched the six types of avoidance strategies. The six types of 
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avoidance strategies were labeled as Avoidance Strategies A through F. Each type of 
avoidance strategies was defined. Three or four items were used as indicators of each 
strategy, making a total of 22 items. The 22 items were then randomly arranged and 
included in a table. Each item started a row, and the 22 items formed the leftmost 
column of the table. The next six columns were titled by Avoidance Strategies A 
through D, respectively. Participants were instructed to rate how well each item 
matched each avoidance strategy. The rating scale had 0% = not matching at all and 
100% = perfect match.  Example ratings were provided in each part. 
 Sample and procedure. Four student volunteers enrolled in an undergraduate 
communication course participated. They were all Asian American females, and the 
mean age was 20.00 (SD = 1.73). Upon arrival, participants were issued the consent 
form. They were asked to sign the consent form if they agreed to participate in the 
study. Each participant was then asked to complete the questionnaire. Participants 
were asked to give verbal feedback after they turned in the questionnaires.  
 Results. Because of the small number of participants, descriptive statistics 
were used to assess the effectiveness of measurement items. For the 12 items 
representing the four types of goals, six items perfectly matched their corresponding 
goals (i.e., the percentage of the matching was 100% on the targeted goal and 0% on 
all others). Four items had high matching percentage on their intended goals (66.7%) 
and low percentages on the other four goals. Two items had almost equally low 
percentages across the four types of goals. 
 For the 22 items representing the six avoidance strategies, nine items perfectly 
matched their intended strategy types, 10 items had a high matching percentage on 
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their intended short-term avoidance strategies but also a high matching percentage on 
the long-term versions of these avoidance strategies (e.g., withdrawal and exit). This 
result suggested that clear time framing should be added to the items to distinguish 
between long-term and short-term avoidance strategies. Two items matched four 
types of strategies with a slightly higher matching percentage on their intended 
avoidance strategies. One item had almost equally low matching across the six types. 
 Participants provided oral feedback for the improvement of the items. Based 
on the results of this pilot study, items were revised and tested in Pilot Study 2. 
Pilot Study 2: Testing Revised Instruments 
 Purpose. The purpose of this pilot study was to test the improved 
measurements for the manipulation checks and for the avoidance strategies. 
 Questionnaire. Items from Pilot Test 1 were kept, revised, or deleted, and new 
items were added. Instructions were revised as well. The new questionnaire included 
16 items for the four types of goals (four items for each type) and 24 items for the six 
types of avoidance strategies (four items for each type). An expert (D. A. Cai, 
personal communication, February 15, 2006) pointed out the avoidance strategies for 
the short-term and long-term should be clarified with time-defining phrases, such as 
“on the spot” and “during the meeting” for the short-term strategies and “after the 
meeting” for the long-term strategies. See the questionnaire in Appendix E. 
 Sample and procedure. Participants were 10 undergraduate students enrolled 
at a large eastern university (six sophomores, two freshmen, and two juniors). Eight 
were females. The mean age was 19.80 (SD = 2.62). They were five Caucasian or 
Europe Americans, one Asian American, one Korean, one Hispanic or Latino 
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American, and one multiracial person (self-described). The procedure was the same 
as for Pilot Study 1.  
Results. Overall, the items matched their intended constructs (see Tables 5 and 
6). Two items appeared to match their constructs less satisfactorily than others 
(withdraw4 and outflank3; the actual statements of these items are found in Appendix 
E). One item (labeled withdraw4 in Table 6) was intended to measure withdrawal but 
was rated highly on pretending: “I will avert the discussion at the moment.” Students 
provided feedback that “avert” was an ambiguous word. The item was changed to “If 
the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I will just step out.”  
Another item (labeled outflank3 in Table 6) was intended to measure 
outflanking but was rated highly on yielding: “After the meeting, I decided not to 
argue with Casey again but to think of something else to solve the problem.” After 
consulting the participants, the item was changed to, “After the meeting, I’ll come up 
with some sideway strategy (talk to our professor [boss] or do something else) to 
actualize my ideas.” All the labels and actual statements are found in Appendix E. 
Items with a matching percentage of their intended constructs lower than 
80.00% were revised.  
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Table 5  
Item Matching Percentages for Goal Constructs (N = 10), Pilot Study 2, 
Questionnaire Found in Appendix E 






Enmity1 68.50% 46.00% .00% 10.00%
Enmity2 80.00% 27.00% .00% 10.00%
Enmity3 89.00% 12.00% 3.00% 1.00%
Enmity4 80.50% 37.50% .00% .00%
Instrumental Competition1 19.50% 80.00% 9.00% 5.50%
Instrumental Competition2 10.00% 50.00% 9.00% 41.00%
Instrumental Competition3 23.00% 87.50% 2.50% .00%
Instrumental Competition4 15.00% 81.50% 5.00% 7.50%
Support1   1.00% .00% 67.00% 56.00%
Support2   5.00% .00% 69.50% 44.50%
Support3   7.50% .00% 68.50% 23.00%
Support4     .00% .00% 82.00% 29.00%
Instrumental Cooperation1     .00% .00% 22.50% 90.50%
Instrumental Cooperation2     .00% .00% 21.50% 92.50%
Instrumental Cooperation3     .00% .00% 15.00% 99.00%
Instrumental Cooperation4   1.00% .00% 39.00% 81.00%
Note. Bold values indicate the matching percentages of the indicators to their targeted 
goal constructs. The actual items are found in Appendix E. 
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Table 6 
Item Matching Percentages for Avoidance Strategy Constructs (N = 10), Pilot Study 
2, Questionnaire Found in Appendix E 




Pretend Exit Outflank Yield
Withdraw1 90.00% .00% .00% 21.00% 1.00% .00%
Withdraw2 79.00% .00% 10.00% 39.00% .00% 10.00%
Withdraw3 85.00% 10.00% 10.00% 5.00% .00% 10.00%
Withdraw4 24.00% 20.00% 55.00% 20.00% .00% 5.00%
Passively Compete1 40.00% 60.00% .00% 10.00% 2.00% .00%
Passively Compete2 12.22% 53.33% 35.56% 2.22% 6.67% 2.22%
Passively Compete3 35.00% 50.00% 10.00% .00% .00% 20.00%
Passively Compete4 10.00% 60.00% 15.00% 10.00% .00% 5.00%
Pretend1 6.00% 1.00% 99.00% 5.00% .00% 20.00%
Pretend2 10.00% .00% 90.00% .00% .00% 20.00%
Pretend3 10.00% .00% 90.00% .00% 5.00% 5.00%
Pretend4 .00% .00% 100.00% .00% .00% 10.00%
Exit1 20.00% .00% .00% 80.00% 10.00% .00%
Exit2 49.00% .00% .00% 79.00% .00% .00%
Exit3 20.00% .00% .00% 90.00% .00% 10.00%
Exit4 25.00% 10.00% 10.00% 85.00% .00% .00%
Outflank1 .00% 30.00% .00% 10.00% 60.00% 10.00%
Outflank2 .00% 10.00% .00% 10.00% 90.00% .00%
Outflank3 .00% 15.00% 10.00% 1.00% 20.00% 50.00%
Outflank4 5.00% 10.00% .00% 10.00% 90.00% .00%
Yield1 .00% .00% 30.00% .00% 1.00% 79.00%
Yield2 .00% .00% 10.00% 9.00% 11.00% 95.00%
Yield3 .00% .00% 25.00% .00% 11.00% 90.00%
Yield4 .00% .00% 15.00% .00% .00% 95.00%
Note. Bold values indicate the matching percentages of the indicators to their targeted 
avoidance strategy constructs. The actual items are found in Appendix E. 
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Pilot Study 3: Perceived Manipulation Realism 
 Purpose. The purpose of this pilot study was to examine whether the high or 
low importance of a goal or a combination of goals would be considered realistic in 
the two hypothetical scenarios that were developed.  
 Sample and procedure. Six students enrolled at a large eastern university 
participated in the study (four females and two males; Mage = 20.00, SD = 1.67). They 
were two seniors, two juniors, one sophomore, and one freshman. Three were Asian 
Americans, one was African American, one was Caucasian, and one was Indian 
American from Central Asia. 
 Participants were asked to read the consent form upon arrival. They were 
further asked to sign the consent form and answer the questionnaire if they agreed to 
participate. They were dismissed when they turned in the questionnaire. 
 Questionnaire. The questionnaire had two parts. Part I described the classmate 
scenario and Part II described the colleague scenario (Appendix F). Because among 
the 12 hypotheses, two groups of hypotheses (H3a through H3c and H6a through 
H6c) had the same goal induction but varied only in the temporal duration (i.e., short-
term vs. long-term), only nine goal inductions were assessed. Two versions of the 
questionnaire were used. In one version, the classmate scenario was presented first. In 
the other version, the colleague scenario was presented first.  
The questionnaire started with a description of the hypothetical conflict 
scenario with Casey. Instructions were given to rate the realism of goals that 
followed, where 0% = not realistic at all and 100% = completely realistic. For 
example, to test whether high importance of support goals was realistic, the 
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questionnaire said, “Casey is a friend you really care about. You have a goal to 
maintain your friendship.” Then a question followed, “How realistic is this goal?” 
Participants were further asked to provide reasons for their ratings in an open-ended 
question. The format for the questions in the classmate scenario was exactly the same 
as in the colleague scenario. 
Results. Most of the goal inductions appeared realistic for this sample. Of nine 
goal inductions, two in the classmate situation appeared to be less realistic than 50%. 
All other seven goal inductions appeared to be realistic in both the classmate and 
colleague scenarios (see Tables 7 and 8). The participants’ responses to the goal 
inductions in the two scenarios did not differ by whether the classmate or the 
colleague scenario was presented first. 
For the classmate situation, the less realistic goal inductions were high 
importance of rivalry goals and low importance of cooperative goals. Participants’ 
answers to the open-ended questions for these ratings were examined, and two 
possible reasons for this outcome were considered. First, the wording of the 
questionnaire was a little confusing because instead of asking participants “how 
realistic is this goal,” this question asked “how realistic is it for you to lack this goal 
in this scenario.” One participant rated the realism of the goal as 20% and wrote that 
“I would think that it is fairly realistic that I’d lack that.” The ambiguity of the 
wording may have caused the low rating of the realism of certain goals, although the 
answer may have reflected high realism. This type of response may suggest that 
revision of this question was necessary. 
Second, in the classmate scenario, low importance of the cooperative goals 
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was perceived to be unrealistic. The reason for this result may be that the scenario 
wrote that the group project counted for 20% of the course grade; such a great portion 
of course grade could make most students want to cooperate. One student wrote that 
“you have to work well in this project to get it done and if you both produce a good 
result you can actually work together in the future.” To make realistically low 
importance of cooperative goals, the grade percentage of the group project needed to 
be lowered.  
Four undergraduate students were consulted about whether they would give 
up a project that was worth 20% of a course grade; none of them said they would. 
They suggested that they might sacrifice a group project that was worth 10% if the 
other group member was “really nasty.” Therefore, the percentage of the teamwork 
grade was changed to 10%. Some other changes in wording and format were made. 
Further, because no large differences in realism were observed between the classmate 
and the colleague scenarios, it was decided to test the goal inductions in the next pilot 
study with only the classmate scenario. This decision did not contradict Jackson’s 
(1992) proposal of using multiple versions of a treatment because (a) Pilot Study 3 
already indicated no apparent differences of the goal induction realism in the two 
versions of the hypothetical scenario, (b) the purpose of Pilot Study 4 was solely to 
test wording improvement based on the outcome of Pilot Study 3, which would be 




Realism Ratings of Goal Inductions in the Classmate Scenario (N = 6), Pilot Study 3, 
Questionnaire Found in Appendix F  
Importance of Goals M (SD)
H1a:















High importance of rivalry goals  






High importance of support goals  






High importance of instrumental cooperative goals 
Low importance of enmity goals 







High importance of cooperative goals 
Low importance of enmity goals 












High importance of instrumental cooperative goals 






Realism Ratings of Goal Inductions in the Colleague Scenario (N = 6), Pilot Study 3, 
Questionnaire Found in Appendix F 
Importance of Goals M (SD)
H1a:















High importance of rivalry goals  






High importance of support goals  






High importance of instrumental cooperative goals 
Low importance of enmity goals 







High importance of cooperative goals 
Low importance of enmity goals 












High importance of instrumental cooperative goals 





Pilot Study 4: Perceived Realism of Revised Manipulations 
 Purpose. Pilot Study 4 examined whether the changes based on the results of 
Pilot Study 3 improved the realism of the goal inductions. 
 Sample and procedure. Participants were 10 undergraduate students enrolled 
at a large eastern university (Mage = 19.10, SD = 1.37). Seven were female. Six were 
freshmen, three were sophomores, and one was a senior. They were five Caucasian 
Americans, one Pakistani American, one Asian American, one African American, one 
Hispanic American, and one multiracial American. The data collection procedure was 
the same as that in Pilot Study 3. 
 Questionnaire. The questionnaire used in Pilot Study 4 was a revised version 
of Pilot Study 3 questionnaire. The percentage of the teamwork grade was changed to 
10%. Wording and format were changed to make the instructions and the purpose 
clearer. For example, “you two argued vehemently” was changed to “you two had a 
heated argument” because one participant asked the meaning of the word 
“vehemently” during the Pilot Study 3 data collection session. Further, special care 
was taken to test the importance of reliance goals. An induction of low importance of 
reliance goals was done by inducing low importance of all four baseline goals (i.e., 
enmity goals, support goals, instrumental competitive goals, and instrumental 
cooperative goals). One question, “how realistic is it for you to lack all these goals,” 
may be double-barreled if the participants perceived realism in one or some of these 
four goals but not in all. One student commented that “there has to be SOME 
[capitalization in original] goal.” In Pilot Study 4, low importance of reliance goals 
was separately measured by low importance of instrumental goals and low 
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importance of socioemotional goals: “You begin to lose motivation to do the project. 
How realistic is this description?” and “You begin to lose motivation to deal with 
Casey. How realistic is this description?” Separation of task-oriented goals from 
relation-oriented goals may make it easier for participants to indicate whether low 
importance of one type or both types of goals could be induced realistically. The 
questionnaire is found in Appendix G. 




Realism Ratings of Goal Inductions, Revised Version (N = 10), Pilot Study 4, 
Questionnaire Found in Appendix G 
 M (SD)
H1a:















High importance of rivalry goals  






High importance of support goals  






High importance of instrumental cooperative goals 
Low importance of enmity goals 







High importance of cooperative goals 
Low importance of enmity goals 







Low importance of reliance goals for task 






High importance of instrumental cooperative goals  





The Formal Study 
 Data collection for the formal study was done between March 15 and April 6, 
2006. This section introduces the analytical strategy, the determination of the sample 
size and the sample description, the variables of interest, the experimental design, and 
the data collection procedure. 
Analytical Strategy 
 The hypotheses were tested with contrast analyses in analyses of variance and 
with structural equation modeling.  
 Analyses of variance (ANOVAs). To test how well the manipulations worked, 
planned contrast analyses were used to test the manipulation checks. In particular, the 
importance of the goals intended to be high or low or null were coded, and the 
differences between importance levels of these goals based on the codings were 
submitted to statistical significance tests.  
 Structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM was used to test the causal 
relationships proposed in the hypotheses. The 12 experimental conditions were 
represented by 11 dummy variables, which served as independent variables. The 
condition that manipulated low importance of all four types of goals was the 
reference condition: the condition coded “0” for all dummy variables (see Table 10). 
The mediating variables were the manipulation checks, which were the importance 
levels of the four baseline goals. The outcome variables were the likelihoods of the 
six avoidance strategies. The proposed model consisted of the links between the 
independent variables and the outcome variables via the mediating variables. An 
alternative model that comprised both direct and indirect links from the independent 
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variables to the outcome variables was compared against the fully-mediated model. 
 Goodness-of-fit indices showed how well the data fit the proposed model. 
Testing total effects from the dummy variables to the outcome variables indicated 
whether the hypotheses were supported. Significant coefficients from the dummies to 
the importance of the goals indicated the extent to which the importance of each goal 
was manipulated successfully as compared with the reference condition; and 
significant coefficients from the importance of a goal to the likelihood of an 
avoidance strategy indicated the extent to which the importance of each goal 
predicted the likelihood of each avoidance strategy. 
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Table 10 
Dummy Coding for the 12 Experimental Conditions for the Formal Study 
Condition Hypothesis ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ7 ξ8 ξ9 ξ10 ξ11 
Condition1  H1a 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Condition2  H1b 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Condition3  H1c 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Condition4  H2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Condition5  H3a 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Condition6  H3b 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Condition7  H3c 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Condition8 H4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Condition9  H5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Condition10 H6a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Condition11 H6b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Condition12 H6c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Note 1. ξi = dummy variable i; i = 1 to 11. 
Note 2. Bold font indicate the condition used as the base group. 
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Sample 
Proposed sample size. Sample size was determined assuming that SEM would 
be used to analyze the data. Two sample size recommendations were used. The first 
sample size recommendation was based on the ratio of the number of indicators per 
factor (Gagné & Hancock, 2006), and the second was based on the estimated power 
desired of the model (Hancock, 2006). 
Although five participants per parameter (e.g., Bentler & Chou, 1987) has 
been recommended for SEM, Gagné and Hancock (2006) recently reviewed the 
history of SEM sample size recommendations and argued that consideration of model 
quality is more important than consideration of number of people per variable or per 
parameter. Gagné and Hancock (2006) described a Monte Carlo simulation study 
done by Marsh, Hau, Balla, and Grayson (1998), in which Marsh et al. found that as 
the number of indicators per factor (p/f) increases, the sample size required for the 
model to converge decreases, and that “parameter estimate accuracy appeared to 
maximize once p/f = 4, improving marginally, if at all, as p/f increased” (Gagné & 
Hancock, 2006, p. 66). Building on Marsh et al.’s (1998) study, Gagné and Hancock 
(2006) further explored the relationship between model quality and sample size by 
considering a combination of the number of indicators per factor and their loading 
magnitudes.  
Gagné and Hancock (2006) argued that low-quality indicators function 
differently from high-quality indicators in determining a measurement model’s 
quality. The operationalization of the measurement model quality can be represented 
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where ai = loading magnitude, i = 1 to k, and k = number of indicators. As Gagné and 
Hancock (2006) stated, H, called maximal reliability elsewhere (e.g., Raykov, 2004), 
represents the extent to which the indicators reflect the construct. H increases as the 
number of indicators increases; H also increases as loading magnitude increases. H is 
an index that demonstrates the proportion of the true score captured by the observed 
variables (Gagné & Hancock, 2006). 
Because the current study has four indicators per factor, the ratio-based 
guideline for the sample size from Gagné and Hancock (2006) will only be used when 
the number of indicators equals four. Gagné and Hancock (2006) found that for a 
measurement model with homogeneous loadings, when p/f  ≥ 4, model convergence 
was acceptable with loading magnitudes ≥ .4 and N = 200. For a measurement model 
with heterogeneous loadings, adding an additional indicator reduced the model 
convergence rate when N ≥ 50. However, because of the large number of 
combinations of heterogeneous loading magnitudes, researchers can use both the 
sample size recommendation for homogeneous loadings and H to estimate the sample 
size for the indicators with heterogeneous loading magnitudes (Gagné & Hancock, 
2006). When p/f ≥ 4, an H between .701 (N = 400) and .776 (N = 400) is considered 
acceptable. With these indices and actual outcomes from Pilot Studies 1 and 2, a 
proposed N for the current study is estimated to be between 200 and 400. 
In addition, Hancock (2006) discussed SEM power analysis and the technique 
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to determine the sample size for SEM based on power analysis related to the overall 
data-model fit. Central to the issue is to develop appropriate null and alternative 
hypotheses, to determine the test statistic to assess the null hypothesis, and to discuss 
the noncentral distributions for the designated value of the alternative hypothesis 
(Hancock, 2006).  
Although the null hypothesis in SEM is that the theory-implied matrix ( Σ̂ )
and the population matrix (Σ) are the same, the test of the null and alternative 
hypothesis in SEM is rather limited in terms of results interpretation and power 
analysis. Whereas rejection of the null hypothesis implies an incorrect model, failing 
to reject the null only means that the proposed model is capable of reproducing the 
observed data, yet this model is not necessarily the true model and there may be other 
models reproducing the observed data just as well (Hancock, 2006). Furthermore, the 
exact model-fit test is over-demanding; a practically acceptable model could be 
rejected for trivial misspecifications (Hancock, 2006). Finally, because “statistical 
power refers to the probability of rejecting a hypothesized model rather than retaining 
it, relative to more traditional analytical scenarios, the power analysis for testing data-
model fit as a whole in SEM must be reframed” (Hancock, 2006, p. 94). 
Based on MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara’s (1996) suggestion that a null 
hypothesis for model testing can be stated in terms of close or not close fit, Hancock 
(2006) recommended using the estimated root mean square error of approximation 








dfχε . (2) 
Hancock (2006) further recommended using the value of ε0 to represent the 
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threshold of acceptability of model fit, and to help develop appropriate null and 
alternative hypotheses for the power analysis purpose.   
H0: ε = ε0, that the population data-model fit is at the threshold between 
acceptability and unacceptability. The alternative hypothesis in this case, H1:
ε ≠ ε0, contains two possibilities: H1: ε < ε0, that the data-model fit is 
acceptable, and H1: ε > ε0, that the data-model fit is unacceptable. For the 
purposes of power analysis, however, interest tends to be in being able to 
reject data-model fit at the threshold in favor of acceptable data-model fit. As 
such, we will hereafter define the alternative hypothesis as H1: ε < ε0, and 
hence the corresponding null hypothesis as H0: ε ≥ ε0. (p. 95) 
When ε̂ 0 ≥ .05, the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, and when ε̂ 0 < .05 at 
the chosen α level (e.g., α =.05), the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the alternative 
hypothesis is retained that the significance of the discrepancy between the theory-
implied model and the observed model is statistically significant at p = .05 (Hancock, 
2006).  
Although ideally the theorized model would have an ε of .00, Hancock (2006) 
recommended that: 
For researchers interested in planning to have sufficient power to reject ε0 ≥
.05 in favor of acceptable data-model fit, selecting ε1 = .02 seems like a 
desirable balance between the generally unrealistic optimism of ε1 = .00 and 
the frequent impracticality associated with the recommended sample size for 
ε1 = .04. (p. 101) 
With a recommended ε̂ = .02, the required sample size can be found in 
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Hancock (2006) when the degrees of freedom of the theoretical model is specified. In 
the current study, the structural relations in the theoretical model yields a df of [(21 x 
22)/2] – 137 = 95. The free parameters and relevant calculations can be found in 
Table 11. With ε̂ = .02, N = 220 is needed for a power of .80, and N = 307 for a 
power of .95. 
Therefore, based on Gagné and Hancock’s (2006) and Hancock’s (2006) 




Structural Equations of Fully Mediated Relations Between Goal Inductions and 
Avoidance Strategies 
η η1 η2 η3 η4 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ7 ξ8 ξ9 ξ10 ξ11 ζ
η1 = γ14 γ15 γ16 γ17 γ19 γ1,10 γ1,11 ζ1
η2 = γ24 γ25 γ26 γ27 γ27 γ29 γ2,10 γ2,11 ζ2
η3 = γ31 γ33 γ34 γ35 γ37 γ38 γ39 γ3,11 ζ3
η4 = γ42 γ43 γ44 γ46 γ47 γ48 γ4,10 γ4,11 ζ4
η5 = β53 β54 ζ5
η6 = β61 β62 β63 β64 ζ6
η7 = β71 β72 β73 β74 ζ7
η8 = β81 β82 β83 β84 ζ8
η9 = β92 β93 β94 ζ9
η10 = β10,1 β10,2 β10,3 β10,4 ζ10 
Note 1. For the structural model, there are 21 free parameters in the Β matrix, 31 free 
parameters in the Γ matrix, 66 free parameters in the Φ matrix (all exogenous 
variables are allowed to covary), and 19 free parameters in the Ψ matrix (10 error 
variances and 9 error covariances are allowed; refer back to Figure 1). Therefore,  
 df = [(21 x 22)/2] – (21 + 31 + 66 + 10 + 9)   
 = 231 – 137 
 = 95. 
Note 2. ξ1 through ξ11 are the 11 dummy coded variables as shown in Table 10. η1
through η4 represent importance of enmity goals, importance of instrumental 
competitive goals, importance of support goals, and importance of instrumental 
cooperative goals, respectively. η5 through η10 represent likelihood of withdrawal, 
likelihood of passive competition, likelihood of pretending, likelihood of exit, 
likelihood of outflanking, and likelihood of yielding, respectively.
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Sample. Participants were 352 students, mainly undergraduates (46.3% of 
freshmen, 28.4% of sophomores, 14.1% of juniors, 10.3% of seniors, and .3% of 
graduate students) recruited from an eastern university. The age range was 17 to 25 
(M = 19.38, SD = 1.34, Median = 19.00, Range = 8.00). Two hundred and forty-eight 
participants were female (71.3%) and 95 were male. The majority were “White, 
Caucasian, and European” (51.4%), followed by “African American, African, or 
Black” (11.5%), and “Asian American, Pacific Islander, Chinese, Japanese, or 
Korean” (11.5%), and Jewish (9.2%). Approximately 5.0% of the participants 
checked both the Jewish and White categories, 4.6% checked the “Central Asian, 
Indian, or Pakistani” category, and 2.6% checked the “Hispanic, Latino, Mexican 
American, Cuban American, or Puerto Rican” category. About 3.5% reported other 
mixed cultural backgrounds or checked the category “other.” 
Variables 
Independent variables. Although for the data analysis, the independent 
variables were the dummy variables presented in Table 10, the independent variables 
that operationalized the relevant constructs described in the hypotheses were the 12 
goal inductions. With two hypothetical scenarios, there were 24 experimental 
conditions. This section describes the finalized two hypothetical conflict scenarios 
and the 12 variations of goal inductions in each scenario.  
Based on the results from Pilot Studies 3 and 4, the two hypothetical scenarios 
were finalized, as presented in the next paragraphs. Note that phrases in parentheses 
were word variations for different experimental conditions to make the scenario 
sound more natural. For example, when support goals were to be induced, “Casey is a 
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classmate and friend you really care about” was used as the first sentence; when 
rivalry goals were to be induced, “Casey is a classmate and rival of yours” was used. 
All other scenario descriptions remained the same. 
For the conflict situation with a classmate, the situation reads: 
Casey is a classmate [or classmate and friend you really care about, or 
classmate and rival of yours]. You have volunteered [or been assigned] to do a 
project together. The project grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both 
of you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the 
blueprint of the project.  
For the conflict situation with a colleague, the situation read:  
Casey is a colleague [or colleague and friend you really care about, or 
colleague and rival of yours] at work. You have volunteered [or been 
assigned] to do a project together. The outcome of the project is important 
because the boss will use it to evaluate your job performance. Both of you 
really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint 
of the project.  
At the end of a hypothetical scenario, sentences for goal inductions and a 
question were added. The following is an example of the complete experimental 
condition to induce high importance of support goals: 
Casey is a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a project 
together. The project grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you 
really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint 
of the project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one 
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is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize that 
further argument may make your communication break down and may even 
harm your friendship. Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. 
What would you do? 
 The 12 goal induction descriptions are found in Table 12. The 24 experimental 
conditions are found in Appendix H.
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Table 12 
Independent Variables: Importance of Goals Induced 
Condition (Hypothesis): 
Importance of Goals To 
Be Induced 
 
Actual Sentences Used in the Induction 
Condition 1 (H1a): To 
induce high importance 




In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one is 
able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly 
realize that further argument may make your communication break 
down and may even harm your friendship. Remember that Casey 
is a friend you like very much. What would you do? 
 
Condition 2 (H1b): To 
induce high importance 
of an instrumental 




In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one is 
able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly 
realize that further argument may make your communication break 
down. Remember that Casey is a NOT a friend of yours. However, 
you two are assigned to another group project, the grade of which 
constitutes 40% of your course grade. What would you do? 
 
Condition 3 (H1c): To 
induce high importance 
of a cooperative goal in 
an immediate conflict 
situation. 
 
In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one 
seems is to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly 
realize that further argument may make your communication break 
down and may even harm your friendship. Remember that Casey 
is a friend you like very much. What’s more, you two are assigned 
to another group project, the grade of which constitutes 40% of 
your course grade. What would you do? 
 
Condition 4 (H2): To 
induce high importance 
of a rivalry goal and low 
importance of a 




In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one is 
able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly 
realize that further argument may make your communication break 
down. Remember that Casey is a rival of yours. That is, you want 
to compete with Casey and use YOUR plan to do the project. You 
and Casey are not friends. How Casey feels is not something you 
consider; what’s more, you already know that you are not going to 
do any other teamwork with Casey again. What would you do? 
 
Condition 5 (H3a): To 
induce low importance 
of a rivalry goal and high 
importance of a support 
goal in an immediate 
conflict situation. 
In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one is 
able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly 
realize that further argument may make your communication break 
down and may even harm your friendship. Remember that Casey 
is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s 
feelings and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Your relationship 
with Casey is more important than whose idea is used and the 
grade you receive on the project. What would you do? 
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Table 12 (Cont’d) 
Independent Variables: Importance of Goals Induced 
Condition (Hypothesis): 
Importance of goal to be 
induced 
 
Actual sentences used in the induction 
Condition 6 (H3b): To induce 
low importance of a rivalry 
goal and high importance of an 
instrumental cooperative goal 
in an immediate conflict 
situation. 
In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, 
and no one is able to convince the other. As you are 
arguing, you suddenly realize that further argument 
may make your communication break down. 
Remember that you and Casey are NOT friends. 
However, you two are assigned to another group 
project, the grade of which constitutes 40% of your 
course grade. You don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. 
Your relationship with Casey is more important than 
whose idea is used and the grade you receive on the 
project. What would you do? 
 
Condition 7 (H3c): To induce 
low importance of a rivalry 
goal and high importance of a 
cooperative goal in an 
immediate conflict situation. 
In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, 
and no one is able to convince the other. As you are 
arguing, you suddenly realize that further argument 
may make your communication break down and may 
even harm your friendship. Remember that Casey is a 
friend you like very much. You deeply care about 
Casey’s feelings and don’t want to hurt Casey’s 
feelings. Plus, you two are assigned to another group 
project, the grade of which constitutes 40% of your 
course grade. As compared with your relationship 
with Casey and your being able to work well on the 
next project, the grade of this project is less important. 
What would you do? 
 
Condition 8 (H4): To induce 
low importance of a reliance 
goal in long term. 
In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no 
one was able to convince the other. After the meeting, 
you decide to resolve this conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is NOT a friend of yours and 
you already know you two are not involved in any 
other teamwork for this class. The continuous 
argument and Casey’s stubbornness made you so 
exhausted that you feel that you can stand any grade 
for this project, as long as you don’t have to do this 
with Casey any more. You also made a note to 




Table 12 (Cont’d) 
Independent Variables: Importance of Goals Induced 
Condition (Hypothesis): 
Importance of goal to be 
induced 
 
Actual sentences used in the induction 
Condition 9 (H5): To induce 
low importance of a support 
goal and high importance of 
an instrumental reliance goal 
in long term. 
In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no one was 
able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to 
resolve this conflict and move on. Remember that Casey is 
NOT a friend of yours. You don’t really care about how Casey 
feels. You really want to do this project according to your 
ideas because you believe your plan can make a grade of 10 
out of 10 on this project. However, you already know that you 
two are assigned to another group project together, the grade 
of which constitutes 40% of your course grade. As compared 
with this project, the next group project is more important. 
What would you do? 
 
Condition 10 (H6a): To 
induce low importance of a 
rivalry goal and high 
importance of a support goal 
in long term. 
In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no one was 
able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to 
resolve this conflict and move on. Remember that Casey is a 
friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s 
feelings and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. As compared 
with your relationship with Casey, the grade of this project is 
less important. What would you do? 
 
Condition 11 (H6b): To 
induce low importance of a 
rivalry goal and high 
importance of an 
instrumental cooperative 
goal in long term. 
In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no one was 
able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to 
resolve this conflict and move on. Remember that you and 
Casey are not friends. However, you two are assigned to 
another group project, the grade of which constitutes 40% of 
your course grade. You don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. 
As compared with this project, the next group project is more 
important. What would you do? 
 
Condition 12 (H6c): To 
induce low importance of a 
rivalry goal and high 
importance of a cooperative 
goal in long term. 
In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no one was 
able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to 
resolve this conflict and move on. Remember that Casey is a 
friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s 
feelings and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Plus, you two 
are assigned to another group project, the grade of which 
constitutes 40% of your course grade. As compared to/with? 
your relationship with Casey and your being able to work well 
together on the next project, the grade of this project is less 
important. What would you do? 
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Dependent variables. The dependent variables include three groups of 
variables: a group of goal importance variables (the manipulation checks), a group of 
avoidance strategy likelihood variables, and a group of other conflict strategy 
likelihood variables (i.e., integration, compromise, accommodation, and domination). 
The indicators for these dependent variables are listed in Appendix I. 
The instrument for manipulation checks from Pilot Studies 1 and 2 included 
16 items, with 4 items measuring the importance of each type of goal. The scale in the 
formal study was the same response scale as used in the pilot studies, where 0 = 
strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree.  
 The instrument for the six types of avoidance strategies was the improved 
version that resulted from Pilot Studies 1 and 2. The instrument contains 24 items, 
with 4 items measuring the likelihood of each avoidance strategy.  A 0 to100 
probability scale was used, where 0 = not likely at all and 100 = definitely. 
 The instrument for the other four types of conflict strategies (accommodation, 
domination, compromise, and integration) was Rahim’s (1983) ROCI-II: four items 
that measure domination, six items that measure accommodation, five items that 
measure integration, and five items that measure compromise; these ROCI-II items 
were not tested in the pilot studies. Rahim’s (1983) ROCI-II used a 5-point Likert-
type scale where higher number means greater use of the strategy. A 0 to 100 
probability scale was used in this study, where 0 = not likely at all and 100 = 
definitely. 
Experimental Design 
 As described in the overall design section, the experiment had 24 conditions. 
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It was a posttest only, independent groups design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the 24 experimental conditions specific to the 12 hypotheses. 
Procedure 
 The questionnaires had 24 versions, based on the two different hypothetical 
scenarios and 12 goal inductions. They were administered to participants randomly; 
172 participants were in the 12 classmate-scenario conditions and 180 were in the 12 
colleague-scenario conditions. All the data were collected in small groups (10 to 20 
people) in two classrooms. The data were collected in 45 sessions. The total number 
of participants that signed up to participate was 394, and the actual number of 
participants that attended the data collection sessions was 352. Participants signed up 
for the study via an online participant pool program. The description of the study 
online stated that the study was to investigate how people handle conflict, and that 
participants would respond to a survey that took 20 to 30 minutes (the actual time 
length was about 25 to 30 minutes). The author managed all data collection sessions. 
 When participants arrived at the designated classroom, they were asked to 
read the consent form for the study and to sign the consent form if they agreed to 
participate in the study. Each participant was then asked to complete a questionnaire 
(see Appendix J for an example; the only difference for the other versions was the 
hypothetical scenario, and all of these scenarios are provided in Appendix H). There 
were 24 versions of the questionnaires. The stacks of questionnaires for each version 
were placed in a systematic random order and collated for distribution. After the 
participants completed their questionnaires, the author debriefed all the participants in 
that session by stating that the scenario they received was different from person to 
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person, and the purpose of the research was to see whether people would use different 
conflict strategies, especially avoidance strategies, when different goals were 
activated. The author further told the participants that if they felt uncomfortable about 
this induction and did not want their questionnaire to be included, they could indicate 
so by writing a note on the top of the first page of the questionnaire. Finally, the 
students were told that the study would be continuing, so it would be appreciated if 
they did not discuss the study with others. Participants were asked to turn their 
questionnaires face down and leave the classroom. Questionnaires were then 
collected and numbered. No participants wrote a note indicating that their 





This chapter consists of three parts. The first part presents preliminary data 
analyses, including data preparation for the primary analyses, preliminary tests for 
possible intervening variables, reliability and confirmatory factor analyses for 
measurement models, and manipulation checks. The second part presents the primary 
data analyses and tests of hypotheses. The third part provides post-hoc data analyses. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Data Entry Checks 
Frequencies of all the variables were examined to minimize data entry error. 
All frequencies fell in the preset range defined by the lower and the higher boundaries 
of each item or variable. Further, all the responses in the questionnaires were checked 
against the data entries. Out of 352 participants’ data (with 81 variables in total), 5 
errors were found, yielding an error rate of 5 ÷ (352 × 81) = .00017. The five 
incorrect inputs were corrected.  
Missing Data 
The questionnaires were numbered in the time order as they were turned in. 
Six participants had incomplete data. These missing data were random; that is, the 
missing data in each questionnaire did not show a systematic pattern. Kline (2005) 
argued that non-systematic missing data can be ignored. In such statistical analyses as 
principal component analyses, regression analyses, and analyses of variances, 
pairwise deletion was used to treat the missing data to maintain the statistical power 
and increase the effect size (e.g., Kline, 2005). However, for confirmatory factor 
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analyses and SEM, pairwise deletion may pose a problem, and listwise deletion is 
preferable when the number of cases with missing value is small: 
When individual values in a covariance matrix are based on different numbers 
of cases, it is possible that some of the values are mathematically out of range; 
that is, it would be impossible to derive them if the covariances were all 
calculated using data from the same cases . . . . If an out-of-bounds correlation 
is part of a covariance matrix, then the matrix is nonpositive definite or 
singular, which means that certain mathematical operations with the matrix 
such as division (e.g., inverting the matrix) will fail because of problems such 
as denominators that equal zero. (Kline, 2005, p. 54) 
Therefore, listwise deletion was used (i.e., the six cases with missing data 
were discarded) in conducting confirmatory factor analyses and SEM. 
Data Transformations 
As described in the method section, the importance of each of the four goals 
had four indicators. The likelihood of each of the six avoidance strategies also had 
four indicators. In addition, accommodation (6 indicators), domination (4 indicators), 
compromising (5 indicators), and integration (5 indicators) were measured with 
ROCI-II (Rahim, 1983). Therefore, the total number of indicators was 60. 
 The 60 indicators were submitted to a descriptive analysis. The skewness and 
kurtosis were examined to see whether data transformation would be needed. The 
ratio of skewness over the standard error was calculated, and an indicator’s 
distribution is considered as skewed when the ratio is greater than 1.96 (see Frey et 
al., 2000). 
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Following the 1.96 cutoff rule, five of the 16 indicators that measure the 
importance of goals were not considered skewed, three were positively skewed and 
eight negatively skewed. For the 24 indicators that measure the likelihood of 
avoidance strategies, five were not skewed and 19 were positively skewed. For the 20 
indicators that measure the likelihood of the other four conflict strategies in ROCI-II 
(Rahim, 1983), five indicators were not skewed, three indicators were positively 
skewed, and 12 were negatively skewed. Means, standard deviations, skewness, and 
kurtosis of the 60 indicators are found in Appendix K. 
 Because the data were to be used in SEM later, and maximum likelihood 
estimation assumes multivariate normality of data distributions (e.g., Kline, 2005), 
data transformations were performed to correct the skewness of the relevant variables. 
Data transformation also helps the assumption of homoscedasticity that is used in 
testing SEM (Kline, 2005). Homoscedasticity means that the variances of the 
residuals should be uniform across all levels of the independent variable. Kline 
(2005) suggested that “a transformation may remedy heteroscedasticity due to 
nonnormality” (p. 52). For positively skewed indicators, the natural logarithm 
function was used: 
New indicator = ln (Original indicator + c) + 50,   (3) 
where c is a positive constant. For negatively skewed indicators, the exponential 
function was used: 
New indicator = Original indicator a – Original indicator a1 + c, (4) 
where a is a positive number greater than 1, a1 is a positive number slightly smaller 
than a, and c is a constant. The exact transformation formulae are found in Appendix 
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L, and means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis of the 60 indicators after 
transformation are found in Appendix M. Later data analyses used transformed data. 
Principal Component Analyses 
Unrotated principal component analyses were performed for the purpose of 
obtaining component scores of the measured variables in this study. Because the 
study has 14 measured variables (4 importance levels of goals, 6 likelihoods of 
avoidance strategies, and 4 likelihoods of four other conflict strategies), 14 principal 
component analyses on the transformed data were performed separately on the 
indicators of these variables.  
The first principal component was extracted from the indicators for each of 
the 14 variables. In every case the first principal component’s eigenvalue was greater 
than 1. In every case the second and later components had eigenvalues less than 1. 
Eigenvalues and the percentages of variances explained by each principal component 
are found in Table 13. 
Each component score was then used to represent its variable score in all later 
analyses when the variable score was treated as an observed variable. However, in 
testing the structural equation models, measurement items, not component scores, 
were used. The reason for using principal components instead of averages for 
composites is that the former come from weighted contributions from each indicator, 
and thus, the reliability of the measurement items is factored in.  
The reason for using principal components instead of measurement items in 
the analyses other than structural equation modeling is to focus on the relationships 
between concepts and avoid unnecessary complications in expressing the results. In 
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later analyses such as analysis of variance, multivariate analysis of variance, principal 
component analysis among dependent variables, and regression analysis, a principal 
component represents the items with appropriate weights, and such a representation 
simplifies the analysis. Nonetheless, measurement items are preferred to composites 
in testing structural equation models because an inclusion of measurement models 
corrects unreliability incurred by measurement error (Kline, 2005). 
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Table 13 
Eigenvalues of the 14 Extracted Principal Components with the Proportions of the 
Variance Explained by Each Principal Component Based on Transformed Data 
Variable Items (Labels) Based on Eigenvalue % Variance 
Explained 





Importance of instrumental 
competitive goals 
New Instrumental Competition1 









Importance of instrumental 
cooperative goals 
New Instrumental Cooperation1 
New Instrumental Cooperation2 
New Instrumental Cooperation3 
New Instrumental Cooperation4 
2.58 64.50% 





Likelihood of passive 
competition 
New Passive Compete1 
New Passive Compete2 
New Passive Compete3 
New Passive Compete4 
2.40 59.96% 
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Table 13 (Cont’d) 
Eigenvalues of the 14 Extracted Principal Components with the Proportions of the 
Variance Explained by Each Principal Component Based on Transformed Data 
Variable Items (Labels) Based on Eigenvalue % Variance 
Explained 





Likelihood of exit New Exit1 






















Table 13 (Cont’d) 
Eigenvalues of the 14 Extracted Principal Components with the Proportions of the 
Variance Explained by Each Principal Component Based on Transformed Data 
Variable Items (Labels) Based on Eigenvalue % Variance 
Explained 

















Note. The actual items are found in Appendix J. The transformation formulas for the 
transformed indicators are found in Appendix L. The descriptives for the transformed 
indicators are found in Appendix M. 
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Casey’s Gender 
 The study used a gender neutral name, Casey. One question asked participants 
to indicate Casey’s perceived gender. Two hundred and seventy-one (77.6%) 
participants reported Casey’s gender to be female, 61 reported it to be male (17.3%), 
and 14 reported “not clear” (4.3%). Four people added a note (though they were not 
asked in the questionnaire) that Casey’s gender did not matter. Twelve participants 
(3.4%) talked to the student researcher (i.e., the author) after their sessions and 
indicated that they liked the last question about Casey’s gender. When the author 
asked what gender they were thinking about, those participants’ responses showed an 
interesting pattern: Participants matched their gender with Casey’s gender. A χ² test 
was performed to test this pattern. The crosstabulation of Casey’s perceived gender 
by participants’ gender is reported in Table 14. 
Results indicated a significant gender difference in the perception of Casey’s 
gender, χ2 (2, N = 346) = 25.37, p < .001. Casey was perceived to be a female more 
often by females (n = 212, 85.1%) than by males (n = 58, 60.8%), but was perceived 
to be a male more often by males (n = 32, 33.0%) than by females (n = 21, 11.2%). 
Moreover, a slightly larger percent of males (n = 6, 6.2%) reported being unclear 
about Casey’s gender than did females (n = 9, 3.6%).  
These results indicate a gender difference in the perceived gender of Casey. 
Whether this perception affected the relationships between goals and strategies 
needed further examination. The next section reports a preliminary test of possible 
effects on dependent variables by Casey’s perceived gender and two other variables: 
participants’ gender and type of scenario.
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Table 14 
Crosstabulation of Casey’s Perceived Gender by Participants’ Gender (N = 346) 
 
Participant’s Gender  
Female Male n
Female 213 (85.10%) 58 (60.80%) 271 
Casey’s Perceived Gender Male 28 (11.20%) 32 (33.00%) 60 
 Not clear 9 (3.60%) 6 (6.20%) 15 
103
Multivariate Analysis of Variance and Data Merging 
 The hypothetical conflict scenarios used two versions, one for classmate and 
one for colleague. Previous χ2 test study indicated a gender difference of Casey’s 
perceived gender. Before further analyses, a few decisions had to be made: Should 
data from the two different hypothetical scenarios be merged or treated separately? 
How should participants’ gender and perceptions of Casey’s gender be treated? To 
solve these problems, a multivariate analysis of variance was performed.  
In the analysis, type of scenario (2 levels: classmate vs. colleague), 
participants gender (2 levels: male vs. female), perceived Casey’s gender (3 levels: 
male, female, or unclear), and experimental condition (12 conditions: goal inductions) 
were entered as the independent variables. The dependent variables were the six 
likelihoods of avoidance strategies, represented by their component scores. The 
purpose of the analysis was to test whether type of scenario, participants’ gender, and 
Casey’s gender had main effects or interaction effects with the experimental 
condition on the dependent variables. Further, any other interaction effects between 
the four variables were examined as well. If any of these effects were significant, then 
the corresponding variable should be considered to be an independent variable in later 
analyses. 
Results indicated that type of scenario, participants’ gender, and Casey’s 
gender did not have a main effect or an interaction effect with experimental condition 
on the dependent variables. There was no significant two-way, three-way, or four-
way interaction between the four variables either (Table 15). Multivariate analysis 
statistics on each dependent variable are found in Appendix N.6 Therefore, data from 
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the two hypothetical scenarios were merged. The three variables (type of scenario, 













Freedom p Level 
Condition  .55 2.29 66.00 1278.95 .00
Scenario .98 .48 6.00 238.00 .82
Ps Gender  .96 1.30 6.00 238.00 .25
Cs Gender .94 1.11 12.00 476.00 .34
Scenario × Condition .75 1.02 66.00 1278.95 .41
Scenario × Ps Gender .98 .63 6.00 238.00 .70
Scenario × Cs Gender .98 .34 12.00 476.00 .98
Condition × Ps Gender .75 1.05 66.00 1278.95 .37
Condition × Cs Gender .62 1.07 108.00 1371.16 .28
Ps Gender × Cs Gender .96 .81 12.00 476.00 .63
Scenario × Condition  
× Ps Gender .75 1.17 60.00 1252.01 .17
Scenario × Condition  
× Cs Gender .85 .69 54.00 1218.16 .95
Scenario × Ps Gender  
× Cs Gender .98 .66 6.00 238.00 .67
Condition × Ps Gender × 
Cs Gender .83 .79 54.00 1218.16 .85
Scenario × Condition  
× Ps Gender × Cs Gender .98 .48 6.00 238.00 .81
Note 1. For independent variables, Condition = Experimental Condition, Scenario = 
Type of Scenario, Ps Gender = Participants’ Gender, Cs Gender = Casey’s Gender. 
Note 2. Dependent variables are likelihoods of withdrawal, passive competition, 
pretending, exit, outflanking, and yielding. 
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Reliability  
Two sets of reliability tests for the 14 variables were done. First, Cronbach's 
alphas were calculated for unweighted item scores, listed in the third column of Table 
16. These reliability coefficients provide information about measurement items if a 
researcher were to use the sum or the mean of the items for each variable. Second, the 
last column in Table 16 reports Cronbach's alphas for weighted item scores; the 
weights were determined by the component score coefficients gained in the earlier 
principal component analyses.  
The second set of Cronbach's alphas is directly relevant for the current study, 
because this study used principal components that represented weighted measurement 
items. To obtain a Cronbach's alpha for weighted items that composed the principal 
component, the following procedure was performed: (a) The component score 
coefficient matrix was obtained; (b) each item score was standardized; (c) each 
coefficient of an item used to make up a component score was identified; (d) a new 
weighted score for this item was calculated by multiplying each item's standardized 
score by its coefficient; and (e) Cronbach's alpha was calculated for this component 
score with its four newly weighted item scores. As shown in Table 16, for both 
unweighted and weighted items, Cronbach’s alphas for all 14 variables with their 
measurement items were moderately or highly acceptable
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Table 16 











Importance of the enmity goal 345 .785 .788 
Importance of the support goal 347 .875 .876 
Importance of the instrumental competitive goal 348 .633 .633 
Importance of the instrumental cooperative goal 349 .812 .817 
Likelihood of using withdrawal 351 .757 .762 
Likelihood of using passive competition 349 .776 .777 
Likelihood of using pretending 351 .743 .747 
Likelihood of using exit 350 .791 .791 
Likelihood of using outflanking 350 .685 .690 
Likelihood of using giving in 350 .655 .690 
Likelihood of using accommodation 348 .754 .767 
Likelihood of using domination 348 .708 .719 
Likelihood of using compromise 349 .787 .791 
Likelihood of using integration 350 .838 .843 
Note. The indicators for each variable are found in Appendix J. The transformation 
formulas for the transformed indicators are found in Appendix L. The descriptives for 
the transformed indicators are found in Appendix M. 
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Confirmatory Factor Analyses  
 Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were performed using LISREL 8.70 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004) to test measurement model fit. The goodness-of-fit 
criteria were based mainly on Hu and Bentler’s (1998, 1999) recommendation of 
RMSEA ≤ .06, SRMR ≤ .08, and CFI ≥.95. Hu and Bentler (1998, 1999) made this 
recommendation based on extensive simulation research, and the criteria have been 
largely accepted (e.g., Hancock, 2006). In addition, Hancock and Mueller’s (2001) H
was calculated to estimate the information captured by the indicators (the maximal 
reliability of each measurement model). Tables 17 through 19 present each variable’s 
indicator loadings and the measurement model quality indices. The four importance 
levels of goals (i.e., manipulation checks) are found in Table 17, the likelihoods of the 
six avoidance strategies are found in Table 18, and the likelihoods of accommodation, 
domination, compromise, and integration are found in Table 19.7
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Table 17 
Importance of Goals, Indicator Loadings and Measurement Model Indices 
Importance of Goals and Indicators Unstandardized 
Loadings 
(standardized) 
Enmity Goals  
 
I don’t mind hurting Casey’s feelings. 1.00 (.68)* 
I don’t need to worry whether my words would humiliate Casey; 
the more important thing is to get my way on this project. 
0.02 (.72)* 
I want to make Casey feel inferior. 0.10 (.54)* 
I do not care if Casey would feel upset because of my words. 
 
0.03 (.84)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 11.72, p < .01, RMSEA = .12, SRMR = .03, CFI = .97. H = .825. 
 
Instrumental Competitive Goals  
 
I need to defend my position on the issue.  1.00 (.54)* 
I need to think of ways to actualize my plan on this project. 1.91 (.52)* 
I need to make Casey submit to my ideas. 27.67 (.60)* 
I should plan on doing this project according to my ideas.  
 
27.57 (.55)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 6.29, p = .05, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .03, CFI = .97. H = .640. 
 
Support Goals 
I care about how Casey feels because I want to maintain a good 
relationship with Casey. 
1.00 (.81)* 
I will be careful not to hurt Casey because I truly care how Casey 
feels. 
0.73 (.92)* 
It is important for me to let Casey feel my affection and care. 11.20 (.70)* 
It is important for me to protect Casey’s feelings.  
 
11.95 (.75)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 21.69, p < .001, RMSEA = .17, SRMR = .03, CFI = .97. H = .906. 
 
Instrumental Cooperative Goals  
 
I should avoid words or actions that might make our 
communication break down because I need to work with Casey 
again. 
1.00 (.89)* 
I need to keep good communication with Casey because we have 
to work together. 
11.02 (.67)* 
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Table 17 (Cont’d) 
Importance of Goals, Indicator Loadings and Measurement Model Indices 
Importance of Goals and Indicators Unstandardized 
Loadings 
(standardized) 
Instrumental Cooperative Goals  
 
I should plan on keeping the communication going just for the 
sake of future teamwork with Casey. 
13.02 (.52)* 
I should be careful with word choice because I need to work with 
Casey again in the future. 
 
0.94 (.58)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 5.75, p = .07, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .02, CFI = .99. H = .834. 
 
* p < .01. 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients resulted from the analyses of relevant covariance 
matrix. The LISREL syntax is found in Appendix O. Bold values represent 
unstandardized loadings of reference indicators. 
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Table 18 
Likelihoods of Avoidance Strategies, Indicator Loadings and Measurement Model 
Indices 





In the rest of the meeting, I will stop arguing and leave the scene. 1.00 (.58)* 
In the rest of the meeting, I’ll just shut up and stop responding. 1.30 (.79)* 
I’ll just sit there and zip my mouth in the rest of the meeting. 1.35 (.83)* 
If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I will just step out. 0.06 (.43)* 
 




In the rest of the meeting, I will stop arguing with Casey but start doing 
what I want, pretending not to hear Casey’s nagging. 
1.00 (.64)* 
I’ll focus on doing the project as I want and don’t have to argue back. 0.07 (.60)* 
In the rest of the meeting, I’ll play deaf and do the project as I have 
planned. 
1.08 (.75)* 
On the spot, even though I will stop arguing, I will start doing the project 
as I want.   
1.15 (.74)* 
 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 1.00, p = .61, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .01, CFI = .99. H = .790.
Pretending 
If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I will pretend nothing’s 
wrong by talking about something else. 
1.00 (.69)* 
If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I’ll switch the topic on 
the spot. 
1.31 (.88)* 
On the spot, I will stop arguing and suggest we say or do something else. 40.97 (.48)* 
In the rest of the meeting, I will try to keep the communication going by 
shifting the topic. 
 
43.68 (.55)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 1.48, p = .48, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .01, CFI = .99. H = .835.
Exit 
 
After the meeting, I will ask the instructor (boss) to remove me from the 
team. I will also make sure that I won’t have Casey as a friend. 
1.00 (.74)* 
It is fine for me to move on without this project or Casey in my life. 0.99 (.70)* 
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Table 18 (Cont’d) 
Likelihoods of Avoidance Strategies, Indicator Loadings and Measurement Model 
Indices 




I’ll give up my ideas on this project and maybe never talk to Casey again. 0.84 (.67)* 
After the meeting, I won’t want to be discussing anything, or even talking with 
Casey any more. 
 
0.95 (.67)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 2.72, p = .26, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .02, CFI = .99. H = .775.
Outflanking 
After the meeting, I will try to solve the problem indirectly without having to 
discuss it with Casey again. 
1.00 (.43)* 
After the meeting, I will talk to our professor (boss) about my ideas without any 
more discussion with Casey. 
1.66 (.69)* 
After the meeting, I’ll come up with some sideway strategy (talk to our 
professor [boss] or do something else) to actualize my ideas. 
174.00 (.74)* 
After the meeting, I’ll try something else to actualize my plan for the project but 
not through another debate with Casey. 
122.93 (.53)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 3.95, p = .14, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .02, CFI = .99. H = .732.
Yielding 
 
After the meeting, I will restrain myself from arguing about the project with 
Casey in our future conversations. 
1.00 (.20)* 
After the meeting, I’ll give up my ideas and remain Casey’s friend. 0.04 (.59)* 
I want to be, or remain, Casey’s friend and will never mention our different 
ideas about the project again. 
0.04 (.83)* 
After the meeting, I’ll be, or remain, Casey’s friend but I’ll be careful not to 
mention our argument on the project in our conversations. 
5.30 (.72)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 5.42, p = .07, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .03, CFI = .99. H = .794.
* p < .01. 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients resulted from the analyses of relevant covariance 
matrix. The LISREL syntax is found in Appendix O. Bold values represent 
unstandardized loadings of reference indicators. 
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Table 19 
Likelihoods of Accommodation, Domination, Compromise, and Integration, Indicator 
Loadings and Measurement Model Indices 





I will try to satisfy Casey’s needs during the meeting. 1.00 (.61)* 
I will not give in to Casey’s wishes.  16.77 (.47)* 
I will try to satisfy Casey’s expectations. 26.68 (.74)* 
I will not bend over backwards to accommodate Casey’s wishes.  0.12 (.29)* 
I will like going along with Casey’s suggestions.  20.22 (.59)* 
I will accommodate Casey’s needs. 29.05 (.80)* 
 




I will exert pressure on Casey to reach a solution leaning towards my 
ideas. 
1.00 (.71)* 
I will use my power to get my way.  0.01 (.81)* 
I will not use influence to get my ideas accepted.  0.03 (.38)* 
I will use my expertise to make Casey accept my ideas. 
 
0.04 (.59)* 
χ²(2, N = 346) = 4.22, p = .12, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .02, CFI = .99. H = .789. 
 
Compromise 
I will try to find a middle course or compromise to solve the problem. 1.00 (.54)* 
If deadlock happens, I will take a moderate position to resolve the conflict. 15.52 (.51)* 
I will bargain with Casey to get a middle ground. 10.92 (.72)* 
I will try to work out a compromise that gives both of us some of what we 
want. 
11.19 (.82)* 
I will try to give and take so that moderate profits can be obtained. 11.21 (.72)* 
 
χ²(5, N = 346) = 4.16, p = .53, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .02, CFI = .99. H = .833. 
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Table 19 (Cont’d) 
Likelihoods of Accommodation, Domination, Compromise, and Integration, Indicator 
Loadings and Measurement Model Indices 





I do not want to collaborate with Casey to make decisions.  1.00 (.47)* 
I will work with Casey to find a solution that satisfies the expectations of 
both of us. 
139.52 (.78)* 
I will work closely with Casey for a proper understanding of what both of 
us want.  
10.47 (.80)* 
I am willing to exchange information openly with Casey to reach the best 
solution. 
205.98 (.77)* 
I will bring all our concerns out in the open to reach an agreement in the 
best possible way. 
 
21.56 (.75)* 
χ²(5, N = 346) = 17.76, p = .003, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .03, CFI = .98. H = .864. 
* p < .01. 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients resulted from the analyses of relevant covariance 
matrix. The LISREL syntax is found in Appendix O. Bold values represent 
unstandardized loadings of reference indicators. 
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As shown in Tables 17 through 19, most of the measurement models had a 
good fit according to the model fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 1998, 1999). Five 
measurement models for avoidance strategies had a good fit; the exception was the 
model for withdrawal. The measurement model for withdrawal had the largest χ²
among all measurement models presented here. Its RMSEA was greater than .10 and 
CFI less than .90. The wording of two measurement items of withdrawal may need 
improvement: “In the rest of the meeting, I’ll just shut up and stop responding,” and 
“I’ll just sit there and zip my mouth in the rest of the meeting.” All four items were 
kept in the measurement model, however, because more items were preferred than 
fewer items in SEM (Gagné & Hancock, 2006, Marsh et al., 1998). Each additional 
item reduces the sample size needed to make the model converge (Gagné & Hancock, 
2006; Marsh et al., 1998). Further, each additional item increases the maximal 
reliability of the measurement model because the information about the construct 
captured by the observed items is increased (Gagné & Hancock, 2006; Hancock & 
Mueller, 2001).  
The measurement models for instrumental competitive goals and instrumental 
cooperative goals were acceptable, and fit better than the models for enmity and 
support goals. The measurement models for the other conflict strategies measured by 
ROCI-II had acceptable or good fit. 
 For H (Hancock & Mueller, 2001), with a sample of 352, an acceptable 
magnitude equals .719 (using interpolation based in Table 3 in Gagné & Hancock, 
2006) for a measurement model with four indicators. Using this criterion, only the 
model for the instrumental competitive goals was a little lacking (H = .640); all other 
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models had an H greater than .719. Because the other fit indices for instrumental 
competitive goals were acceptable, the corresponding measurement model was 
considered adequate in the overall analysis. 
Manipulation Checks 
To check whether the 12 experimental conditions effectively induced the 
desired importance levels in the targeted goals, four analyses of variances with 
planned contrasts were performed. In all four analyses, the independent variable was 
the experimental condition with planned contrast coefficients. The dependent 
variables were the importance levels of the four goal types, each tested in a separate 
analysis. The first component scores for goal importance from earlier principal 
component analyses were used to represent the dependent variables.  
Table 20 indicates how each type of goal was coded to reflect the 
manipulation of an experimental condition that tested each specific hypothesis. For 
example, H1a states that importance of support goals positively predicts likelihood of 
withdrawal; thus the other three types of goals have a coefficient of 0 and the 
coefficient for support goals is positive. H2 states that importance of rivalry goals 
positively yet importance of cooperative goals negatively predicts likelihood of 
passive competition. Because rivalry goals comprise enmity goals and instrumental 
competitive goals, and cooperative goals comprise support goals and instrumental 
cooperative goals, the coefficients for enmity goals and instrumental competitive 
goals were coded as positive whereas the coefficients for support goal and 
instrumental cooperative goal were coded as negative. Using the same logic, the four 
types of goals in each condition were assigned a positive, negative, or null value. 
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The magnitude of each coefficient was determined such that the sum of the 
induction coefficients for the same goal across 12 conditions equals zero. For 
example, because enmity goals were not manipulated in Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 9 (in 
testing H1a, H1b, H1c, and H5), were manipulated to be high in Condition 4 (in 
testing H2), and were manipulated to be low in Conditions 5, 6, 7, 8 , 10, 11, 12 (in 
testing H3a, H3b, H3c, H4, H6a, H6b, and H6c), a coefficient of 0 was assigned for 
the importance of enmity goals in Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 9, .98 in Condition 4, and  
-.14 in Conditions 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12, respectively. The sum of the coefficients 
for the importance of enmity goals across the 12 conditions equals 0. The same logic 
was used to assign coefficients for the other three types of goals. 
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Table 20 
Coding Coefficients in Contrast Analyses 
Dependent 
Variable 










1 H1a    0    0  .17    0 
2 H1b    0    0    0  .14 
Withdrawal 
Withdrawal 
Withdrawal 3 H1c    0    0  .17  .14 
Passive 
competition 
4 H2  .98  .49 -.34 -.49 
5 H3a -.14 -.14  .17    0 
6 H3b -.14 -.14    0  .14 
Pretending 
Pretending 
Pretending 7 H3c -.14 -.14  .17  .14 
Exit 8 H4 -.14 -.14 -.34 -.49 
Outflanking 9 H5    0  .49 -.34  .14 
10 H6a -.14 -.14  .17    0 
11 H6b -.14 -.14   0  .14 
Yielding 
Yielding 
Yielding 12 H6c -.14 -.14  .17  .14 
 
Sum of coefficients     0    0    0    0 
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Four ANOVAs with planned contrasts were performed to test whether the 
experimental condition had a main effect on each of the dependent variables based on 
the contrast codings. Results indicated that the manipulations were all successful. In 
all four analyses, Levene’s statistics of homogeneity was non-significant at the .05 
level, and thus the hypothesis of population homoscedasticity was not rejected (all ps
> .20). For the importance of enmity goals, the experimental condition had a 
significant effect with planned contrast coefficients, F(11, 333) = 7.09, p < .001, η2 =
.19. For the importance of instrumental competitive goals, the experimental condition 
had a significant effect, F(11, 337) = 10.44, p < .001, η2 = .25. For the importance of 
support goals, the effect of the experimental condition was significant, F(11, 338) = 
26.59, p < .001, η2 = .46. For the importance of instrumental cooperative goals, the 
effect of the experimental condition was significant, F(11, 333) = 7.09, p < .001, η2 =
.19. The manipulations, therefore, were successful overall. 
Model Assessment and Hypotheses Testing 
The hypotheses were tested with structural equation modeling (SEM) using 
LISREL 8.70 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The model included structural and 
measurement components. Two hierarchical models were tested to see whether 
manipulations in the 12 experimental conditions had both direct and indirect effects 
on the likelihoods of avoidance strategies, or had indirect effects via manipulation 
checks only. 
Model Assessment 
 Model A (Figure 2) illustrates the proposition that all the links from 
experimental conditions to the outcome variables were mediated through 
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manipulation checks. Model B (Figure 3) illustrates the proposition that not all effects 
from manipulations to outcome variables are through manipulation checks; rather, a 
manipulation may have a direct effect on its corresponding outcome variable. These 
two propositions were tested through a nested model comparison. Model 
specifications for Models A and B are listed in Tables 21 and 22, separately. 
Note that Figures 2 and 3 only describe the structural model of the 
relationships between conflict goals and avoidance strategies. The measurement 
models of the goals and strategies are not included in the figure although they are 
included in the model. Also, in Figures 2 and 3, two groups of errors of predictions 
were allowed to covary. The first group includes error covariances within the same 
time frame: The errors for the three short-term avoidance strategies, withdrawal, 
passive competition, and pretending, were allowed to covary, and the errors for the 
three long-term avoidance strategies, exit, outflanking, and yielding, were allowed to 
covary.  The reason for allowing such covariances is that, according to Pilot Studies 
results, phrases that define time duration appeared important to distinguish different 
strategies. Therefore, phrases such as “in the meeting,” “on the spot,” and “in the rest 
of the meeting” were used in the items that measure the three short-term avoidance 
strategies. “After the meeting” was used in the items that measure the three long-term 
avoidance strategies. Such similar wording in time framing may have an effect on the 
avoidance strategies in the same time frame above and beyond the covariances 
explained by the independent variables.  
The second group of errors allowed to covary includes the error covariances 
of the avoidance strategies that differ only along the time frame (i.e., short-term vs. 
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long-term): withdrawal and exit, passive competition and outflanking, and pretending 
and yielding. For avoidance strategies that only differ in time duration, goals (the 
independent variables) explain some of their covariances, but other factors such as 
personality characteristics (shyness, disliking direct communication, not being 
argumentative, and so on) may also be reasons for an individual to use one avoidance 
strategy both short-term and long-term. In this case, allowing the corresponding pair 































Figure 2. Structural relations between manipulations and avoidance strategies mediated fully through manipulation checks




Structural Equations of Fully Mediated Relations between Goal Inductions and Avoidance Strategies (Model A)
η η1 η2 η3 η4 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ7 ξ8 ξ9 ξ10 ξ11 ζ
η1 = γ14 γ15 γ16 γ17 γ19 γ1,10 γ1,11 ζ1
η2 = γ24 γ25 γ26 γ27 γ27 γ29 γ2,10 γ2,11 ζ2
η3 = γ31 γ33 γ34 γ35 γ37 γ38 γ39 γ3,11 ζ3
η4 = γ42 γ43 γ44 γ46 γ47 γ48 γ4,10 γ4,11 ζ4
η5 = β53 β54 ζ5
η6 = β61 β62 β63 β64 ζ6
η7 = β71 β72 β73 β74 ζ7
η8 = β81 β82 β83 β84 ζ8
η9 = β92 β93 β94 ζ9
η10 = β10,1 β10,2 β10,3 β10,4 ζ10
Note. ξ1 through ξ11 are the 11 dummy coded variables as shown in Table 10. η1 through η4 represent importance of enmity
goals, importance of instrumental competitive goals, importance of support goals, and importance of instrumental
cooperative goals, respectively. η5 through η10 represent likelihood of withdrawal, likelihood of passive competition,
































Figure 3. Structural relations between manipulations and avoidance strategies partially mediated through manipulation checks.
(Model B; covariance matrix in Appendix Q).
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Table 22
Structural Equations of Partially Mediated Relations between Goal Inductions and Avoidance Strategies (Model B)
η η1 η2 η3 η4 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ7 ξ8 ξ9 ξ10 ξ11 ζ
η1 = γ14 γ15 γ16 γ17 γ19 γ1,10 γ1,11 ζ1
η2 = γ24 γ25 γ26 γ27 γ27 γ29 γ2,10 γ2,11 ζ2
η3 = γ31 γ33 γ34 γ35 γ37 γ38 γ39 γ3,11 ζ3
η4 = γ42 γ43 γ44 γ46 γ47 γ48 γ4,10 γ4,11 ζ4
η5 = β53 β54 γ51 γ52 γ53 ζ5
η6 = β61 β62 β63 β64 γ64 ζ6
η7 = β71 β72 β73 β74 γ75 γ76 γ77 ζ7
η8 = β81 β82 β83 β84 ζ8
η9 = β92 β93 β94 γ98 ζ9
η10 = β10,1 β10,2 β10,3 β10,4 γ10,9 γ10,10 γ10,11 ζ10
Note. ξ1 through ξ11 are the 11 dummy coded variables as shown in Table 10. η1 through η4 represent importance of enmity
goals, importance of instrumental competitive goals, importance of support goals, and importance of instrumental
cooperative goals, respectively. η5 through η10 represent likelihood of withdrawal, likelihood of passive competition,
likelihood of pretending, likelihood of exit, likelihood of outflanking, and likelihood of yielding, respectively.
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Overall model fit and model comparisons. For Model A, χ²(1,113, N = 346) = 
2,176.78, p < .05, RMSEA = .052 with a 90% CI of (.049, .055), SRMR = .07, CFI = 
.94, TLI = .93. Although the χ² estimate was enormous, the model was retained for 
three reasons. First, as compared with the null model where a zero covariance was 
assumed between any pair of constructs, Model A had a significantly better fit. For 
the null model, χ²(740, N = 346) = 4,016.79, p < .05, RMSEA = .11 with a 90% CI of 
(.11, .12), SRMR = .21, CFI = .87, TLI = .86. A model comparison indicated that 
Model A was significantly improved from the null model, ∆χ² (N = 346) = 1,840.01, 
∆df = 373, p < .001. 
Second, Model A has a decent goodness of fit when taking multiple fit indices 
into consideration. SEM researchers (e.g., Bollen, 1989) have recommended using 
multiple fit indices to estimate the fitness of a model because all the fit indices have 
their advantages and disadvantages. Again, based on Hu and Bentler’s (1998, 1999) 
recommended use of RMSEA ≤ .06 and SRMR ≤ .08, the current model suggested a 
close fit of the data to the proposed model. Hu and Bentler (1998, 1999) have also 
shown that CFI and TLI perform well in samples of different sizes when the 
estimation is based on maximum likelihood estimation; indeed, they recommended 
using these two indices for a sample with N ≥ 250.  
 Hu and Bentler (1995) suggested a cutoff point of .90 for CFI and TLI for an 
acceptable fit. Hu and Bentler (1999) raised the bar of CFI and TLI to .95 for a stable
acceptable fit (e.g., across different samples). This criterion, however, has been
criticized for being too restrictive (e.g. Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). Model A has a 
CFI of .94 and a TLI of .93, and small RMSEA and SRMR indices. When these
127
multiple fit indices were taken into account, Model A was acceptable.
Third, χ² is sensitive to the sample size. Kenny (2003) argued that χ² is a 
reasonable measure of model fit with a sample of 75 to 200, but should not be used as 
a measure of model fit when N > 200. Kline (2005) argued that for N > 100, the ratio 
of χ²/df is an effective measure of fit, and a ratio of less than 3.00 is acceptable. For 
the current model, χ²/df = 1.95. Based on the examination of multiple indices and 
recommendations for a large sample size, the proposed model appeared to have a 
good fit. 
 Next, Models A and B were compared to see whether the manipulations had 
direct effects on the outcome variables above and beyond the mediating effects 
through manipulation checks. For Model B, which had both direct and indirect links 
to the dependent variables, χ²(1,102, N = 346) = 2,168.58, p < .05, SRMR = .07, 
RMSEA = .052 with a 90% CI of (.049, .056), CFI = 94, TLI = .93. A nested model 
comparison indicates that Model B did not fit better than Model A, ∆χ² (N = 346) = 
8.20, ∆df = 11, p > .05. Because the fit indices of Model B were not better than those 
for Model A, Model A was preferred to Model B because Model A was more 
parsimonious. Unstandardized structural coefficients are reported in Table 23. Error 
variances and covariances are reported in Table 24. 
128
Table 23
Unstandardized Structural Coefficients in Model A
η η1 η2 η3 η4 ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4 ξ5 ξ6 ξ7 ξ8 ξ9 ξ10 ξ11
η1 29.47* -3.79 3.56 -11.04* 1.51 -1.07 -4.97
η2 8.47* -0.93 2.74 -3.73* -2.21 -0.82 1.06 -2.90
η3 19.52* 21.08* -25.94* 22.50* 26.63* 0.08 25.92* 24.92*
η4 8.94* 5.14 -35.78* 8.37* 13.16* 12.94* 12.57* 13.28*
η5 -0.01 -0.05
η6 -0.04 1.10* -0.01 -0.09*
η7 -0.37* 0.92* -0.13 0.09
η8 0.40* 1.34* -0.48* 0.01
η9 1.04* -0.05 0.07
η10 0.09 -0.14 0.17* -0.01
*p < .05.
Note. ξ1 through ξ11 are the 11 dummy coded variables as shown in Table 10. η1 through η4 represent importance of enmity
goals, importance of instrumental competitive goals, importance of support goals, and importance of instrumental
cooperative goals, respectively. η5 through η10 represent likelihood of withdrawal, likelihood of passive competition,
likelihood of pretending, likelihood of exit, likelihood of outflanking, and likelihood of yielding, respectively.
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Table 24 
Error Variances and Covariances for Mediating and Outcome Variables in Model A 
 ς1 ς2 ς3 ς4 ς5 ς6 ς7 ς8 ς9 ς10 
ς1 411.26*             
ς2 52.81*         
ς3 298.96*        
ς4 431.74*       
ς5 65.93**      
ς6 29.50** 104.71**     
ς7 45.54** 33.83* 303.40**    
ς8 45.68**   81.96**   
ς9 32.45**  -3.69 97.66**  
ς10 14.85* -3.38 4.23 12.41 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
Note. ς1 = Error term of the importance of enmity goals; ς2 = Error term of the 
importance of instrumental competitive goals; ς3 = Error term of the importance of 
support goals; ς4 = Error term of the importance of instrumental cooperative goals; ς5
= Error term of likelihood of withdrawal; ς6 = Error term of the likelihood of passive 
competition; ς7 = Error term of the likelihood of pretending; ς8 = Error term of 
likelihood of exit; ς9 = Error term of the likelihood of outflanking; ς10 = Error term of 
likelihood of yielding. 
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Interpretations of significant structural loadings. Structural coefficients that 
represent the relations between the dummy variables (ξs) and the importance of goals 
(η1 through η4), and between the importance of goals (η1 through η4) and the 
likelihood of avoidance strategies (η5 through η10) are reported in Table 23. Because 
the dummy coding system used the group of which the importance of the four goals 
to be all low (Condition 8, to predict exit strategy) as the reference group, each γ
coefficient from a ξ to one of the first four ηs reflects the predicted difference in that 
η between the manipulated condition represented by the ξ and the reference group. 
Each β coefficient represents how many units of the likelihood of the relevant 
strategy increase as the importance of the goal increases by one unit, holding all else 
constant. 
The significance tests for γs, as shown in Table 23, were based on a 
comparison with the reference group in Condition 8. Condition 1 created high 
importance of support goals and instrumental cooperative goals. Condition 3, in 
manipulating cooperative goals, only created high importance of support goals, but 
fell short in creating high importance of instrumental cooperative goals. Condition 4 
created high importance of rivalry goals (both enmity and instrumental competitive 
goals) and low importance of cooperative goals (both support and instrumental 
cooperative goals).  
Conditions 5, 6, and 7 were all intended to induce low importance of rivalry 
goals. Condition 5, 6, and 7 were also intended to induce high importance of support 
goals (Condition 5), instrumental cooperative goals (Condition 6), and cooperative 
goals (Condition 7). For Condition 5, the importance of enmity goals and 
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instrumental competitive goals were both non-significant, but the importance of 
support goals was successfully induced. Similarly, for Condition 6, the importance of 
enmity goals and instrumental competitive goals were not significant, but the high 
importance of instrumental cooperative goals was created. Condition 7 successfully 
created low importance of enmity goals and instrumental competitive goals, as well 
as high importance of support goals and instrumental cooperative goals. 
Condition 9 was intended to induce low importance of support goals and high 
importance of instrumental reliance goals. One component of the instrumental 
reliance goals—instrumental cooperative goals—was significant in the planned 
direction. The condition did not create high importance of instrumental competitive 
goals and low importance of support goals. 
Condition 10, 11, and 12 had the same manipulations of goals as in 
Conditions 5, 6, and 7, respectively; the two groups of conditions vary only in the 
temporal duration (i.e., short-term vs. long-term). For Conditions 10 through 12, the 
importance of enmity goals and instrumental competitive goals were not induced in 
the intended direction. However, the importance of cooperative goals was 
successfully induced: High importance of support goals was created in Condition 10, 
high importance of instrumental cooperative goals was created in Condition 11, and 
high importance of cooperative goals was created in Condition 12.  
The β coefficients in Table 23 reflected the changes in the likelihoods of 
avoidance strategies brought about by changes in the importance of goals. 
Withdrawal was hypothesized to be positively influenced by importance of 
cooperative goals, but neither support goals nor instrumental cooperative goals had a 
132
significant effect. Passive competition was caused by high importance of instrumental 
competitive goals and low importance of instrumental cooperative goals; enmity 
goals and support goals were not significant causes.  
Pretending was caused by high importance of instrumental competitive goals 
and low importance of enmity goals. Importance of support goals and importance of 
instrumental cooperative goals were not significant causes of pretending. Exit was 
caused by high importance of enmity goals and instrumental competitive goals and 
low importance of support goals. Importance of instrumental cooperative goals was 
not a significant cause of exit. Outflanking was caused by high importance of 
instrumental competitive goals; importance of support goals and importance of 
instrumental cooperative goals were not significant causes of this strategy. Yielding 
was caused by high importance of support goals. Importance levels of enmity goals, 
instrumental competitive goals, and instrumental cooperative goals were not 
significant causes of yielding.  
Hypotheses Testing 
 To test the 12 hypotheses that state the relationships between the importance 
of goals and the likelihoods of avoidance strategies, the total effects of the 
experimental conditions on their relevant outcome variables were examined. 
 H1a states that the importance of support goals positively predicts the 
likelihood of withdrawal, ceteris paribus. The hypothesis was not supported. The total 
effect from Condition 1 to unresponsiveness was not significant, total effect b =
-0.01, z = -0.03, p > .05.  
 H1b states that the importance of instrumental cooperative goals positively 
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predicts the likelihood of unresponsiveness, ceteris paribus. The hypothesis was not 
supported. The total effect from Condition 2 to unresponsiveness was not significant, 
total effect b = -0.45, z = -1.40, p > .05.  
 H1c states that the importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the 
likelihood of unresponsiveness, ceteris paribus. The hypothesis was not supported. 
The total effect from Condition 3 to unresponsiveness was not significant, total effect 
b = -0.27, z = -0.47, p > .05. 
 H2 states that ceteris paribus, the combined effect of high importance of 
rivalry goals and low importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the 
likelihood of passive competition. The hypothesis was supported, total effect b =
11.65, z = 4.85, p < .01. The total effect from Condition 4 to passive competition was 
significant. 
 H3a states that the combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and 
high importance of support goals positively predicts the likelihood of pretending, 
ceteris paribus. The total effect from Condition 5 to pretending was not significant, 
total effect b = -2.35, z = -1.15, p > .05. The hypothesis was not supported. 
 H3b states that the combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and 
high importance of instrumental cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood 
of pretending, ceteris paribus. The total effect from Condition 6 to pretending was not 
significant, total effect b = 1.99, z = 1.41, p > .05. The hypothesis was not supported. 
 H3c states that the combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and 
high importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood of pretending, 
ceteris paribus. The total effect from Condition 7 to pretending was not significant, 
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total effect b = -1.53, z = -0.76, p > .05. The hypothesis was not supported. 
 H4 states that the importance of reliance goals negatively predicts the 
likelihood of exit, ceteris paribus. Because the condition to test H4 was used as the 
reference group in the dummy coding, the coefficients from the importance of the 
four goals to exit, instead of a total effect, were examined. Although the importance 
of support goals (b = 0.48, z = -7.02, p < .01) negatively predicted exit, the 
importance of enmity goals (b = 0.40, z = 3.44, p < .01) and instrumental competitive 
goals (b = 1.34, z = 4.14, p < .01) positively predicted exit. The importance of 
instrumental cooperative goals (b = 0.01, z = 0.07, p > .05) did not predict exit. 
Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported. Even if the total effect from Condition 8 
to exit were significant, the directions of some individual coefficients were not in 
accordance with the hypothesis. 
 H5 states that the combined effect of low importance of support goals and 
high importance of instrumental reliance goals positively predicts the likelihood of 
outflanking, ceteris paribus. The total effect from Condition 9 to outflanking was not 
significant, total effect b = -1.43, z = -1.01, p > .05. The hypothesis was not 
supported. 
 H6a states that the combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and 
high importance of support goals positively predicts the likelihood of yielding, ceteris 
paribus. The total effect from Condition 10 to yielding was significant, total effect b =
4.78, z = 2.88, p < .01. The hypothesis was supported. 
 H6b states that the combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and 
high importance of instrumental cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood 
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of yielding, ceteris paribus. The hypothesis was not supported: The total effect from 
Condition 11 to yielding was not significant, total effect b = 0.20, z = 0.35, p > .05. 
 H6c states the combined effect of low importance of rivalry goals and high 
importance of cooperative goals positively predicts the likelihood of yielding, ceteris 
paribus. The total effect from Condition 11 to yielding was significant, total effect b =
4.19, z = 2.86, p < .01. The hypothesis was supported. 
Post-Hoc Analyses 
 Three post-hoc analyses were conducted to further explore the relationships 
between interpersonal conflict goals and the likelihood of conflict strategies. First, 
principal component analyses were performed on the types of goals and the types of 
avoidance strategies to identify the characteristics of the principal component(s) 
formed in each group; a follow-up SEM was performed to investigate the 
relationships between the extracted principal components. Second, the importance 
levels of the four goals were used to predict the likelihoods of the other four conflict 
strategies proposed in the previous two-dimensional conflict strategy literature (i.e., 
accommodation, domination, compromise, and integration; Rahim, 1983). Finally, to 
explore the relationships between the avoidance strategies and the other conflict 
strategies, a principal component analysis was performed among all the conflict 
strategies used in the study.  
Goals and Avoidance Strategies 
 Interrelations among avoidance strategies. To test the interrelationships 
among the six types of avoidance strategies, a principal component analysis with 
oblique rotation was performed. As indicated earlier (i.e., in Table 10), the six 
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variables were represented by their first principal components extracted from their 
indicators. Two components with an eigenvalue above 1 were maintained. The scree 
plot is shown in Figure 4.  
 Four strategies that appear to be passively aggressive, or involving a 
communication breakdown, loaded highly together on the first component: 
withdrawal, passive competition, exit, and outflanking. The second component 
contained two avoidance strategies that involve communication maintenance: 
pretending and yielding (see Table 25). Thus, the first component, with an eigenvalue 
of 2.76 explaining 46.01% of the total variance, was labeled communication avoidant 
strategies. The second component, with an eigenvalue of 1.25 explaining 20.79% of 
the variance, was named issue avoidant strategies. The correlation between the two 
components was .14 (p < .05). 
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Figure 4. Scree plot for the principal components extracted from the likelihood of the 
six avoidance strategies. Each variable was represented by its first component scores 
extracted from its indicators as shown in Table 10. 
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Table 25 




Withdrawal .723 .351 
Passive Competition .870 -.016 
Pretending .380 .601 
Exit .857 -.201 
Outflanking .677 -.023 
Yielding -.217 .895 
Eigenvalue 2.76 1.25 
% Variance Explained 46.01% 20.79% 
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Interrelations among goals. Another principal component analysis was 
performed on the four types of goals. Again, as indicated earlier (i.e., in Table 10), 
the four variables were represented by their first component scores extracted from 
their indicators. One component with an eigenvalue of 2.33, explaining 58.23% of the 
total variance, was extracted with Kaiser’s rule (see the scree plot in Figure 5). The 
two competitive goals (enmity goals and instrumental competitive goals) had high 
negative loadings on this component, whereas the two cooperative goals (support 
goals and instrumental cooperative goals) had high positive loadings (Table 26). 
Therefore, the data suggest that competitive goals and cooperative goals are at the 
ends of one component. This component was labeled cooperation-competition. 
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Figure 5. Scree plot for the principal components extracted from the importance of 
the four goals. Each variable was represented by its first component scores extracted 




Loadings of the Four Goal Importance Variables on One Principal Component 
Component 
1
Enmity Goals -.860 
Instrumental Competitive Goals -.634 
Support Goals .804 
Instrumental Cooperative Goals .735 
Eigenvalue 2.33 
% Variance Explained 58.23% 
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Relationships among the three extracted components. To further explore the 
relationship between the two avoidance components and the goal component, SEM 
was performed using LISREL 8.70. The three variables were represented by their 
principal components separately. The extracted principal component of cooperation-
competition was entered as the independent variable; the extracted principal 
components of communication avoidant strategies and issue avoidant strategies were 
entered as the dependent variables. Errors were allowed to covary. The model was 
just-identified. 
Both structural coefficients from cooperation-competition to the 
communication avoidant strategies (b = -.46, z = -9.64, p < .001, R2 = .276) and to the 
issue avoidant strategies (b = .42, z = 8.45, p < .001, R2 = .176) were significant 
(Figure 6). Importance of cooperative goals positively predicted whereas importance 
of competitive goals negatively predicted likelihood of issue avoidant strategies. The 
opposite prediction was true for communication avoidant strategies: Importance of 
cooperative goals negatively predicted whereas importance of competitive goals 
positively predicted likelihood of communication avoidant strategies. This model was 
just-identified. 
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Figure 6. Structural relations between cooperation-competition and communication 















Regressing Likelihoods of Other Conflict Strategies on Importance of Goals 
 This post-hoc analysis was done to test the linear relationships between the 
importance of the four goals and the likelihood of four other types of strategies 
proposed in the conflict literature: accommodation, domination, compromise, and 
integration. All the variables were represented by their first principal components 
based on the earlier principal component analyses.  
 The importance of the four goals together significantly predicted the 
likelihood of accommodation, F(4, 333) = 32.57, p < .001, R2 = .281, adjusted R2 =
.273. Enmity goals (b = -.13, t[333] = -2.04, p < .05) and support goals (b = .36, 
t[333] = 5.84, p < .001) had significant unique contributions to accommodation, but 
instrumental competitive goals (b = .07, t[333] = 1.29, p > .05) and instrumental 
cooperative goals (b = .09, t[333] = 1.54, p > .05) did not make significant unique 
contributions to the prediction. 
 The importance of the four goals together significantly predicted the 
likelihood of domination, F(4, 334) = 46.17, p < .001, R2 = .356, adjusted R2 = .348. 
Enmity goals (b = .28, t[334] = 4.42, p < .001) and instrumental competitive goals (b
= .39, t[334] = 7.72, p < .001) had significant unique contributions to domination, but 
support goals (b = .01, t[334] < 1) and instrumental cooperative goals (b = -.04, t[334] 
< 1) did not make significant unique contributions to the prediction. 
 The importance of the four goals together significantly predicted the 
likelihood of compromise, F(4, 334) = 26.36, p < .001, R2 = .240, adjusted R2 = .231. 
Enmity goals negatively (b = -.31, t[334] = -4.57, p < .001) yet instrumental 
cooperative goals positively (b = .25, t[334] = 4.26, p < .001) predicted compromise. 
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Support goals (b = -.02, t[334] < 1) and instrumental competitive goals (b = -.05, 
t[334] < 1) did not make significant unique contributions to the prediction. 
 The importance of the four goals together significantly predicted the 
likelihood of integration, F(4, 335) = 45.77, p < .001, R2 = .353, adjusted R2 = .346. 
Similar to the results of compromise, enmity goals negatively (b = -.36, t[335] =  
-5.82, p < .001) yet instrumental cooperative goals positively (b = .30, t[335] = 5.69, 
p < .001) predicted compromise. Support goals (b = .05, t[335] < 1) and instrumental 
competitive goals (b = -.03, t[335] < 1) did not make significant unique contributions 
to the prediction. 
Principal Component Analysis on Avoidance and Other Conflict Strategies 
 To explore how the proposed avoidance strategies relate to the other conflict 
strategies mentioned in the literature (e.g., accommodation, domination, compromise, 
and integration), a principal component analysis with oblique rotation was performed 
among the six avoidance strategies and the four other conflict strategies. 
 The data yielded three components with eigenvalues over 1. The first 
component had an eigenvalue of 3.83 and explained 38.33% of the total variance in 
the set of conflict strategies. The second component had an eigenvalue of 1.93, 
explaining 19.29% of the total variance. The last component had an eigenvalue of 
1.00, explaining 10.01% of the variance. The three components together explained 
67.63% of the total variance. 
 Withdrawal, passive competition, and exit had positive loadings and 
compromise and integration had negative loadings on the first principal component. 
Similar to the structure found among the six avoidance strategies, the loadings on this 
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component all indicate the tendency to cease communication. Pretending, yielding, 
and accommodation had high loadings on the second component. These loadings 
indicate the tendency to maintain communication and avoid argument about an issue. 
As earlier analyses have shown, these three strategies were all caused by high 
importance of some cooperative goals (either instrumental cooperative or support 
goals). This component can be considered as composed of cooperative or 
accommodating strategies. 
 Outflanking and domination loaded highly on the third component, indicating 
that direct and indirect strategies to pursue an issue have much in common. Earlier 
findings have shown that both domination and outflanking are driven by some 
competitive goals. Although outflanking has avoidant features such as avoiding direct 
communication with the other to resolve conflict, the data suggest that outflanking is 
an active method to pursue a conflict, just as domination is.  
 The interrelations between the three principal components are found in Table 
27. The scree plot and the loadings matrix of this principal component analysis are 
displayed in Figure 7 and Table 28, respectively. Table 29 reports the correlation 
coefficients between the likelihoods of conflict strategies. Again, the likelihood of 





Correlation Coefficients Between Three Principal Components Extracted from 
Conflict Strategies (Avoidance and Other) 
Principal Component 1 2
1
2 -.04 
3 .44* -.10 
*p < .01. 
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Figure 7. Scree plot for the principal components among the likelihood of the conflict 
strategies. Each variable was represented by its first component scores extracted from 








Withdrawal  .787 .414 -.023
Passive Competition .776 .051 .175
Pretending .317 .582 .240
Exit .815 -.047 -.007
Outflanking .122 .158 .792
Yielding -.014 .708 -.033
Accommodation -.147 .673 -.221
Domination -.140 -.156 .898
Compromise -.559 .544 -.074
Integration -.741 .422 -.027
Eigenvalue 3.83 1.93 1.00
% Variance Explained 38.33% 19.29% 9.99%
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Table 29 
Correlation Coefficients Between Likelihoods of Conflict Strategies (Avoidance and 
Other) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




3. Pretending .44** .26** 1.00 
4. Exit .54** .65** .24** 1.00 
5. Outflanking .36** .50** .31** .37** 1.00 
6. Yielding .18** -.02 .22** -.18** -.05 1.00 
7. Accommodation .01 -.20** .11* -.21** -.19** .42** 1.00 
8. Domination .12* .35** .07 .26** .45** -.14* -.29** 1.00 
9. Compromise -.17** -.46** -.01 -.36** -.26** .24** .46** -.35** 1.00 
10. Integration -.34** -.57** -.10* -.54** -.33** .21** .42** -.34** .77** 1.00
**p < .01, *p < .05. 
Note. Each variable was represented by its first component score extracted from its 
indicators as shown in Table 10. 
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CHAPTER V  
Discussion 
This chapter consists of four parts. The first part provides a summary of the 
study. The second part summarizes and interprets the results and discusses the study’s 
implications. Limitations of the study and directions for future research compose the 
third part. The chapter ends with the significance of the study and a conclusion. 
Summary of the Study 
This study was designed to answer the following question: Under what 
circumstances do people use avoidance as a strategy to deal with interpersonal 
conflict? This study investigated the links between interpersonal goals and avoidance 
strategies. A typology of goals in interpersonal conflict situations and a typology of 
avoidance strategies were developed. A model that specified 12 situations in which a 
goal or a combination of goals predicted different avoidance strategies was then 
proposed to link interpersonal goals to avoidance strategies. 
Twelve goal inductions corresponding to the 12 hypotheses were created. 
Each goal induction was placed in one of two hypothetical conflict scenarios, thereby 
creating 24 experimental conditions. In all these conditions, a gender neutral name, 
Casey, was used to refer to the hypothetical other person involved in the conflict 
scenarios.  
Prior to the formal study, four pilot studies were conducted to (a) test and 
improve the items that measure the constructs and (b) test and improve the realism of 
manipulations that would be used in the formal study. The experimental 
manipulations and instruments that resulted from these pilot tests were then used in 
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the formal study. 
The formal study involved 352 participants enrolled at a large eastern 
university. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 24 experimental 
conditions. The experiment employed questionnaires. The questionnaire started with 
a scenario that described a hypothetical conflict with Casey and reflected the goal 
manipulation, followed by the manipulation checks to see whether the targeted goals 
in the message had been considered important by the participants. The next part of the 
questionnaire asked the participants to report their likelihood of using different 
strategies (including avoidance and other conflict strategies) to respond to the conflict 
situation. Participants’ demographic information was collected in the last part of the 
questionnaire. 
 Preliminary analyses indicated that type of scenario (classmate vs. colleague) 
did not have a main effect on the likelihoods of avoidance strategies, so the 
conditions differentiated by the two scenarios were merged in further analyses. 
Preliminary analyses also found that indicators in all but one measurement model 
captured the information of their intended constructs, and that the manipulations were 
successful. The hypotheses were evaluated using structural equation modeling. The 
experimental conditions were dummy coded and entered as independent variables. 
The importance levels of goals were mediators, and the likelihoods of avoidance 
strategies were outcome variables. Post-hoc analyses were done to further explore the 
relationships between goals and conflict strategies. 
Summary and Interpretation of Results 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c: The Goals Predicting Withdrawal 
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Withdrawal refers to the avoidance strategy in which the actor avoids both the 
person and the issue in the immediate situation. Because withdrawal signals an 
actor’s effort to avoid further argument, it may be a cooperative strategy. Hence, 
support goals (H1a), instrumental cooperative goals (H1b), and a combination of both 
(H1c) were expected to predict withdrawal.  
However, none of these hypotheses were supported. Indeed, the signs of the 
statistics were negative although not significant, suggesting that withdrawal is not a 
product of cooperative goals. As shown in the later principal component analysis 
among the avoidance strategies, withdrawal is associated with passive competition, 
outflanking, and exit, all of which involve discontinuing communication with the 
other person (i.e., communication avoidant strategies). These four avoidance 
strategies are also caused by high competition and low cooperation. The principal 
component analysis among all the conflict strategies further confirmed the 
competitive element in withdrawal through its association with passive competition 
and exit, and its distance from two cooperative strategies, compromise and 
integration. Therefore, withdrawal implies more competition than cooperation. 
Hypothesis 2: The Goals Predicting Passive Competition 
 Passive competition refers to the actor’s avoidance of the person in the 
immediate situation but not of the issue. Because passive competition is a bold face-
threatening act that undermines involvement in communication, passive competition 
suggests little concern for cooperation for either affection needs (support goals) or 
instrumental purposes (instrumental cooperative goals). Passive competition shows 
the actor’s high need for actualizing his or her wishes (instrumental competitive 
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goals) and high need for putting his or her feelings above the other (enmity goals). 
Therefore, H2 states that the presence of both high importance of rivalry goals and 
low importance of cooperative goals predicts passive competition.  
H2 was supported. Importance of instrumental competitive goals and enmity 
goals positively predicted while importance of instrumental cooperative goals and 
support goals negatively predicted likelihood of passive competition. Among the four 
goals, the importance of instrumental competitive goals contributed the most to a 
greater likelihood of passive competition, followed by the importance placed on 
instrumental cooperative goals. These findings suggest that passive competition is a 
strategy that results mainly from high concerns for instrumental gains. 
Although domination was also predicted by instrumental competitive goals, 
the decision to use passive competition or domination seems to be determined by the 
actor’s concern for future cooperation with the other person. Low importance of 
instrumental cooperative goals led to passive competition, but it did not lead to 
domination. These findings suggest that when people have high instrumental 
competitive needs, they may choose to argue with the other party until he or she 
submits (i.e., domination) or start doing what they want without further efforts of 
verbal engagement (i.e., passive competition). The latter is more likely to occur when 
the actor does not need to worry about future cooperation with the other party. As 
argued in the first chapter, passive competition, involving some conflict avoidance, 
may be a more aggressive strategy than domination. 
Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c: The Goals Predicting Pretending 
Pretending is avoiding the issue but not the person in the immediate conflict 
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situation. Because pretending demonstrates the actor’s effort to maintain 
communication, it may be a strategy preceded by high importance of cooperation 
together with low importance of competition; the cooperative purpose can originate 
from support goals (H3a), instrumental cooperative goals (H3b), or both (H3c). 
 These hypotheses were not supported. Nevertheless, two intriguing findings in 
the post-hoc analyses relate to this set of hypotheses. First, pretending was predicted 
positively by cooperative goals and negatively by competitive goals. In other words, 
the higher the importance placed on cooperative goals, the more likely the pretending. 
Because the post-hoc principal component analysis among the four goals indicates 
that enmity goals and support goals were at opposite ends of a single component, and 
pretending was negatively predicted by enmity goals, pretending should be positively 
predicted by support goals. 
 Second, an examination of β coefficients from the importance of goals to 
pretending leads to the finding that high importance of instrumental competitive goals 
causes pretending (see Table 23). Although pretending clustered with yielding and 
accommodation in the post-hoc principal component analysis, pretending has an 
important difference from the other two regarding their antecedents: High importance 
of instrumental competitive goals is a cause of pretending, but not a cause of yielding 
or accommodation. This finding suggests that avoiding the issue during the 
interaction (i.e., pretending) is quite different from avoiding the issue in the long run 
(i.e., yielding and accommodation). Communication maintenance in the immediate 
situation is not necessarily a sign that the actor gives up on the issue. Instead, 
competitive goals may motivate a person to use pretending. Pretending could be used 
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to prevent a relationship from deterioration through unpleasant verbal engagement. 
Then other ways may be sought to actualize competitive goals. In contrast, yielding 
and accommodation did not have competitive goals as antecedents. Yielding and 
accommodation may mean complete giving in because of the lengthened duration of 
avoiding the issue and continued interaction with the person. The short-term versus 
long-term use of issue avoidant strategies appears to result from different goals and 
may have different consequences. 
Hypothesis 4: The Goals Predicting Exit 
Hypotheses 4 through 6 make predictions about three long-term avoidance 
strategies. Exit refers to avoiding both the issue and the person in the long run. Exit, 
because of its complete abandonment of the relationship and the issue, was described 
as a strategy caused by the absence of competitive or cooperative goals: If the actor 
wants to gain something, he or she will not leave; if the actor wants to work with the 
other person in the future, he or she will also not leave; if there is anything that the 
actor wants, he or she will not leave. Therefore, H4 predicts that when all goals have 
low importance, the actor will choose to exit. 
 This hypothesis was not supported. Although low importance of support goals 
caused exit, high importance of enmity goals and instrumental competitive goals also 
caused exit. These results imply that exit may not result from passivity about the 
relationship and the issue, but a strategy to show competitive motivations. The post-
hoc component analyses among all conflict strategies showed that exit clusters with 
withdrawal and passive competition, both of which involve discontinuation of 
communication. Cooperative strategies such as compromise and integration (see, e.g., 
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Cai & Fink, 2002) loaded negatively on the same component with these 
communication avoidant strategies. Communication avoidant strategies were also 
predicted negatively by cooperative goals and positively by competitive goals. 
Therefore, even though exit appears to be an escape from conflict engagement, it is a 
negative strategy of communication. 
 Hypothesis 5: The Goals Predicting Outflanking 
 Outflanking is a long-term strategy to avoid the person but not the issue. One 
example is to use a more powerful third party than either the actor or the opponent to 
enforce the actor’s needs (Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). The actor who uses outflanking 
shows a clear intention to compete against the opponent because personal ideas on the 
issue are asserted. Such an indirect rather than a direct strategy hints at the actor’s 
intention not to offend the other person by face-to-face engagement in conflict. 
Because going behind a person’s back shows a lack of affection (e.g., Rusbult, 1987), 
it was predicted that an actor’s intention to not be offensive would result from 
instrumental cooperative rather than support goals. H5 states that a combination of 
high importance of instrumental reliance goals (i.e., instrumental competitive and 
instrumental cooperative goals) and low importance of support goals leads to 
outflanking. 
 This hypothesis was not supported. The only significant goals that predicted 
outflanking were instrumental competitive goals. The principal component analysis 
among the avoidance strategies grouped outflanking together with withdrawal, 
passive competition, and exit. The principal component analysis among all conflict 
strategies grouped outflanking with domination. These findings indicate that 
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outflanking is an instrumental competitive strategy similar to domination. Some 
people feel comfortable using argumentative strategies to get what they want; others 
may feel that using a third party such as an authority figure or a mediator is 
preferable. Outflanking should not be considered to be a backstabbing strategy but 
rather as one way that some people choose to fulfill their goals in a conflict situation. 
Hypotheses 6a, 6b, and 6c: The Goals Predicting Yielding 
 The last avoidance strategy, yielding, refers to avoiding the issue but not the 
person in the long run. It is tantamount to a long-term accommodation strategy (see, 
e.g., Rahim, 1983). Willingly or not, yielding denotes giving up on the issue and 
maintaining communication with the other party. Yielding is caused by a combination 
of low importance placed on the two competitive goals (enmity goals and 
instrumental competitive goals) and high importance placed on support goals (H6a), 
instrumental cooperative goals (H6b), or both (H6c). 
 Results supported H6a and H6c, but not H6b. These results suggest that the 
low importance placed on the two competitive goals is necessary to cause yielding. 
Also, high importance placed on support goals or high importance on both support 
and instrumental cooperative goals is necessary to cause yielding. Cooperation based 
on instrumental goals alone does not lead to yielding. The implication is that yielding 
may be a strategy that involves affection needs. Cooperation with the other person 
only for an instrumental purpose does not lead to the likelihood of yielding. Further 
analyses have provided additional evidence for this interpretation. 
 First, high importance of support goals was the most important predictor 
(largest β coefficient) of yielding among all goal importance variables (see Table 23). 
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Second, yielding was predicted positively by cooperation and negatively by 
competition. Finally, yielding was predicted negatively by enmity goals and 
positively by support goals. Taken together, the most important goals (with the largest 
β coefficient as shown in Table 23) that yielding serves are support goals, which 
involve high cooperative needs because of care and affection. In other words, the 
actor that chooses to yield may explain his or her action by saying, “I give in to you 
because I care about you.” 
Limitations of the Study  
 This study has three main limitations: the quality of measurement models, the 
hypothetical scenarios used, and a potential multicollinearity problem. 
Quality of the Measurement Models 
 The current research proposed two typologies and a model to link the two 
typologies. Each construct proposed in the typologies was measured by four items. 
For the study to be manageable, a very small number of participants were used in the 
pilot studies. Informative evidence, rather than statistical results, was used to 
determine the final items for each construct. 
 Reliability coefficients and indices derived from measurement models 
indicated that the reliability and the dimensionality of the items were acceptable, and 
in some cases good. However, a more careful procedure could have been done to 
develop the instruments. Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma (2003) specified four steps 
in scale construction. First, the construct and its content domain should be defined. 
Second, measurement items should be generalized and evaluated; usually a large 
quantity of measurement items should be developed in this step. Third, multiple 
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studies (with multiple samples) should be conducted for initial development and 
validation; items should be submitted to exploratory factor analysis and reliability 
tests. Fourth, the items should be finalized and should be tested using confirmatory 
factor analyses with additional samples. Future research may focus specifically on the 
development and assessment of measurement models to better represent the 
constructs proposed in this study.  
Hypothetical Scenarios Versus Interactions 
The second limitation of this study was that this study used the method of 
hypothetical situations to test the model, in which importance of goals was first 
manipulated, and the likelihood of using avoidance strategies was measured. The time 
ordering and the structural equation modeling allowed specifications of the causal 
links between goals and avoidance strategies. Nonetheless, the applicability of the 
results from hypothetical situations to actual interactions may be questioned. A 
researcher has to rely on the participants’ trustworthiness of self-report, awareness of 
their own intentions, and ability to identify the sources of their behaviors to generate 
results from hypothetical situations to actual interactions. However, people are often 
unable to recognize the influences on their behaviors (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1971; 
Nisbett & Bellows, 1977). People sometimes invent goals to make sense of their 
behaviors (Donohue, 1990). Therefore, the results from these hypothetical conflict 
scenarios may not necessarily apply to interactions. 
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity may have limited the results of the study. The current study 
aimed to specify conditions that may cause an avoidance strategy to occur, and 
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therefore used an experimental design with stringent propositions. The use of dummy 
variables as the independent variables in SEM may have created a multicollinearity 
problem. Multicollinearity can pose a problem in SEM because it may result in a 
singular matrix or a matrix with a determinant close to zero. A small determinant of 
the correlation (or covariance) matrix of the independent variables can easily lead to 
non-significant and unstable structural coefficients (Kline, 2005). In such cases, the 
unique contribution from each experimental condition may not be statistically 
significant. In fact, the determinant of the correlation matrix was .021. 
Multicollinearity may partly explain why only one-fourth of the hypotheses were 
supported. 
Future research may divide the larger model proposed in this study into sub-
models, each of which focuses on testing the relationship between goals and one type 
of avoidance strategy. Such an approach may help avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity.  
Directions for Future Research 
 The above section discusses the procedural limitations in conducting the 
study. The model proposed in this study can be improved in at least two ways. These 
improvements do not represent the limitations of the study. Rather, they have arisen 
from examination of the data and shed some light on future research directions. The 
two aspects are re-specifying the function of goals in predicting certain avoidance 
strategies and using other methods (especially interaction) to test and improve the 
model. 
What is in the Black Box? 
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The cognitive model linking interpersonal conflict goals to avoidance 
strategies proposed in the study specified 12 situations in which a goal or a 
combination of goals leads to a certain avoidance strategy. As indicated earlier, 10 
out of 12 situations depict a combination of goals. In these situations, the importance 
of some goals has to be high, the importance of other goals has to be low, and 
unmentioned goals have the implied importance level of zero. These situations may 
involve interactions reflecting some products of a 3 (enmity goals: negative, 0, 
positive) × 3 (instrumental competitive goals: negative, 0, positive) × 3 (support 
goals: negative, 0, positive) × 3 (instrumental cooperative goals: negative, 0, positive) 
experimental design. But this design becomes very large and cumbersome.  The 
number of cells makes it difficult to manage as an actual experiment. Therefore, the 
model in this research only focused on the cells with potential effects on the 
likelihoods of avoidance strategies. 
 Results indicated that out of the 12 specified hypotheses, only three were 
supported. Two reasonable follow-up questions are the following: Are the other 
specifications problematic? Are the avoidance strategies indeed predicted by 
interactions between goals? If the answer to the first question is positive, then future 
research should re-specify the situations that may predict the avoidance strategies. 
The second question is more complex. What if the effects of goals on avoidance 
strategies are not the result of interaction effects? What if the effects are additive? To 
answer these questions, a simple yet efficient way is to start from the scratch: 
Examine the effect of conflict goals on each avoidance strategy separately or use a 
simple experimental design to examine the relations between goals and avoidance. 
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Although the model proposed in this study has received partial support, the 
data provide directions for the future research. First, that the four types of goals 
loaded on one dimension indicates that cooperation and competition are indeed 
opposite goals. Therefore, instead of using four dimensions to produce a typology of 
goals, one dimension, the competitive-cooperative dimension, is good to start with. If 
emotional needs are of interest in a study, then two dimensions may be used (Table 
30). The first dimension has competition versus cooperation as polar ends. The 




A Recommended Typology of Goals  
 Competitive Cooperative 
Emotional Enmity Goals Support Goals 
Instrumental Task Goals Cooperative Goals 
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Second, the post-hoc principal component analysis among the avoidance 
strategies indicates the avoidance clusters into two groups: communication avoidant 
strategies and issue avoidant strategies. A way to look at these two clusters is that 
avoidance can be competitive or cooperative. Whereas withdrawal, passive 
competition, exit, and outflanking arise from competitive goals, pretending and 
yielding arise from cooperative goals. These findings provide direct support for the 
links from competitive goals to the first cluster and from cooperative goals to the 
second cluster. Future research can modify the model by specifying these 
parsimonious yet indirectly supported links. The black box question, however, 
remains and needs further consideration: Are the effects from goals to the likelihood 
of an avoidance strategy interactive or additive? To answer the question, an 
experiment using a 2 (enmity goals vs. support goals) × 2 (task goals vs. cooperative 
goals) is a sensible start. 
What are Other Ways to Test the Model? 
 As indicated in the limitations of the study, this study used hypothetical 
interactions instead of face-to-face interactions. Future research may use other 
methods to cross-validate the links between goals and avoidance strategies found in 
this study. 
 First, actual dialogues or behaviors that embody each type of avoidance 
strategy can be given to participants, who are asked to infer the actor’s goals behind 
these behaviors. If the links from goals to avoidance strategies can be confirmed 
using this retrospective inference, then the model gains additional support. Second, 
participants can be asked to recall an episode in which they have used one of the 
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avoidance strategies (with an independent-groups design), and the motivations behind 
such a strategy. Cross-validation can then be done by analyzing what the participants 
have provided and what has been proposed in the model. This way the model may be 
modified to approach actual interaction situations. Third, a group of people who tend 
to use avoidance strategies can be identified; observations can be made and 
interactive dialogues analyzed to infer at what point the actors use avoidance, what 
type it is, and what motivations are behind it.  
Significance of the Study and Conclusion 
 This study started by answering a simple yet long-neglected question: What 
goals do people have when they use avoidance as a strategy to resolve conflict? A 
cognitive model was proposed to link interpersonal conflict goals to avoidance 
strategies. This study successfully demonstrates that (a) different avoidance strategies 
exist, (b) different importance levels of goals predict these avoidance strategies, and 
(c) avoidance strategies and other conflict strategies may be motivated by similar or 
different goals. 
 Most of the existing research has focused on problem-solving strategies such 
as integration and compromise (see Kim & Leung, 2000, for a review). Until recently, 
a small number of researchers has focused on understanding why people avoid certain 
topics (e.g., Afifi & Guerrero, 2000; Leung, 1988; Roloff & Ifert, 2000) and how 
conflict is avoided (e.g., Tjosvold & Sun, 2002).  
Understanding avoidance, however, may be more important in conflict 
communication than understanding problem-solving strategies. As Carrère and 
Gottman (1999) discussed, people should find clues of happy or problematic 
167
marriages in what is unsaid rather than being fooled by verbal messages. 
Stonewalling and contempt, for example, are two of the Four Horsemen that Gottman 
identified in an unhappy marriage (Gladwell, 2005). Stonewalling and contempt do 
not need verbal expression; they can be expressed through silence. Indeed, a person 
can express great hostility and defensiveness by avoidance. In contrast, avoidance can 
also be caused by awe, respect, or care for the other person, or by a fear of being 
abandoned (Roloff & Cloven, 1990).  
These confounding characteristics of avoidance were the driving forces for 
this study. Six types of avoidance strategies were specified. The results suggest that 
positive or cooperative avoidance strategies differ from negative or competitive 
avoidance strategies. Further, the post-hoc principal component analysis showed that 
withdrawal, passive competition, and exit loaded positively, and compromise and 
integration loaded negatively, on one component. Pretending, yielding, and 
accommodation all loaded positively with compromise and integration on the second 
component. Outflanking and domination loaded on the third component. 
Withdrawal is a competitive avoidance strategy, grouped with passive 
competition and exit. Withdrawal was negatively predicted by cooperation and 
positively by competition. Passive competition, similar to domination, is a 
competitive strategy caused by competitive goals. What differentiates passive 
competition from domination is that low importance of instrumental cooperative 
goals is a cause for passive competition, but not for domination. Therefore, passive 
competition is a less cooperative strategy than domination. Exit is not a strategy that 
is rooted in the absence of any goal; instead, exit is a strategy motivated by high 
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competitive and low cooperative needs. Withdrawal, passive competition, and exit are 
used to express competition at the socioemotional level or the task level, unlike the 
stereotype found in the traditional two-dimensional models of conflict behaviors (e.g., 
Pruitt & Rubin, 1987). 
Yielding represents the other end of avoidance strategies; it is caused by the 
high importance placed on affection needs. One of the necessary conditions for 
yielding is the presence of support goals. Another necessary condition is low 
importance of competitive goals. These results help distinguish yielding from the 
competitive avoidance strategies such as those mentioned in the above paragraph. 
Pretending is similar to yielding in that it is predicted by high importance of 
support goals. However, it differs from yielding in that pretending is also predicted by 
high importance of instrumental competitive goals. A person may switch the topic or 
give up on an issue on the spot; the person, however, may do so with strong 
competitive needs regarding the issue. In contrast, yielding means that the person 
gives up on the issue in the long run.  
Outflanking, another avoidance strategy, has features similar to domination. In 
a culture that values direct communication, going behind a person’s back tends to be 
considered conspiratorial, performed by a person who not only wants to beat the 
opponent materially, but also socioemotionally. Nonetheless, this study demonstrates 
that outflanking is only predicted by high importance of instrumental competitive 
goals. Thus it may just be another strategy used to compete against an opponent that 
only involves material gains, but does not necessarily involve backstabbing. This 
important finding may help people reconsider perceived enemies who resort to a third 
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party to resolve conflict (see, e.g., Tjosvold & Sun, 2002). Some people may lack 
verbal techniques to express their needs or find face-to-face arguments ineffective, 
and thus they may use outflanking to fulfill their needs.  
This study contributes to the field of conflict management, and 
communication in general, in that it provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding avoidance. Although the study was focused on interpersonal conflict, 
the results can be extended cautiously to other contexts such as organizational 
communication. As indicated earlier, this study focuses on the link between goals and 
avoidance strategies in interpersonal conflict; the mechanism of this link should apply 
to various interpersonal conflict situations.  
This study also contributes to the larger field of cognitive research. Three 
types of concepts are essential to cognitive research. These are “knowledge 
structures, cognitive processes, and limits on information processing” (Wilson, 2005, 
p. 247). Knowledge structures are organized schemata of knowledge about the world. 
Cognitive processes describe how information from outside world is accepted, 
tailored, stored, retrieved, and used to form plans of actions. Limits on information 
processing set the boundary regarding what people can be aware of (Wilson, 2005). 
The current study contributes to the understanding of these three types of concepts. 
First, the success of goal manipulations indicate that competitive and 
cooperative goals about socioemotional or instrumental needs are stored in people’s 
knowledge structures. These goals can be activated by certain situational features. 
Second, although this study did not focus on the process that takes place after goal 
activation and before the output representation of strategies (see Greene, 1984, 1997; 
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Wilson, 1990, 1995), it attends to the beginning and the end of the process by 
addressing the following question: When one or a group of goals are considered 
important, what strategies will be the outcomes? The finding that cooperative goals 
lead to cooperative avoidance strategies (i.e., issue avoidant strategies) and 
competitive goals lead to competitive avoidance strategies (i.e., communication 
avoidant strategies) appear intuitive, but serves as empirical evidence regarding the 
association between goal types and avoidance strategy types. 
Third, the dissertation also contributes to the understanding of the limits of 
information processing. Through a role-playing experiment, the success of goal 
manipulation and its effect on the likelihood of conflict strategies indicate that 
strategies are products of conscious choices. When the importance of certain types of 
goals is increased and brought to awareness, the likelihood of one or more conflict 
strategies being preferred also is increased. Although this study did not examine what 
determines the limits of people’s capacity in conflict situations, it does provide 
information on the link between goals and strategies that are within people’s capacity 
of awareness. 
Different types of avoidance strategies relate to other conflict strategies. Each 
type of avoidance strategy has its own features. When used as a strategy in an 
interpersonal conflict, each avoidance strategy serves its unique goal antecedents. As 
the adage goes, “You cannot not communicate” (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 
1967, p. 24). This study demonstrates that avoidance has various facets and is not 
necessarily a passive or negative strategy. What is uncommunicated may imply more 
information than what is expressed. If the squeaky wheel gets oiled because of their 
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squeakiness, shouldn’t more attention be given to the long-ignored, silent wheels? 
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Footnotes 
1 Whether communication is goal-oriented has been debated (e.g., Dillard & 
Schrader, 1998; Shepherd, 1998; Wilson, 2005). This dissertation only examines 
interpersonal conflict strategies that are goal-oriented. In the cognitive literature, a 
strategy is defined as a means to achieve goals (e.g., Greene, 1984, 1997; Dillard & 
Schrader, 1998; Schrader & Dillard, 1998; Wilson, 1990, 1995, 2005). The 
conceptualization of strategy involves goals; the link from a goal or a group of goals 
has also received empirical support (e.g., Booth-Butterfield, 1987; Cai & Wilson, 
2000; Greene, 1984; Greene & Cappella, 1986; Greene & Lindsey, 1989; Samp, 
2000; Schrader & Dillard, 1998). Therefore, the link between a goal and a strategy is 
assumed. Whether all communication behaviors are goal-oriented is beyond the 
discussion of this study. 
2 Hage and Marwell (1968) used these two elements because situational 
features such as when and where are important in comparing role relationships. 
People could take different roles in different situations. For example, a mother who is 
her child’s teacher will have different role relationships at home (mother-child) and at 
school (teacher-student).  
3 Some researchers may choose to distinguish between immediate, short-term, 
and long-term avoidance (e.g., avoiding the immediate situation, avoiding bringing up 
the situation until both parties cool down, and avoiding discussion forever). This 
dissertation uses a dichotomy to indicate representative types of avoidance strategies. 
4 Some researchers may choose to include these two types in their studies 
because they represent the extreme types where none of the dimensional 
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characteristics are present (see Bailey, 1994). Such inclusion could facilitate 
comparisons between the ideal types that represent all qualities of the dimensions and 
those represent none of such qualities. They are omitted here, however, because the 
dissertation does not seek to differentiate between conflict confrontation and 
avoidance. Instead, emphasis is given to avoidance types only.  
5 Although self-identity goals (defined as personal standards or intrinsic 
values, see Dillard et al., 1989) are not the focus of this study, they can be examined 
along the four dimensions proposed in this study. For example, if an individual 
competes with his or her intrinsic values with those of the other for material gains, the 
goal may be viewed as an instrumental competitive goal. If such competitive purpose 
originates from socioemotional needs (e.g., angered by violation of personal values), 
then the goal may be considered as an enmity goal. 
6 Out of 90 possible main effects and interaction effects, only three (3.33%) 
were significant. Two significant main effects were participants’ gender and Casey’s 
gender on the likelihood of exit. A significant interaction effect was found between 
type of scenario, experimental condition, and participants’ gender on the likelihood of 
withdrawal. Because of the small ratio of these three significant effects to the total 
number of possible effects and the increased amount of complexity by adding these 
variables in the later structural model, type of scenario, participants’ gender, and 
Casey’s gender were excluded. 
7 Another way to conduct confirmatory factor analyses for the measurement 
models would be controlling for the group membership. Because manipulations 
should make participants respond differently to measurement items, measurement 
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models were submitted to confirmatory factor analyses, controlling for group 
membership. The results of the measurement model fits were close to the indices 




Appendix A  
Instrument for Manipulation Checks 
Enmity Goals 
1. It is important to hurt Casey in some way.     _________ 
2. It is important to let Casey feel hurt.     _________ 
3. It is important not to let Casey feel inferior. (Reverse coded.)  _________ 
Instrumental Competitive Goals 
1. It is important to have the project done according to my idea.  _________ 
2. It is important to defend my position on the project.   _________ 
3. It is important to actualize my plan for this project.   _________ 
Support Goals 
1. It is important to have a truly caring relationship with Casey.  _________ 
2. It is important to maintain mutual understanding with Casey.  _________ 
3. It is important to have Casey feel my affection and care.   _________ 
Instrumental Cooperative Goals 
1. It is important to keep a functioning relationship with Casey  
 for possible future use.       _________ 
2. It is important to be able to work with Casey on another project.  _________ 
3. It is important to maintain a relationship with Casey just for the  
 possibility of future cooperation.      _________ 
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Appendix B  
Instrument for the Avoidance Strategies 
To Withdrawal 
1. I will stop arguing and leave the scene. 
2. I will avert the discussion temporarily. 
3. I will not stop arguing. (Reverse coded.) 
4. Withdrawal seems to be a good strategy to me. 
To Passively Compete 
1. I will stop arguing but begin to work on the project with my own ideas. 
2. I won’t argue any more but will do as I want.   
3. Stop arguing and doing what I feel right is most important. 
4. I will shut up and do what I think is right. 
To Pretend 
1. I will switch the topic. 
2. I will pretend nothing was wrong. 
3. I will suggest we do something else. 
4. I will give up the issue tentatively by shifting the topic. 
To Exit 
1. I will ask to be removed from the team and will stop seeing Casey. 
2. I will give up this project and never talk to Casey again. 
3. I just want to be away from the project and Casey.  




1. I will talk to our professor (boss) about my ideas. 
2. I won’t argue with Casey again but will think of something else to solve the 
problem. 
3. I will go sideways (maybe talking to my professor [boss]) to solve the 
problem but won’t argue with Casey. 
4. I will solve the problem indirectly without having to discussing with Casey 
again. 
Yielding 
1. I won’t talk about my different ideas and will remain Casey’s friend. 
2. I will give up arguing with Casey about the issue. 
3. I will keep talking to Casey but not about the issue any more. 




Appendix C  
Instrument for Other Conflict Strategies 
Accommodation 
1. I will try to satisfy this person’s needs. 
2. I will accommodate this person’s needs. 
3. I will not give in to this person’s wishes. (Reverse coded.) 
4. I will not bend over backwards to accommodate this person’s wishes. 
(Reverse coded.) 
5. I will like to go along with this person’s suggestions. (Reverse coded.) 
6. I will try to satisfy this person’s expectations. 
Domination 
1. I will use my power to get the highest profit. 
2. I will exert pressure on this person to reach a solution most beneficial to my 
profits. 
3. I will not use influence to get my ideas accepted. (Reverse coded.) 
4. I will use my expertise to make the other accept my offer. 
Integration 
1. I will work closely with this person for a proper understanding of what both of 
us want. 
2. I will bring all our concerns out in the open to reach an agreement in the best 
possible way. 
3. I do not want to collaborate with this person to make decisions. (Reverse 
coded.) 
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4. I will work with this person to find prices that satisfy expectations of both of 
us. 
5. I am willing to exchange information openly with this person to reach the best 
solution. 
Compromise 
1. I will try to work out a compromise that gives both of us some of what we 
want. 
2. I will try to find a middle course or compromise to solve the problem. 
3. I will bargain with this person to get middle profits. 
4. If deadlock happens, I will take a moderate position to resolve the conflict. 
5. I will try to give and take so that moderate profits can be obtained. 
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Appendix D  
Pilot Study 1 Questionnaire Testing Indicators  
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland, College Park 
Conflict, How Much Do You Know? 
Instructions: In this study, you will be asked to match certain definitions with their 
representative statements. Further, you will be asked to rate how close these 
statements are to the definition. You will also have opportunity to provide comments 
for each statement. The study will take about 30 minutes. Thank you. 
Part I.  
In a conflict situation, people may have different goals to achieve. Here are four types 
of goals that may be salient in conflict:  
Goal A: To make the other person feel inferior or to hurt the other person’s feelings.  
Goal B: To gain your own materialistic interest and ignore the other’s materialistic 
interest.  
Goal C: To show your affection or emotional support to fulfill the other party’s 
needs.  
Goal D: To be cooperative because you may need to use this person in the future.  
Now that you know what these goals are, please evaluate how well the following 
statements reflect the definitions of the above goals. Use a number between 0 and 100 
to indicate how well the statement matches the goal: 0 means not matching at all and 
100 means perfect match.  
Further, you may edit the statement if you think the editing could make the statement 
more appropriate. 
For example, one individual’s answers could look like this: 
 
Statement Goal A Goal B Goal C Goal D 
I don’t mind hurting the other 
person’s feelings.   
100 0 0 0 
I will argue with the other person 
until s/he submits.  
20 100 0 0 
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Please provide your responses to the following statements; you can refer to the 
previous page if you forget the definitions of the four types of goals: 
Statement Goal A Goal B Goal C Goal D 
I will maintain mutual understanding 
with the other person.  
 
I will defend my position on the issue.
 
I will actualize my plan on this issue.
 
I do not care whether the other person 
feels hurt. 
 
I will maintain a relationship with the 
other person just for the purpose to 
cooperate in the future. 
 
I will have the issue solved according 
to my ideas.    
 
I will not hurt the other person because 
I truly value our friendship.  
 
I will show that I don’t really care 
about how the other person feels.
 
I will have the other person feel my 
affection and care.  
 
I want to let the other person feel 
inferior. 
 
I will keep the relationship for future 
use of the other person.  
 
I do not want to deteriorate our 
relationship because I need to work 





When handling conflict, people sometimes use avoidance. An individual could avoid 
the issue, the person, or both. Also, such avoidance could be in the immediate
situation or in the long term. The six types of avoidance strategies are: 
Avoidance in the IMMEDIATE situation:
Avoidance Strategy A: To avoid the person and the issue. 
 Avoidance Strategy B: To avoid the person but not the issue. 
Avoidance Strategy C: To avoid the issue but not the person (i.e., maintaining 
communication).   
To help you understand, consider the following situation and Tom’s 
responses that represent the above three avoidance strategies separately:  
Tom is a married man. One day after dinner, Tom wanted to play a 
videogame but his wife asked him to help her wash dishes. They 
started to quarrel. Tom decided to stop quarreling. 
Avoidance Strategy A (avoiding the person and the issue):
Tom stepped out of the room and drove off. 
Avoidance Strategy B (avoiding the person but not the issue):
Tom stopped arguing but began to play the videogame. 
Avoidance Strategy C (avoiding the issue but not the person):
Tom suggested, “Why don’t we go out and see a movie?” 
Avoidance in the LONG TERM: 
Avoidance Strategy D: To avoid the person and the issue in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy E: To avoid the person but not the issue (e.g., use a 3rd 
party) in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy F: To avoid the issue but not the person in the long run. 
To help you understand, consider the following example and Andrea’s 
responses:  
Andrea and Kelly were friends and colleagues at work. At a staff 
meeting, they disagreed on the plan for a project. After the meeting, 
Andrea decided to resolve the conflict. 
Avoidance Strategy D (avoiding the person and the issue in the long 
 run):
Andrea asked the boss that she be removed from the project 
 and she stopped being Kelly’s friend. 
 
Avoidance Strategy E (avoiding the person but not the issue in the long 
 run):
Andrea avoided talking to Kelly about the issue but sought 
 their boss’s support. 
 
Avoidance Strategy D (avoiding the issue but not the person in the 
 long run):
Andrea no longer insisted on her own arguments and remains 
 Kelly’s friend. 
 
Now that you know what these different avoidance strategies are, please evaluate how 
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well the following statements reflect the definitions of the above avoidance strategies. 
Use a number between 0 and 100 to indicate how well the statement matches the 
goal: 0 means not matching at all and 100 means perfect match.  
Further, you may edit the statement if you think the editing could make the statement 
more appropriate. For example, one individual’s answers could look like this: 
 

















20 0 10 0 100 0 
I will do what I 
want.  
0 100 0 0 0 0 
Please provide your responses to the following statements; you may refer to the 
previous page if you forget the definitions of the avoidance strategies: 












I will solve the 
problem indirectly 
without having to 
discussing with the 
other person ever 
again. 
 
I will stop arguing but 
begin to do what I 
want in the immediate 
situation. 
 
I will ask to be 
removed from the team 
and will stop seeing 




seems to be a good 
strategy to me. 
 
Stop arguing and 
doing what I feel right 
is most important. 
 
I will give up the issue 
tentatively by shifting 
the topic. 
 
I will not stop arguing. 
(Reverse coded.) 
 
I will stop arguing and 
leave the scene. 
 
I will give up this 
project and never talk 




I will talk to our 
supervisor about my 
ideas. 
 
I will shut up and do 
what I think is right. 
 
I will pretend nothing 
was wrong. 
 
I won’t argue with the 
other person again but 
will think of 
something else to solve 
the problem. 
 
I will suggest we do 
something else. 
 
I won’t argue any 
more but will do as I 
want.   
 
I just want to be away 
from the project and 
the other person. 
 
I will go on without 
this project or the other 
person in my life. 
 
I will switch the topic. 
 
I will avert the 
discussion temporarily. 
 
I will go sideways 
(maybe talking to our 
supervisor) to solve the 
problem but won’t 
argue with the other 
person. 
 
Now, tell us something about yourself: 
Age: _________   Gender (Circle one):     Female   Male 
Race/Ethnicity (Circle one):  
Caucasian      African American        Hispanic  Asian    Other______________ 
Year in College (Circle one):   
Freshman Sophomore Junior            Senior  Other _______________ 
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Appendix E  
Pilot Study 2 Questionnaire Testing Indicators  
 
Date _______________ Time ______________ Course # _________________  
 
Conflict, How Much Do You Know? 
Instructions: In this study, you will rate how well certain behaviors match their 
representative concepts. You can choose any number between 0 and 100 to rate the 
match, where 0 means not matching at all and 100 means perfect match.  
 
Part I 
A conflict occurs when two or more interdependent parties have incompatible goals 
or interests. Everyone experiences some form of conflict almost daily. When you 
have a conflict with someone, depending on who the other person is and what your 
relationship is, you may handle conflict situations differently. In other words, you 
may use different strategies to carry out different goals. Here are four types of goals 
that may be salient in a conflict:  
Goal A: To insist on your ideas and refuse to submit to the other person.  
Goal B: To hurt the other person emotionally or to make him or her feel inferior or 
humiliated.   
Goal C: To sacrifice your own needs to support the other emotionally and to show 
your affection.  
Goal D: To be cooperative because you may need to use this person in the future.  
The following table provides 16 behaviors or thoughts that reflect above goals. If you 
feel a behavior or thought reflects one specific goal only and cleanly, write 100 in the 
corresponding box and 0 in all the other boxes. If a behavior or thought seems to 
reflect several goals, you may choose any number between 0 and 100 to indicate how 
much the statement reflects each of those goals. Again, 0 means not matching at all 
and 100 means perfect match.  
For example, one individual’s answers could look like this: 
 
Statement Goal A Goal B Goal C Goal D 
I tried to maintain mutual 
understanding with the other 
person.   
0 0 90 20
I argued with the other person until 
s/he submitted.  
100 0 0 0 
Imagine you just had a conflict with a person named Casey. Rate the following 16 
behaviors or thought as to what goal(s) each of them reflect. 
 
Ready? If so, go to next page. 
[Note. The content in the Item Label column in the following tables did not 
appear in the actual questionnaire.]
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********************************************************************* 
For your convenience, here are the four types of goals and their definitions again: 
Goal A: To insist on your ideas and refuse to submit to the other person. 
Goal B: To hurt the other person emotionally or to make him or her feel inferior or 
humiliated.   
Goal C: To sacrifice your own needs to support the other emotionally and to show 
your affection.  
Goal D: To be cooperative because you may need to use this person in the future.  
 
Please provide your responses to the following statements.  






I didn’t mind hurting Casey’s 
feelings.
Enmity1 








I cared about how Casey felt because 
of our friendship.  
Support1 
I didn’t want to deteriorate our 
relationship because I need to work 
with Casey in another project. 
Instrumental 
Cooperation1








I was careful not to hurt Casey 
because I truly valued our friendship. 
Support2 
I used words to humiliate Casey. Enmity2 
I tried to have Casey feel my 
affection and care. 
Support3 
I wanted to let Casey feel inferior. Enmity3 
I kept the relationship with Casey 
because we had to work together. 
Instrumental 
Cooperation2
I did not care if Casey would feel 
upset because of my words. 
Enmity4 
I tried to maintain a relationship with 
Casey just for the purpose to 
cooperate in the future. 
Instrumental 
Cooperation3
It was important for me to protect 
Casey’s feelings. 
Support4 
I had to be careful with what I said 
because I might be working with 





When handling conflict, people sometimes use avoidance. Avoidance can be divided 
into three types: avoiding the issue, avoiding the person, or avoiding both. What’s 
more, such avoidance could occur during the conflict episode on the spot or after the 
conflict episode in the long run. Hence, there are six types of avoidance strategies: 
Avoidance ON THE SPOT:
Avoidance Strategy A: To avoid the person AND the issue. 
 Avoidance Strategy B: To avoid the person but NOT the issue. 
Avoidance Strategy C: To avoid the issue but NOT the person (i.e., 
maintaining communication).   
Here is an example to help you understand these three avoidance strategies: 
Tom is a married man. One day after dinner, Tom wanted to play a 
videogame but his wife asked him to help her wash dishes. They 
started to quarrel. Tom decided to stop quarreling. 
Avoidance Strategy A (avoiding the person and the issue on the spot):
Tom stepped out of the room and drove off. 
Avoidance Strategy B (avoiding the person but not the issue on the 
spot):
Tom stopped arguing but began to play the videogame. 
Avoidance Strategy C (avoiding the issue but not the person on the 
spot):
Tom dropped the argument and suggested, “Why don’t we go 
out and see a movie?” 
Avoidance IN THE LONG RUN: 
Avoidance Strategy D: To avoid the person AND the issue in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy E: To avoid the person but NOT the issue (e.g., use a 3rd 
party to help you out but avoid talking to the person in 
conflict) in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy F: To avoid the issue but NOT the person in the long run. 
Here is an example to help you understand these three avoidance strategies: 
Andrea and Kelly were friends and colleagues at work. At a staff 
meeting, they disagreed on the plan for a project. After the meeting,
Andrea decided to resolve the conflict. 
Avoidance Strategy D (avoiding the person and the issue in the long 
run):
Andrea asked the boss that she be removed from the project 
and Andrea also stopped being Kelly’s friend. 
Avoidance Strategy E (avoiding the person but not the issue in the long 
run):
Andrea avoided talking to Kelly about the issue but sought 
their boss’s support. 
Avoidance Strategy D (avoiding the issue but not the person in the 
long run):




The table on next page provides 24 statements that reflect the six types of avoidance 
strategies. If you feel a statement reflects one specific type of avoidance only and 
cleanly, write 100 in the corresponding box and 0 in all the other boxes. If a statement 
seems to reflect several types of avoidance, you may choose any number between 0 
and 100 to indicate how much the statement reflects each of those goals. Again, 0
means not matching at all and 100 means perfect match.  














I solved the problem 
indirectly.  
0 0 10 0 100 0
I did what I wanted 
though I stopped 
arguing on the spot. 
0 100 0 0 0 0
Again, we gave the name “Casey” to “the other person” to make the conflict more 
imaginable to you! 
 
Ready? If so, go to next page. 
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********************************************************************* 
For your convenience, here are the six types of avoidance strategies again: 
Avoidance ON THE SPOT:
Avoidance Strategy A: To avoid the person AND the issue. 
 Avoidance Strategy B: To avoid the person but NOT the issue. 
Avoidance Strategy C: To avoid the issue but NOT the person (i.e., 
maintaining communication).   
Avoidance IN THE LONG RUN: 
Avoidance Strategy D: To avoid the person AND the issue in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy E: To avoid the person but NOT the issue (e.g., use a 3rd 
party) in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy F: To avoid the issue but NOT the person in the long run. 
Please provide your responses to the following statements. 
 
In the Conflict Situation After the Conflict Situation 












After the meeting, 
I solved the 
problem indirectly 




In the meeting, I 
stopped arguing 
but began to do 







After the meeting, 
I asked to be 
removed from the 
team and stopped 
being Casey’s 
friend. 
 Exit1  
Casey was still a 
friend after our 
meeting but I was 
careful not to talk 
about the issue any 
more. 
 Yield1  
Stop arguing and 
doing what I 
wanted was the 
most important 







For your convenience, here are the six types of avoidance strategies again: 
Avoidance ON THE SPOT:
Avoidance Strategy A: To avoid the person AND the issue. 
 Avoidance Strategy B: To avoid the person but NOT the issue. 
Avoidance Strategy C: To avoid the issue but NOT the person (i.e., 
maintaining communication).   
Avoidance IN THE LONG RUN: 
Avoidance Strategy D: To avoid the person AND the issue in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy E: To avoid the person but NOT the issue (e.g., use a 3rd 
party) in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy F: To avoid the issue but NOT the person in the long run. 
Please provide your responses to the following statements. 
 
In the Conflict Situation After the Conflict Situation 












I gave up the issue 
tentatively at that 
moment by shifting 
the topic. 
 Pretend1  
I stopped arguing 
and left the scene. 
 Withdraw1  
After the meeting, 
I restrained myself 
from arguing about 
the issue with 
Casey in our future 
conversations. 
 Yield2  
I talked to our 
supervisor about 
my ideas after the 
meeting without 
any more talking 
with Casey.  
Outflank2 




When the argument 
was too hot, I 
pretended nothing 






For your convenience, here are the six types of avoidance strategies again: 
Avoidance ON THE SPOT:
Avoidance Strategy A: To avoid the person AND the issue. 
 Avoidance Strategy B: To avoid the person but NOT the issue. 
Avoidance Strategy C: To avoid the issue but NOT the person (i.e., 
maintaining communication).   
Avoidance IN THE LONG RUN: 
Avoidance Strategy D: To avoid the person AND the issue in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy E: To avoid the person but NOT the issue (e.g., use a 3rd 
party) in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy F: To avoid the issue but NOT the person in the long run. 
Please provide your responses to the following statements. 
 
In the Conflict Situation After the Conflict Situation 












After the meeting, I 
decided not to 
argue with Casey 
again but to think 
of something else 
to solve the 
problem. 
 Outflank3 
On the spot, I 
stopped arguing 
and suggested we 
say something else. 
 Pretend3 
On the spot, 
although I stopped 
arguing, I began 




I just wanted to be 
away from the 
project and Casey 
once and for all. 
Exit2 
On the spot, I just 
sat there and 
zipped my mouth. 
 Withdraw3 
I went on without 
this project or 
Casey in my life. 
 Exit3 
Although I was still 
Casey’s friend, I 
never mentioned 
the issue again. 
 Yield3 
I averted the 




For your convenience, here are the six types of avoidance strategies again: 
Avoidance ON THE SPOT:
Avoidance Strategy A: To avoid the person AND the issue. 
 Avoidance Strategy B: To avoid the person but NOT the issue. 
Avoidance Strategy C: To avoid the issue but NOT the person (i.e., 
maintaining communication).   
Avoidance IN THE LONG RUN: 
Avoidance Strategy D: To avoid the person AND the issue in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy E: To avoid the person but NOT the issue (e.g., use a 3rd 
party) in the long run. 
Avoidance Strategy F: To avoid the issue but NOT the person in the long run. 
Please provide your responses to the following statements. 
 
In the Conflict Situation After the Conflict Situation 












I went sideways 
(talked to our 
supervisor) after 











I switched the 
topic on the spot. 
 Pretend4 
I shut up but 
started doing 




I gave up this 
project and never 





Now, please tell us more about you. 
1. My age is __________ years. 
2. I am     FEMALE  MALE 
3. My ethnicity is or most closely to 
________ African, American African, or Black 
________ Hispanic, Latino, Mexican American, Cuban American, or Puerto Rican 
________ Asian American, Pacific Islander, Chinese, Japanese, or Korean 
________ Central Asian, Indian, or Pakistani 
________ Arab, or Arab American 
________ Jewish 
________ White, Caucasian, European American 
________ Other (please specify): _____________________ 
4. I am a citizen of __________________ (country). 
5. My native language is  ENGLISH   Other (please specify) 
_______________. 
6. I can also speak another language fluently   YES  NO 
 If “yes,” the language is ___________________. 
7. I am  FRESHMAN  SOPHOMORE JUNIOR SENIOR
 GRADUATE  OTHER (please specify) 
__________________. 
8. One last question: While you were answering the questionnaire, were you 
imagining Casey as a male or female? Circle one. 
 
Male   Female  Not clear 
 
That’s all. Thank you for your time.       
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Appendix F  
Pilot Study 3 Questionnaire Testing Perceived Goal Realism  
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
 
Part I 
Read the following hypothetical scenario, and answer questions. 
Casey is your classmate. You volunteer to do a project together. The project grade is 
important because it constitutes 20% of your course grade. Both of you really want to 
do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a 
meeting, you two have argued vehemently, but soon you realize that further argument 
may harm your relationship. 
Each of the following concerns depends on the preceding, underlined condition. For 
each concern below, please rate how realistic it is for you to have these concerns and 
explain why. Use 0 to 100% to rate the realism of the goal, where 0% means the goal 
is not realistic at all and 100% means that the goal is completely realistic. 
 
1. Casey is a friend you really care about.
You have a goal to maintain your friendship because you truly care about how Casey 
feels.  
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________ 






2. You have to work on another project with Casey later on.
You have a goal to maintain a good relationship with Casey because you hope to 
work well with Casey on the other project.  
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________ 






3. Casey is a friend you really care about and you are assigned to work with Casey on 
another group project.
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You have a goal to maintain a good relationship with Casey both because you cherish 
your friendship and because you are assigned to another group project with Casey.  
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________ 






4. You want to compete with Casey and you don’t really care about how Casey feels, 
and you are not assigned to any other cooperative project with Casey.
You have a goal to compete with Casey about your ideas, even if such competition 
may hurt Casey. Further, you do not have a goal to maintain a good relationship or 
work with Casey in another project.  
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 






How realistic for you to lack the second goal? ____________ 






5. Casey is a friend you really care about, and for the sake of your relationship, you 
are willing to sacrifice your own needs.
You have a goal to maintain your friendship because you really care about how Casey 
feels. You also have a goal to give up your plan to Casey so that your friendship 
won’t be harmed.  
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 






How realistic is the second goal? ____________ 
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6. You have to work on another more important project with Casey later on, so you 
don’t want to make Casey feel hurt, and you are willing to sacrifice your needs. 
You have a goal to maintain a good relationship with Casey because you want to do 
well in the other project. You also have a goal to not make Casey to feel hurt. You 
have a third goal to give in to Casey in this argument if that’s what it takes to 
maintain a good relationship with Casey.  
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 






How realistic is the second goal? ____________ 






How realistic is the third goal? ___________ 






7.  Casey is a friend you really care; you two are assigned to another more important 
project. Therefore, you don’t want to make Casey feel hurt, and you are willing to 
sacrifice your needs.
You have a goal to maintain a good relationship with Casey both because you care 
about Casey and because you want to do well in the later project. You also have a 
goal to make Casey not feel hurt. You have a third goal to give in to Casey in this 
argument if that’s what it takes to maintain a good relationship with Casey. 
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 







How realistic is the second goal? ____________ 






How realistic is the third goal? ___________ 






8.  Casey is not a friend of yours; you won’t possibly work with Casey again; you no 
longer care about the outcome of this project; and you don’t care how Casey feels.
You don’t have any goal about Casey and the project. 
 
How realistic is the lack of any goal? ____________ 






9. Casey is not a friend of yours but you two are assigned to another more important 
group project. Meanwhile, you want your ideas realized in this project.
You have a goal to maintain your relationship with Casey because you want to do 
well in the later group project. You have a second goal to insist on your plan for the 
project.  
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 






How realistic is the second goal? ____________ 
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Are These Conflict Goals Real? 
Part II 
Read the following hypothetical scenario, and answer questions. 
Casey is your colleague at work. You volunteer to do a project together. The outcome 
of the project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your performance. 
Both of you really want to do well in this project. However, you disagree on the 
blueprint of the project. After a meeting in which you two argued vehemently, you 
realize that further argument will harm your relationship. 
Each of the following concerns depends on the preceding, underlined condition. For 
each concern below, please rate how realistic it is for you to have these concerns and 
explain why. Use 0 to 100% to rate the realism of the goal, where 0% means the goal 
is not realistic at all and 100% means that the goal is completely realistic. 
 
1. Casey is a friend you really care about.
You have a goal to maintain your friendship because you truly care about how Casey 
feels.  
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________ 






2. You have to work on another project with Casey later on.
You have a goal to maintain a good relationship with Casey because you hope to 
work well with Casey on the other project.  
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________ 







3. Casey is a friend you really care about and you are assigned to work with Casey on 
another group project.
You have a goal to maintain a good relationship with Casey both because you cherish 
your friendship and because you are assigned to another group project with Casey.  
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________ 






4. You want to compete with Casey and you don’t really care about how Casey feels, 
and you are not assigned to any other cooperative project with Casey.
You have a goal to compete with Casey about your ideas, even if such competition 
may hurt Casey. Further, you do not have a goal to maintain a good relationship or 
work with Casey in another project.  
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 






How realistic for you to lack the second goal? ____________ 






5. Casey is a friend you really care about, and for the sake of your relationship, you 
are willing to sacrifice your own needs.
You have a goal to maintain your friendship because you really care about how Casey 
feels. You also have a goal to give up your plan to Casey so that your friendship 
won’t be harmed.  
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 







How realistic is the second goal? ____________ 






6. You have to work on another more important project with Casey later on, so you 
don’t want to make Casey feel hurt, and you are willing to sacrifice your needs. 
You have a goal to maintain a good relationship with Casey because you want to do 
well in the other project. You also have a goal to not make Casey to feel hurt. You 
have a third goal to give in to Casey in this argument if that’s what it takes to 
maintain a good relationship with Casey.  
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 






How realistic is the second goal? ____________ 






How realistic is the third goal? ___________ 






7.  Casey is a friend you really care; you two are assigned to another more important 
project. Therefore, you don’t want to make Casey feel hurt, and you are willing to 
sacrifice your needs.
You have a goal to maintain a good relationship with Casey both because you care 
about Casey and because you want to do well in the later project. You also have a 
goal to make Casey not feel hurt. You have a third goal to give in to Casey in this 
argument if that’s what it takes to maintain a good relationship with Casey. 
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How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 






How realistic is the second goal? ____________ 






How realistic is the third goal? ___________ 






8.  Casey is not a friend of yours; you won’t possibly work with Casey again; you no 
longer care about the outcome of this project; and you don’t care how Casey feels.
You don’t have any goal about Casey and the project. 
 
How realistic is the lack of any goal? ____________ 






9. Casey is not a friend of yours but you two are assigned to another more important 
group project. Meanwhile, you want your ideas realized in this project.
You have a goal to maintain your relationship with Casey because you want to do 
well in the later group project. You have a second goal to insist on your plan for the 
project.  
 
How realistic is the first goal? ___________ 







How realistic is the second goal? ____________ 






Now, tell us something about yourself: 
Age: _________  Gender (Circle one):    Female    Male 
Race/Ethnicity (Circle one):      Caucasian      African American        Hispanic         
Asian    Other______________ 




Appendix G  
Pilot Study 4 Questionnaire Testing Perceived Goal Realism 
Date _____________ Time ________________ Course # ________________  
 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
 
Researchers at the University of Maryland are interested in how people can role play 
in a conflict situation and forget one’s own identity. A conflict occurs when two or 
more interdependent parties have incompatible goals or interests. Everyone 
experiences some form of conflict almost daily. When you have conflict with 
someone, depending on who the other person is and what your relationship is, you 
may have different goals when handling the conflict.  
What do you need to do in this study? 
 Simple but you need to try hard: You will read a hypothetical conflict 
scenario. DO NOT think what you will do in that scenario; instead, role play. There 
are 9 different role-relationships you would enact mentally in a hypothetical situation 
with someone named Casey. Do your best to ROLE PLAY! This study requires you 
to refresh your imaginary roles 9 times. Try not to use your own preference when 
answering questions.  
 In each role-relationship, the researchers list one or several major concerns 
or goals that may apply.  Use the 0 to 100% scale to rate the realism of those 
concern(s) or goal(s), where 0 means the concern or goal is not realistic at all, and 
100% means that the concern or goal is completely realistic. You can also add to the 
list based on your personal experience. 
 
What do you need to forget? 
 Imagine yourself being an actor in this study. FORGET how you would act 
with your personality or your ethical standards. Again, PLAY THE ROLE! 
 
Ready? If so, go to next page and it’s role play time! 
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Scenario: 
Casey is your classmate. You volunteered to do a project together. The 
project grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really 
want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of 
the project. In a meeting, you two had a heated argument. As you were 
arguing, you suddenly realized that further argument may harm your 
relationship. 
 
Role-Relationship 1: Casey is a friend you really care about.  
 
Corresponding Goal: This role-relationship makes you have a goal to maintain your 
friendship. 
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________% 
 






If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-






NOW, FORGET THIS ROLE AND GO TO YOUR NEXT ROLE. 
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NOW, FORGET THIS ROLE AND GO TO YOUR NEXT ROLE. 
Role-Relationship 2: You and Casey are not friends; but you have to work on 
another project with Casey later on. 
Corresponding Goal: This role-relationship makes you have a goal to maintain a 
good relationship with Casey. 
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________% 
 






If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this 







Role-Relationship 3: Casey is a friend you really care about. Moreover, you are 
assigned to work with Casey on another group project. 
 
Corresponding Goal: This role-relationship makes you have a goal to maintain a 
good relationship with Casey. 
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________% 
 






If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this 






NOW, FORGET THIS ROLE AND GO TO YOUR NEXT ROLE. 
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Role-Relationship 4: Casey is a rival of yours. That is, you want to compete 
with Casey and use YOUR plan to do the project. You and Casey are not 
friends. How Casey feels is not something you consider; what’s more, you 
already know that you are not going to do any other teamwork with Casey 
again. 
 
Corresponding Goal # 1: In the argument, you have a goal to compete with Casey 
about your ideas, even if such competition may hurt Casey. 
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________% 
 





If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this 





Corresponding Goal # 2 (or lack of it): You do NOT care to maintain a good 
relationship. 
 
How realistic is this statement? ___________% 
 





If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this 





NOW, FORGET THIS ROLE AND GO TO YOUR NEXT ROLE. 
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Role-Relationship 5: Casey is a friend you really, really care about. Work is less 
important as compared with your relationship with Casey. 
 
Corresponding Goal # 1: You have a goal to maintain your friendship. 
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________% 
 






If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-






Corresponding Goal # 2: You may also have a goal to give up your argument to Casey if 
further argument may damage your relationship. 
 
How realistic is this statement? ___________% 
 






If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-






NOW, FORGET THIS ROLE AND GO TO YOUR NEXT ROLE. 
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Role-Relationship 6: You and Casey are not friends, but you already know that 
you and Casey have been assigned to another MORE important teamwork. As 
compared with insisting on your ideas in this project, you know that being able to 
co-work on the next teamwork with Casey is more important. 
Corresponding Goal # 1: You have a goal to maintain your friendship. 
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________% 




If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-




Corresponding Goal # 2: You have a goal to avoid hurtful words to upset Casey. 
 
How realistic is this statement? ___________% 
 




If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-




Corresponding Goal # 3: You may also have a goal to give up your argument to Casey 
if further argument may damage your relationship. How realistic is this statement? 
___________% 
 




If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-




NOW, FORGET THIS ROLE AND GO TO YOUR NEXT ROLE. 
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We do not want to exhaust you—we know it’s hard to be an actor and try to 
forget yourself. 
So, relax a little before you go on~~~ When you are ready, go to next page. 
There are three role-relationships left for you to role play! 
Ready? Go! 
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Role-Relationship 7: Casey is a friend you really care about AND you two are 
assigned to another more important project. As compared with insisting on your 
ideas in this project, your friendship with Casey and your being able to co-work on 
the next teamwork with Casey are more important. 
Corresponding Goal # 1: You have a goal to maintain your friendship. 
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________% 




If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-
relationship, list below: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Corresponding Goal # 2: You have a goal to avoid hurtful words to upset Casey. 
 
How realistic is this statement? ___________% 
 




If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-




Corresponding Goal # 3: You may also have a goal to give up your argument to Casey if 
further argument may damage your relationship. How realistic is this statement? 
___________% 
 




If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-




NOW, FORGET THIS ROLE AND GO TO YOUR NEXT ROLE. 
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Role-Relationship 8: Casey is not a friend of yours and you know you aren’t involved 
in any other teamwork with Casey. The continuous argument and Casey’s 
stubbornness made you so exhausted that you decide to give up on the project. What’s 
more, you never want to talk with Casey again. 
Corresponding Goal or Lack of Goals: You begin to lose motivation to do the project.  
 
How realistic is this description? ___________% 
 





If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-





Corresponding Goal or Lack of Goals: You begin to lose motivation to deal with Casey.  
 
How realistic is this description? ___________% 
 





If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-





NOW, FORGET THIS ROLE AND GO TO YOUR NEXT ROLE. 
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Role-Relationship 9: Casey is not a friend of yours but you two are assigned to do 
another more important group project. Meanwhile, you want to insist on your ideas 
on this project.  
 
Corresponding Goal # 1: You have a goal to maintain your relationship. 
 
How realistic is this goal? ___________% 
 






If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-






Corresponding Goal # 2: You also have a goal to have the project done the way you want. 
 
How realistic is this statement? ___________% 
 






If you believe there is/ are other goal(s) that are more important based on this role-






Nice job acting up your role! Thanks!
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********************************************************************* 
Now, please tell us more about you. 
1. My age is __________ years. 
2. I am     FEMALE  MALE 
3. My ethnicity is or most closely to 
________ African, American African, or Black 
________ Hispanic, Latino, Mexican American, Cuban American, or Puerto Rican 
________ Asian American, Pacific Islander, Chinese, Japanese, or Korean 
________ Central Asian, Indian, or Pakistani 
_______ Arab, or Arab American 
________ Jewish 
________ White, Caucasian, European American 
________ Other (please specify): _____________________ 
4. I am a citizen of __________________ (country). 
5. My native language is  ENGLISH Other (please specify) 
_______________. 
6. I can also speak another language fluently   YES  NO 
 If “yes,” the language is ___________________. 
7. I am  FRESHMAN  SOPHOMORE JUNIOR SENIOR 
GRADUATE  OTHER (please specify) __________________. 
8. One last question: While you were answering the questionnaire, were you 
imagining Casey as a male or female? Circle one. 
Male   Female  Not clear 
That’s all. Thank you for your time.    
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Appendix H  
Messages in the 24 Experimental Conditions 
Classmate Conditions 
Condition 1 (H1a):  
Casey is a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a project together. The project 
grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this 
project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are 
having a heated argument, and no one is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you 
suddenly realize that further argument may make your communication break down and may 
even harm your friendship. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. What would you do? 
 
Condition 2 (H1b):  
Casey is a classmate. You volunteered to do a project together. The project grade constitutes 
10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, you 
disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, 
and no one is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize that further 
argument may make your communication break down. 
Remember that Casey is a NOT a friend of yours. However, you two are assigned to another 
group project, the grade of which constitutes 40% of your course grade. What would you do? 
 
Condition 3 (H1c):  
Casey is a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a project together. The project 
grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this 
project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are 
having a heated argument, and no one seems is to convince the other. As you are arguing, you 
suddenly realize that further argument may make your communication break down and may 
even harm your friendship. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. What’s more, you two are assigned to 
another group project, the grade of which constitutes 40% of your course grade. What would 
you do? 
 
Condition 4 (H2):  
Casey is a rival of yours. You were assigned to do a project together. The project grade 
constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this project. 
However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are having a 
heated argument, and no one is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly 
realize that further argument may make your communication break down. 
Remember that Casey is a rival of yours. That is, you want to compete with Casey and use 
YOUR plan to do the project. You and Casey are not friends. How Casey feels is not 
something you consider; what’s more, you already know that you are not going to do any 
other teamwork with Casey again. What would you do? 
 
Condition 5 (H3a):  
Casey is a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a project together. The project 
grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this 
project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are 
having a heated argument, and no one is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you 
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suddenly realize that further argument may make your communication break down and may 
even harm your friendship. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s feelings 
and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Your relationship with Casey is more important than 
whose idea is used and the grade you receive on the project. What would you do? 
 
Condition 6 (H3b):  
Casey is a classmate. You volunteered to do a project together. The project grade constitutes 
10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, you 
disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, 
and no one is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize that further 
argument may make your communication break down. 
Remember that you and Casey are NOT friends. However, you two are assigned to another 
group project, the grade of which constitutes 40% of your course grade. You don’t want to 
hurt Casey’s feelings. Your relationship with Casey is more important than whose idea is used 
and the grade you receive on the project. What would you do? 
 
Condition 7 (H3c):  
Casey is a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a project together. The project 
grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this 
project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are 
having a heated argument, and no one is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you 
suddenly realize that further argument may make your communication break down and may 
even harm your friendship. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s feelings 
and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Plus, you two are assigned to another group project, 
the grade of which constitutes 40% of your course grade. As compared with your relationship 
with Casey and your being able to work well on the next project, the grade of this project is 
less important. What would you do? 
 
Condition 8 (H4):  
Casey is a classmate. You were assigned to do a project together. The project grade 
constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this project. 
However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two had a heated 
argument, and no one was able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to resolve 
this conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is NOT a friend of yours and you already know you two are not 
involved in any other teamwork for this class. The continuous argument and Casey’s 
stubbornness made you so exhausted that you feel that you can stand any grade for this 
project, as long as you don’t have to do this with Casey any more. You also made a note to 
yourself that you don’t want Casey to be a friend in your life. 
 
Condition 9 (H5):  
Casey is a classmate. You were assigned to do a project together. The project grade 
constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this project. 
However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two had a heated 
argument, and no one was able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to resolve 
this conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is NOT a friend of yours. You don’t really care about how Casey feels. 
You really want to do this project according to your ideas because you believe your plan can 
make a grade of 10 out of 10 on this project. However, you already know that you two are 
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assigned to another group project together, the grade of which constitutes 40% of your course 
grade. As compared with this project, the next group project is more important. What would 
you do? 
 
Condition 10 (H6a):  
Casey is a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a project together. The project 
grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this 
project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two had a 
heated argument, and no one was able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to 
resolve this conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s feelings 
and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. As compared with your relationship with Casey, the 
grade of this project is less important. What would you do? 
 
Condition 11 (H6b):  
Casey is a classmate. You volunteered to do a project together. The project grade constitutes 
10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, you 
disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no 
one was able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to resolve this conflict and 
move on. 
Remember that you and Casey are not friends. However, you two are assigned to another 
group project, the grade of which constitutes 40% of your course grade. You don’t want to 
hurt Casey’s feelings. As compared with this project, the next group project is more 
important. What would you do? 
 
Condition 12 (H6c):  
Casey is a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a project together. The project 
grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of you really want to do well on this 
project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two had a 
heated argument, and no one was able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to 
resolve this conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s feelings 
and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Plus, you two are assigned to another group project, 
the grade of which constitutes 40% of your course grade. As compared to/with? your 
relationship with Casey and your being able to work well together on the next project, the 




Condition 1 (H1a):  
Casey is your friend and colleague at work. You volunteered to do a project together. The 
outcome of the project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your job 
performance. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on 
the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one 
is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize that further argument 
may make your communication break down and may even harm your friendship. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. What would you do? 
 
Condition 2 (H1b):  
Casey is your colleague at work. You volunteered to do a project together. The outcome of the 
project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your job performance. Both of 
you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the 
project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one is able to convince 
the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize that further argument may make your 
communication break down. 
Remember that Casey is NOT a friend of yours. However, you two are assigned to work on 
another, more important group proposal, the outcome of which will decide whether you could 
win a multimillion-dollar project from a client. What would you do? 
 
Condition (H1c):  
Casey is your friend and colleague at work. You volunteered to do a project together. The 
outcome of the project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your job 
performance. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on 
the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one 
is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize that further argument 
may make your communication break down and may even harm your friendship. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. What’s more, you two are assigned to 
work on another, more important group proposal, the outcome of which will decide whether 
you could win a multimillion-dollar project from a client. What would you do? 
 
Condition 4 (H2):  
Casey is a rival of yours at work. You were assigned to do a project together. The outcome of 
the project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your job performance. Both of 
you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the 
project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one is able to convince 
the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize that further argument may make your 
communication break down. 
Remember that Casey is a rival of yours. That is, you want to compete with Casey and use 
YOUR plan to do the project. You and Casey are not friends. How Casey feels is not 
something you consider; what’s more, you already know that you are not going to do any 
other teamwork with Casey again. What would you do? 
 
Condition 5 (H3a):  
Casey is your colleague at work and a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a 
project together. The outcome of the project is important because the boss will use it to 
evaluate your job performance. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, 
you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated 
argument, and no one is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize 
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that further argument may make your communication break down and may even harm your 
friendship. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s feelings 
and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Your relationship with Casey is more important than 
whose idea is used and the outcome you receive on the project. What would you do? 
 
Condition 6 (H3b):  
Casey is your colleague at work. You volunteered to do a project together. The outcome of the 
project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your job performance. Both of 
you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the 
project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, and no one is able to convince 
the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly realize that further argument may make your 
communication break down. 
Remember that you and Casey are NOT friends. However, you two are assigned to work on 
another, more important group proposal, the outcome of which will decide whether you could 
win a multimillion-dollar project from a client. You don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Your 
relationship with Casey is more important than whose idea is used and the outcome you 
receive on the project.  What would you do? 
 
Condition 7 (H3c):  
Casey is your colleague at work and a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a 
project together. The outcome of the project is important because the boss will use it to 
evaluate your job performance. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, 
you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, 
and no one seemed to be able to convince the other. As you were arguing, you suddenly 
realized that further argument may make your communication break down and may even 
harm your friendship. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s feelings 
and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Plus, you two are assigned to work on another, more 
important group proposal, the outcome of which will decide whether you could win a 
multimillion-dollar project from a client. As compared with your relationship with Casey and 
your being able to work well on the next proposal, whose idea to use and the outcome of this 
project are less important. What would you do? 
 
Condition 8 (H4):  
Casey is your colleague at work. You volunteered to do a project together. The outcome of the 
project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your job performance. Both of 
you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the 
project. In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no one was able to convince the 
other. After the meeting, you decide to resolve this conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is NOT a friend of yours and you already know you two are not 
involved in any other teamwork. The continuous argument and Casey’s stubbornness made 
you so exhausted that you feel that you can stand any outcome for this project, as long as you 
don’t have to do this with Casey any more. You also made a note to yourself that you don’t 
want Casey to be a friend in your life. What would you do? 
 
Condition 9 (H5):  
Casey is your colleague at work. You volunteered to do a project together. The outcome of the 
project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your job performance. Both of 
you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the 
project. In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no one was able to convince the 
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other. After the meeting, you decide to resolve this conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is NOT a friend of yours. You don’t really care about how Casey feels. 
You really want to do this project according to your ideas because you believe your plan can 
score a 10 out of 10 on this project. However, you already know that you two are assigned to 
work on another, more important group proposal, the outcome of which will decide whether 
you could win a multimillion-dollar project from a client. As compared with this project, the 
next proposal is more important. What would you do? 
 
Condition 10 (H6a):  
Casey is your colleague at work and a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a 
project together. The outcome of the project is important because the boss will use it to 
evaluate your job performance. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, 
you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, 
and no one was able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to resolve this 
conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s feelings 
and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. As compared with your relationship with Casey, 
whose idea to use and the outcome of this project are less important. What would you do? 
 
Condition 11 (H6b):  
Casey is your colleague at work. You volunteered to do a project together. The outcome of the 
project is important because the boss will use it to evaluate your job performance. Both of 
you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the blueprint of the 
project. In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, and no one was able to convince the 
other. After the meeting, you decide to resolve this conflict and move on. 
Remember that you and Casey are NOT friends. However, you two are assigned to work on 
another, more important group proposal, the outcome of which will decide whether you could 
win a multimillion-dollar project from a client. You don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. As 
compared with maintaining good communication with Casey for the sake of your next 
proposal, whose ideas to use and the outcome of this project are less important. What would 
you do? 
 
Condition 12 (H6c):  
Casey is your colleague at work and a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a 
project together. The outcome of the project is important because the boss will use it to 
evaluate your job performance. Both of you really want to do well on this project. However, 
you disagree on the blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two had a heated argument, 
and no one was able to convince the other. After the meeting, you decide to resolve this 
conflict and move on. 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. You deeply care about Casey’s feelings 
and don’t want to hurt Casey’s feelings. Plus, you two are assigned to work on another, more 
important group proposal, the outcome of which will decide whether you could win a 
multimillion-dollar project from a client. As compared with/to your relationship with Casey 
and your being able to work well on the next proposal, whose ideas to use and the outcome of 
this project are less important. What would you do? 
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Appendix I  
Formal Study Instrument for Dependent Variables 
Importance of Goals (Manipulation Checks) 
Enmity Goals 
1. I don’t mind hurting Casey’s feelings. 
2. I don’t need to worry whether my words would humiliate Casey; the more 
important thing is to get my way on this project. 
3. I want to make Casey feel inferior. 
4. I did not care if Casey would feel upset because of my words. 
Instrumental Competitive Goals 
1. I need to defend my position on the issue.  
2. I need to think of ways to actualize my plan on this project. 
3. I need to make Casey submit to my ideas. 
4. I should plan on doing this project according to my ideas.  
Support Goals 
1. I care about how Casey feels because I want to maintain a good relationship 
with Casey. 
2. I should be careful not to hurt Casey because I truly care how Casey feels. 
3. It’s important for me to let Casey feel my affection and care. 
4. It is important for me to protect Casey’s feelings.  
Instrumental Cooperative Goals 
1. I should avoid words or actions that might make our communication break 
down because I need to work with Casey again. 
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2. I need to keep good communication with Casey because we have to work 
together. 
3. I should plan on keeping the communication going just for the sake of future 
teamwork with Casey. 
4. I should be careful with word choice because I need to work with Casey again 
in the future. 
Likelihood of Avoidance Strategies 
To Withdraw 
1. In the rest of the meeting, I will stop arguing and leave the scene. 
2. In the rest of the meeting, I’ll just shut up and stop responding. 
3. I’ll just sit there and zip my mouth in the rest of the meeting. 
4. If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I will just step out. 
To Passively Compete 
1. In the rest of the meeting, I will stop arguing with Casey but start doing what I 
want, pretending not to hear Casey’s nagging. 
2. I’ll focus on doing the project as I want and don’t have to argue back. 
3. In the rest of the meeting, I’ll play deaf and do the project as I have planned. 
4. On the spot, even though I will stop arguing, I will start doing the project as I 
want.   
To Pretend 
1. If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I will pretend nothing’s 
wrong by talking about something else. 
2. If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I’ll switch the topic on the 
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spot. 
3. On the spot, I will stop arguing and suggest we say or do something else. 
4. In the rest of the meeting, I will try to keep the communication going by 
shifting the topic. 
To Exit 
1. After the meeting, I will ask the instructor (boss) to remove me from the team. 
I will also make sure that I won’t have Casey as a friend. 
2. It is fine for me to move on without this project or Casey in my life. 
3. I’ll give up my ideas on this project and maybe never talk to Casey again. 
4. After the meeting, I won’t want to be discussing anything, or even talking 
with Casey any more. 
To Outflank 
1. After the meeting, I will try to solve the problem indirectly without having to 
discuss it with Casey again. 
2. After the meeting, I will talk to our professor (boss) about my ideas without 
any more discussion with Casey. 
3. After the meeting, I’ll come up with some sideway strategy (talk to our 
professor [boss] or do something else) to actualize my ideas. 
4. After the meeting, I’ll try something else to actualize my plan for the project 
but not through another debate with Casey. 
To Yield 
1. After the meeting, I will restrain myself from arguing about the project with 
Casey in our future conversations. 
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2. After the meeting, I’ll give up my ideas and remain Casey’s friend. 
3. I want to be, or remain, Casey’s friend and will never mention our different 
ideas about the project again. 
4. After the meeting, I’ll be, or remain, Casey’s friend but I’ll be careful not to 
mention our argument on the project in our conversations. 
Likelihood of Other Conflict Strategies 
To Accommodate 
1. I will try to satisfy Casey’s needs during the meeting. 
2. I will not give in to Casey’s wishes.  
3. I will try to satisfy Casey’s expectations. 
4. I will not bend over backwards to accommodate Casey’s wishes.  
5. I will like going along with Casey’s suggestions.  
6. I will accommodate Casey’s needs. 
To Dominate 
1. I will exert pressure on Casey to reach a solution leaning towards my ideas. 
2. I will use my power to get my way.  
3. I will not use influence to get my ideas accepted.  
4. I will use my expertise to make Casey accept my ideas. 
To Compromise 
1. I will try to find a middle course or compromise to solve the problem. 
2. If deadlock happens, I will take a moderate position to resolve the conflict. 
3. I will bargain with Casey to get a middle ground. 
4. I will try to work out a compromise that gives both of us some of what we 
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want. 
5. I will try to give and take so that moderate profits can be obtained. 
To Integrate 
1. I do not want to collaborate with Casey to make decisions.  
2. I will work with Casey to find a solution that satisfies the expectations of both 
of us. 
3. I will work closely with Casey for a proper understanding of what both of us 
want.  
4. I am willing to exchange information openly with Casey to reach the best 
solution. 




Appendix J  
Formal Study Questionnaire Example (H1a) 
 
Date ______________ Time _____________  Course # ____________ 
 
Department of Communication 
University of Maryland 
 
Researchers at the University of Maryland are interested in knowing how people 
handle conflict situations.  
What do you need to do in this study? 
1. Read a hypothetical conflict situation. 
2. Rate the importance of your concerns in this conflict situation. 








Casey is a friend you really care about. You volunteered to do a project 
together. The project grade constitutes 10% of your course grade. Both of 
you really want to do well on this project. However, you disagree on the 
blueprint of the project. In a meeting, you two are having a heated argument, 
and no one is able to convince the other. As you are arguing, you suddenly 
realize that further argument may make your communication break down and 
may even harm your friendship. 
 
Remember that Casey is a friend you like very much. What will you do? 
227
Part I 
Rate the importance of the following thoughts or goals while you are thinking about how to 
deal with the conflict with Casey. If you STRONGLY AGREE with a thought or a goal stated 
below, rate it 100. If you STRONGLY DISAGREE with a thought or a goal, rate it 0. You 
may choose ANY number between 0 and 100 to indicate different degrees of agreement. 
Note: Some statements seem to be repetitive. Never mind. Just respond to them. 
Statement Item Label Your 
Rating 
Scale 
I don’t mind hurting Casey’s feelings. 
 
Enmity1  100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 




100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I should be careful with word choice because I 
need to work with Casey again in the future. 
Instrumental 
Cooperation4
100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I care about how Casey feels because I want to 
maintain a good relationship with Casey. 
Support1  100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I should avoid words or actions that might 
make our communication break down because 
I need to work with Casey again. 
Instrumental 
Cooperation1
100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I need to make Casey submit to my ideas. Instrumental 
Competitiin3 
 100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I should be careful not to hurt Casey because I 
truly care how Casey feels. 
Support2  100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I don’t need to worry whether my words 
would humiliate Casey; the more important 
thing is to get my way on this project. 
Enmity2  100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I should plan on doing this project according 
to my ideas.   
Instrumental 
Competition4
100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
It’s important for me to let Casey feel my 
affection and care.   
Support3  100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I want to make Casey feel inferior. Enmity3  100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I need to keep good communication with 
Casey because we have to work together. 
Instrumental 
Cooperation2
100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I did not care if Casey would feel upset 
because of my words. 
Enmity4  100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I should plan on keeping the communication 




 100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
It is important for me to protect Casey’s 
feelings. 
Support4  100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
I need to think of ways to actualize my plan 
on this project. 
Instrumental 
competition2 
 100 = Strongly Agree 
 0 = Strongly Disagree 
List other goals or thoughts that are important to you (not listed above), each 
followed with a score of importance:      .
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Part II 
Now, consider what you would do in order to resolve this conflict and move on. We 
have listed some strategies people often use to resolve conflicts. Some statements 
describe people’s conflict strategies DURING the conflict; others describe people’s 
strategies AFTER the conflict episode. Rate how likely you would use each strategy. 
People often use multiple strategies to handle conflict. So you can give high numbers 
to as many strategies as you may use. Also, you may give low ratings to any number 
of strategies that you are not likely to use.  
Again, use the numbers between 0 and 100. If you feel you are almost certain to use a 
strategy, rate it 100. If you feel you are almost certain that you would not use a 
strategy, rate it 0. You may choose any number between 0 and 100 to indicate 
different likelihood to use a strategy. 
Statement  Item Label Your 
Rating
Scale 
After the meeting, I will try to solve the 
problem indirectly without having to discuss it 
with Casey again. 
Outflank1  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will try to satisfy Casey’s needs during the 
meeting. 
Accommodate1  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
If the argument begins to turn into a 
breakdown, I will pretend nothing’s wrong by 
talking about something else. 
Pretend1  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will exert pressure on Casey to reach a 
solution leaning towards my ideas. 
Dominatie1  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will not give in to Casey’s wishes.  Accommodate2 
(Reverse coded) 
 100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will try to find a middle course or 
compromise to solve the problem. 
Compromise1  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
After the meeting, I will talk to our professor 
(boss) about my ideas without any more 
discussion with Casey. 
Outflank2  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will use my power to get my way.  Dominate2  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
If the argument begins to turn into a 
breakdown, I’ll switch the topic on the spot. 
Pretend2  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 




 100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
If deadlock happens, I will take a moderate 
position to resolve the conflict. 
Compromise2  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
On the spot, I will stop arguing and suggest we 
say or do something else. 
Pretend3  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
After the meeting, I’ll come up with some 
sideway strategy (talk to our professor [boss] or 
do something else) to actualize my ideas. 
Outflank3  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
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After the meeting, I will restrain myself from 
arguing about the project with Casey in our 
future conversations. 
Yield1  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
In the rest of the meeting, I will stop arguing 
with Casey but start doing what I want, 
pretending not to hear Casey’s nagging. 
Passively 
Compete1 
 100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
In the rest of the meeting, I will stop arguing 
and leave the scene. 
Withdraw1  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
After the meeting, I will ask the instructor 
(boss) to remove me from the team. I will also 
make sure that I won’t have Casey as a friend. 
Exit1  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 




 100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
In the rest of the meeting, I’ll just shut up and 
stop responding. 
Withdraw2  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will work with Casey to find a solution that 
satisfies the expectations of both of us. 
Integrate2  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
After the meeting, I’ll give up my ideas and 
remain Casey’s friend. 
Yield2  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will bargain with Casey to get a middle 
ground. 
Compromise3  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I’ll just sit there and zip my mouth in the rest of 
the meeting. 
Withdraw3  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will use my expertise to make Casey accept 
my ideas. 
Dominate4  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
It is fine for me to move on without this project 
or Casey in my life. 
Exit2  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will try to satisfy Casey’s expectations. Accommodate3 
 
100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
In the rest of the meeting, I will try to keep the 
communication going by shifting the topic. 
Pretend4  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will try to work out a compromise that gives 
both of us some of what we want. 
Compromise4  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will work closely with Casey for a proper 
understanding of what both of us want.  
Integrate3  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will not bend over backwards to 
accommodate Casey’s wishes.  
Accommodate4 
(Reverse coded) 
 100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will try to give and take so that moderate 
profits can be obtained. 
Compromise5  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
If the argument begins to turn into a 
breakdown, I will just step out. 
Withdraw4  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I am willing to exchange information openly 
with Casey to reach the best solution. 
Integrate4  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 




100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
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I want to be, or remain, Casey’s friend and 
will never mention our different ideas about 
the project again. 
Yield3  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will bring all our concerns out in the open to 
reach an agreement in the best possible way. 
Integrate5  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I’ll focus on doing the project as I want and 
don’t have to argue back. 
Passively 
Compete2 
 100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
After the meeting, I’ll try something else to 
actualize my plan for the project but not 
through another debate with Casey. 
Outflank4  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
In the rest of the meeting, I’ll play deaf and 
do the project as I have planned. 
Passively 
Compete3 
 100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I’ll give up my ideas on this project and 
maybe never talk to Casey again. 
Exit3  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
On the spot, even though I will stop arguing, 
I will start doing the project as I want.   
Passively 
Compete4 
 100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
I will accommodate Casey’s needs. Accommodate6  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
After the meeting, I’ll be, or remain, Casey’s 
friend but I’ll be careful not to mention our 
argument on the project in our conversations. 
Yield4  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
After the meeting, I won’t want to be 
discussing anything, or even talking with 
Casey any more. 
Exit4  100 = Definitely 
 0 = Not At All Likely 
List any other strategies that you will use that are not list above, each strategy 





Now, please tell us more about you: 
1. My age is __________ years. 
 
2. I am     FEMALE  MALE 
3. My cultural background is or most closely to (If you are multiethnic, just choose 
the one whose culture influences you the most.) 
 
________ African, American African, or Black 
________ Hispanic, Latino, Mexican American, Cuban American, or Puerto Rican 
________ Asian American, Pacific Islander, Chinese, Japanese, or Korean 
________ Central Asian, Indian, or Pakistani 
________ Arab, or Arab American 
________ Jewish 
________ White, Caucasian, European American 
________ Other (please specify): _____________________ 
4. I am a citizen of __________________ (country). 
5. My native language is  ENGLISH Other (please specify) 
_______________. 
 
6. I can also speak another language fluently   YES  NO 
 If “yes,” the language is ___________________. 
7. I am  FRESHMAN  SOPHOMORE JUNIOR SENIOR 
 
GRADUATE  OTHER (please specify) __________________. 
 
8. One last question: While you were answering the questionnaire, were you 
imagining Casey as a male or female? Circle one. 
Male   Female  Not clear 
That’s all. Thank you again for your participation. If you are interested in the purpose 
of the survey and the results of the study, feel free to contact Qi Wang at 
qiqiwang@umd.edu or call her at 301-405-6533. Note: The results will be available 
after August 1, 2006.  
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Appendix K  
Descriptives of the Indicators Before Transformation 
Indicators Mean SD Skewness Standard Error Kurtosis Standard Error
Enmity1 39.80 29.87 .233 .130 -1.073 .260 
Enmity2 27.96 26.73 .750 .130 -.387 .260 
Enmity3 12.80 20.51 1.865 .131 3.250 .260 
Enmity4 26.38 26.69 .880 .130 -.190 .260 
Instrumental 
Competition1 80.42 19.63 -1.279 .130 2.002 .259 
Instrumental 
Competition2 74.34 22.15 -.850 .130 .387 .260 
Instrumental 
Competition3 52.47 24.39 -.210 .130 -.072 .260 
Instrumental 
Competition4 42.63 26.48 -.021 .130 -.776 .260 
Support1 71.30 29.13 -.925 .130 -.136 .259 
Support2 63.07 30.85 -.520 .130 -.880 .260 
Support3 55.31 31.09 -.205 .130 -1.032 .260 
Support4 52.90 30.75 -.141 .130 -1.032 .259 
Instrumental 
Cooperation1 80.16 26.17 -1.836 .130 2.839 .259 
Instrumental 
Cooperation2 87.52 17.91 -2.442 .130 7.791 .260 
Instrumental 
Cooperation3 70.09 29.40 -1.037 .130 .089 .260 
Instrumental 
Cooperation4 81.05 27.09 -1.900 .130 2.888 .260 
Withdraw1 13.73 20.47 1.778 .130 2.912 .259 
Withdraw2 9.34 16.94 2.235 .130 4.993 .259 
Withdraw3 7.94 15.90 2.961 .130 10.271 .260 
Withdraw4 23.84 26.19 .955 .130 .037 .259 
Passively 
Compete1 16.76 23.92 1.505 .130 1.492 .259 
Passively 
Compete2 27.58 27.98 .817 .130 -.318 .260 
Passively 
Compete3 7.79 15.46 2.548 .130 6.634 .259 
Passively 
Compete4 15.84 22.14 1.708 .130 2.579 .260 
Pretend1 21.98 25.54 1.181 .130 .514 .260 
Pretend2 24.03 25.79 .974 .130 .077 .260 
Pretend3 45.90 32.10 .026 .130 -1.194 .260 
Pretend4 37.83 30.26 .340 .130 -1.009 .259 
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Indicators Mean SD Skewness Standard Error Kurtosis Standard Error
Exit1 11.01 20.28 2.308 .130 5.102 .260 
Exit2 18.69 28.60 1.517 .130 1.174 .260 
Exit3 6.70 14.50 3.048 .130 11.029 .260 
Exit4 21.62 30.02 1.298 .130 .388 .259 
Outflank1 30.27 29.61 .729 .130 -.577 .260 
Outflank2 32.05 30.49 .563 .130 -.941 .260 
Outflank3 45.01 31.41 .093 .130 -1.188 .260 
Outflank4 42.66 30.86 .243 .130 -1.018 .260 
Yield1 76.48 25.22 -1.179 .130 .809 .260 
Yield2 29.01 29.58 .709 .130 -.706 .259 
Yield3 39.15 33.54 .333 .130 -1.202 .260 
Yield4 54.36 33.51 -.250 .130 -1.211 .259 
Accommodate1 57.90 24.43 -.418 .130 -.057 .260 
Accommodate2 51.89 25.86 -.005 .130 -.420 .260 
Accommodate3 51.05 26.37 -.181 .130 -.512 .260 
Accommodate4 35.73 30.35 .579 .130 -.731 .260 
Accommodate5 43.43 24.84 -.027 .130 -.342 .259 
Accommodate6 48.51 26.67 -.019 .130 -.552 .259 
Dominate1 49.60 27.92 -.156 .130 -.858 .260 
Dominate2 32.42 28.63 .505 .131 -.842 .260 
Dominate3 32.99 27.71 -.670 .130 -.326 .260 
Dominate4 55.97 28.89 -.400 .130 -.812 .259 
Compromise1 90.56 24.25 4.958 .130 76.902 .260 
Compromise2 69.44 24.83 -.733 .130 -.045 .260 
Compromise3 84.04 20.93 -1.570 .130 2.114 .259 
Compromise4 87.31 20.07 -2.137 .130 4.681 .260 
Compromise5 81.72 23.72 -1.664 .130 2.545 .259 
Integrate1 23.56 28.86 -1.055 .130 -.077 .259 
Integrate2 88.84 18.34 -2.158 .130 4.738 .259 
Integrate3 86.36 20.13 -1.882 .130 3.458 .259 
Integrate4 89.80 17.82 -2.556 .130 7.392 .259 
Integrate5 87.74 19.31 -2.157 .130 4.644 .260 
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Appendix L  
Data Transformation Formulas 
Indicators for Enmity Goals 
New Enmity2 = ln(Enmity2 + 30) + 50 
New Enmity3 = ln(Enmity3 + 0.01) + 60 
New Enmity4 = ln(Enmity4 + 15) + 50  
Indicators for Instrumental Competitive Goals 
New Instrumental Competition1 = Instrumental Competition12.911 –  
 Instrumental Competition12.910999 + 50  
New Instrumental Competition2 = Instrumental Competition21.3 – 
 Instrumental Competition1.296 + 50 
Indicators for Support Goals 
New Support1 = Support11.3 – Support11.296 + 50  
 New Support2 = Support21.2 – Support21.196 + 50  
Indicators for Instrumental Cooperative Goals 
 New Instrumental Cooperation1 = Instrumental Cooperation12.911 –
Instrumental Cooperation12.910999 + 50  
New Instrumental Cooperation2 = instrumental Cooperation23.51 –
Instrumental Cooperation23.509999 + 20 
 New Instrumental Cooperation3 = instrumental Cooperation31.60  –
Instrumental Cooperation31.59 
New Instrumental Cooperation4 = instrumental Cooperation42.911 –
Instrumental Cooperation42.910999 + 50 
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Indicators for Withdrawal 
New Withdraw1 = ln(Withdrawal1 + 0.0001) + 50  
 New Withdraw2 = ln(Withdrawal2 + 0.0001) + 50  
 New Withdraw3 = ln(Withdrawal3 + 0.0001) + 50  
 New Withdraw4 = ln(Withdrawal4 + 30) + 50  
 Indicators for Passive Competition 
New Passively Compete1 = ln(passive Compete1 + 0.0001) + 50   
New Passively Compete2 = ln(Passively Compete2 + 30) + 50   
New Passively Compete3 = ln(Passively Compete3 + 0.0001) + 50   
New Passively Compete4 = ln(Passively Compete4 + 0.0001) + 50  
 Indicators for Pretending 
New Pretend1 = ln(Pretend1 + 20) + 50  
 New Pretend2 = ln(Pretend2 + 20) + 50   
Indicators for Exit 
New Exit1 = ln(Exit1 + 0.0001) + 50  
 New Exit2 = ln(Exit2 + 0.0001) + 50  
 New Exit3 = ln(Exit3 + 0.0001) + 50  
 New Exit4 = ln(Exit4 + 0.0001) + 50  
 Indicators for Outflanking 
New Outflank1 = ln(Outflank1 + 60) + 50  
 New Outflank2 = ln(Outflank2 + 60) + 50  
Indicators for Yielding 
New Yield1 = Yield11.6 – Yield11.59 
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New Yield2 = ln(Yield2 + 60) + 50  
 New Yield3 = ln(Yield3 + 100) + 50  
 Indicators for Accommodation 
New Accommodate1 = Accommodate11.2 – Accommodate11.196 + 50   
New Accommodate4 = ln(Accommodate4 + 60) + 50  
 Indicators for Domination 
New Dominate2 = ln(Dominate2 + 60) + 50  
 New Dominate3 = Dominate31.2 – Dominate31.196 + 50   
New Dominate4 = Dominate41.2 – Dominate41.196 + 50  
 Indicators for Compromise 
New Compromise1 = ln(Compromise1 + 90) + 40  
 New Compromise2 = Compromise21.3 – Compromise21.296 + 50  
 New Compromise3 = Compromise32.911 – Compromise32.910999 + 50  
 New Compromise4 = Compromise42.911 – Compromise42.910999 + 50  
New Compromise5 = Compromise52.911 – Compromise52.910999 +50  
 Indicators for Integration 
New Integrate1 = Integrate2.019 – Integrate2.01899 + 50   
New Integrate2 = Integrate23.51 – Integrate3.509999 + 20   
New Integrate3 = Integrate32.94 – Integrate32.939999 + 50  
 New Integrate4 = Integrate44.59 – Integrate44.58999999 + 50 
 New Integrate5 = Integrate53.61 – Integrate53.6099999 + 40 
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Enmity1 39.80 29.87 .233 .130 -1.073 .260 
New Enmity2 53.95 .45 .173 .130 -1.221 .260 
New Enmity3 58.74 3.84 .318 .131 -1.830 .260 
New Enmity4 53.51 .65 .113 .130 -1.305 .260 
New Instrumental 
Competition1 51.81 .98 -.086 .130 -1.273 .259 
New Instrumental 
Competition2 54.79 1.94 -.419 .130 -.740 .260 
Instrumental 
Competition3 52.47 24.39 -.210 .130 -.072 .260 
Instrumental 
Competition4 42.63 26.48 -.021 .130 -.776 .260 
New Support1 54.65 2.38 -.520 .130 -1.024 .259 
New Support2 52.56 1.53 -.195 .130 -1.280 .260 
Support3 55.31 31.09 -.205 .130 -1.032 .260 
Support4 52.90 30.75 -.141 .130 -1.032 .259 
New Instrumental 
Cooperation1 51.95 1.04 -.476 .130 -1.053 .259 
New Instrumental 
Cooperation2 54.09 15.23 -.634 .130 -.913 .260 
New Instrumental 
Cooperation3 42.43 23.55 -.415 .130 -1.046 .260 
New Instrumental 
Cooperation4 52.03 1.05 -.605 .130 -.958 .260 
New Withdraw1 46.85 6.14 .040 .130 -1.974 .259 
New Withdraw2 45.39 5.89 .518 .130 -1.710 .259 
New Withdraw3 45.17 5.78 .578 .130 -1.640 .260 
New Withdraw4 53.87 .45 .419 .130 -1.186 .259 
New Passive 
Compete1 47.14 6.21 -.026 .130 -1.971 .259 
New Passive 
Compete2 53.94 .46 .265 .130 -1.253 .260 
New Passive 
Compete3 44.96 5.73 .662 .130 -1.534 .259 
New Passive 
Compete4 47.61 6.10 -.202 .130 -1.926 .260 
New Pretend1 53.57 .55 .482 .130 -1.044 .260 
New Pretend2 53.62 .56 .293 .130 -1.247 .260 
Pretend3 45.90 32.10 .026 .130 -1.194 .260 







New Exit1 45.76 5.97 .391 .130 -1.812 .260 
New Exit2 44.50 5.54 .840 .130 -1.261 .260 
New Exit3 47.59 6.26 -.142 .130 -1.940 .259 
New Exit4 46.75 6.26 .125 .130 -1.945 .260 
New Outflank1 54.45 .31 .363 .130 -1.154 .260 
New Outflank2 54.46 .32 .249 .130 -1.343 .260 
Outflank3 45.01 31.41 .093 .130 -1.188 .260 
Outflank4 42.66 30.86 .243 .130 -1.018 .260 
New Yield1 47.43 22.26 -.568 .130 -.904 .260 
New Yield2 54.43 .31 .390 .130 -1.246 .259 
New Yield3 54.90 .24 .101 .130 -1.376 .260 
New Yield4 54.36 33.51 -.250 .130 -1.211 .259 
New 
Accommodate1 52.22 1.19 .139 .130 -.552 .260 
Accommodate2 51.89 25.86 .005 .130 -.420 .260 
Accommodate3 51.05 26.37 -.181 .130 -.512 .260 
New 
Accommodate4 54.51 .31 .177 .130 -1.143 .260 
Accommodate5 43.43 24.84 .027 .130 -.342 .259 
Accommodate6 48.51 26.67 -.019 .130 .-552 .259 
Dominate1 49.60 27.92 -.156 .130 -.858 .260 
New Dominate2 54.47 .30 .152 .131 -1.281 .260 
New Dominate3 52.73 1.41 -.275 .130 -.999 .260 
New Dominate4 52.17 1.37 .011 .130 -1.034 .259 
New Compromise1 45.18 .12 -.870 .130 17.821 .260 
New Compromise2 54.39 2.09 -.279 .130 -.921 .260 
New Compromise3 52.08 1.03 -.619 .130 -1.029 .259 
New Compromise4 52.28 .97 -.985 .130 -.347 .260 
New Compromise5 52.00 1.06 -.453 .130 -1.218 .259 
New Integrate1 50.32 .18 -.521 .130 -1.325 .259 
New Integrate2 56.25 15.73 -.998 .130 -.399 .259 
New Integrate3 52.53 1.14 -.830 .130 -.691 .259 
New Integrate4 51.64 23.51 -.919 .130 -.587 .259 
New Integrate5 45.55 2.52 -.869 .130 -.561 .260 
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Appendix N  







Corrected Model Withdraw 94 1.35 .03
Passively Compete 94 1.20 .13
Pretend 94 .95 .60
Exit 94 2.34 .00
Outflank 94 1.29 .05
Yield 94 1.89 .00
Intercept Withdraw 1 .24 .62
Passively Compete 1 1.37 .24
Pretend 1 1.64 .20
Exit 1 4.31 .03
Outflank 1 .02 .87
Yield 1 .00 .98
Scenario Withdraw 1 .40 .52
Passively Compete 1 .24 .62
Pretend 1 .69 .40
Exit 1 .07 .78
Outflank 1 .22 .63
Yield 1 .37 .54
Condition Withdraw 11 .97 .47
Passively Compete 11 1.29 .23
Pretend 11 1.33 .20
Exit 11 4.77 .00
Outflank 11 1.65 .08
Yield 11 2.66 .00
Ps Gender Withdraw 1 .41 .52
Passively Compete 1 3.09 .08
Pretend 1 .28 .59
Exit 1 5.91 .01
Outflank 1 .02 .87
Yield 1 .02 .87
Cs Gender Withdraw 2 2.20 .11
Passively Compete 2 1.14 .31
Pretend 2 1.14 .32








Outflank 2 .21 .80
Yield 2 .61 .54
Scenario × Condition Withdraw 11 1.55 .11
Passively Compete 11 1.19 .29
Pretend 11 1.05 .39
Exit 11 1.75 .06
Outflank 11 .74 .69
Yield 11 1.27 .24
Scenario × Ps Gender Withdraw 1 .02 .87
Passively Compete 1 .11 .73
Pretend 1 .02 .87
Exit 1 1.00 .31
Outflank 1 .54 .46
Yield 1 .91 .33
Condition × Ps Gender Withdraw 11 .97 .46
Passively Compete 11 1.28 .23
Pretend 11 1.10 .36
Exit 11 1.33 .20
Outflank 11 1.83 .06
Yield 11 .45 .93
Scenario × Condition × Ps 
Gender 
Withdraw 10 2.84 .00
Passively Compete 10 1.09 .36
Pretend 10 1.19 .29
Exit 10 .82 .60
Outflank 10 .65 .76
Yield 10 1.12 .34
Scenario × Cs Gender Withdraw 2 .14 .86
Passively Compete 2 .36 .69
Pretend 2 .57 .56
Exit 2 .01 .98
Outflank 2 .19 .82
Yield 2 .69 .49
Condition × Cs Gender Withdraw 18 1.69 .05
Passively Compete 18 1.24 .22
Pretend 18 1.30 .18
Exit 18 .76 .73
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Outflank 18 1.00 .45
Yield 18 .76 .74
Scenario × Condition × Cs 
Gender 
Withdraw 9 1.24 .27
Passively Compete 9 .70 .70
Pretend 9 .66 .73
Exit 9 .78 .63
Outflank 9 .52 .85
Yield 9 .92 .50
Ps Gender × Cs Gender Withdraw 2 1.52 .22
Passively Compete 2 1.53 .21
Pretend 2 .41 .66
Exit 2 2.65 .07
Outflank 2 2.12 .12
Yield 2 .08 .91
Scenario × Ps Gender × Cs 
Gender 
Withdraw 1 .46 .49
Passively Compete 1 .12 .72
Pretend 1 .00 .93
Exit 1 .29 .58
Outflank 1 2.18 .14
Yield 1 .00 .97
Condition × Ps Gender × Cs 
Gender 
Withdraw 9 1.08 .37
Passively Compete 9 1.04 .40
Pretend 9 .51 .86
Exit 9 .59 .79
Outflank 9 1.02 .42
Yield 9 1.26 .25
Scenario × Condition × Ps 
Gender × Cs Gender 
Withdraw 1 .55 .45
Passively Compete 1 .41 .52
Pretend 1 .03 .84
Exit 1 .01 .89
Outflank 1 .00 .98
Yield 1 .03 .85
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Note 1. For independent variables, Condition = Experimental Condition, Scenario = 
Type of Scenario, Ps Gender = Participants’ Gender, Cs Gender = Casey’s Gender. 
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Appendix O  
LISREL Syntax for Measured Variables in the Formal Study 
Importance of Enmity Goals 
 
CFA for Es transformed 51206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




31.260 .796 14.802 
11.590 .171 1.152 .426 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Importance of Instrumental Competitive Goals 
 
CFA for IPEs transformed 51206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




7.252 12.673 594.930 
6.405 13.385 253.977 701.374 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Importance of Support Goals 
 
CFA for Ss transformed 51206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 





41.290 29.664 967.039 
41.756 32.562 587.602 945.966 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Importance of Instrumental Cooperative Goals 
 
CFA for IOPS transformed 51206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




11.031 133.878 555.025 
.804 8.705 10.505 1.114 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Withdrawal 
 
CFA for WS transformed 1206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




15.991 22.946 33.417 
1.194 .714 .957 .208 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Passive Competition 
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CFA for PCS transformed 1206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




16.888 1.174 32.834 
17.351 1.287 19.718 37.328 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Pretending 
 
CFA for PS transformed 1206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




6.054 7.504 1030.682 
5.784 8.272 305.507 916.258 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Exit 
 
CFA for EXS transformed 1206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




17.242 16.520 30.707 
18.799 19.621 14.257 39.301 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
246
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Outflanking 
 
CFA for OS transformed  051206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




2.772 5.139 986.820 
2.049 3.345 410.361 952.696 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Yielding 
 
CFA for GS transformed  051206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




.905 .038 .058 
156.562 4.516 4.776 1122.995 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Accommodation 
 
CFA for AS transformed  051206 
DA NI=6 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 





16.341 205.516 695.465 
.064 1.387 1.420 .097 
9.787 249.803 260.556 1.626 617.033 
14.637 258.989 419.284 2.028 320.823 711.504 
MO NY=6 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 LY 5 1 LY 6 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Domination 
 
CFA for DS transformed  051206 
DA NI=4 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




10.688 .142 1.990 
16.747 .201 .362 1.900 
MO NY=4 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1  
VA 1 LY 1  1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
 
Likelihood of Compromise 
 
CFA for CS transformed  051206 
DA NI=5 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




.049 .896 1.070 
.058 .748 .552 .949 
.047 .824 .579 .591 1.142 
MO NY=5 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 LY 5 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
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Likelihood of Integration 
 
CFA for IS transformed  051206 
DA NI=5 NO=346 MA=CM 
LA 




.075 11.844 1.317 
1.685 202.369 16.857 553.069 
.153 23.457 1.644 36.940 6.365 
MO NY=5 NE=1 LY=FU,FI TE=DI,FR 
FR LY 2 1 LY 3 1 LY 4 1 LY 5 1 
VA 1 LY 1 1 
PD 
OU AL SC AM AD=OFF 
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Appendix P   
Measurement Model Statistics Controlling for Groups 
Importance of Goals, Indicator Loadings and Measurement Model Indices 
Importance of Goals and Indicators Unstandardized 
Loadings 
(standardized) 
Importance of Enmity Goals  
 
I don’t mind hurting Casey’s feelings. 1.00 (.68)* 
I don’t need to worry whether my words would humiliate Casey; 
the more important thing is to get my way on this project. 
0.02 (.71)* 
I want to make Casey feel inferior. 0.10 (.53)* 
I do not care if Casey would feel upset because of my words. 
 
0.03 (.83)* 
χ²(34, N = 346) = 70.88, p < .01, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .03, CFI = .96. H = .812. 
 
Importance of Instrumental Competitive Goals  
 
I need to defend my position on the issue.  1.00 (.51)* 
I need to think of ways to actualize my plan on this project. 1.88 (.49)* 
I need to make Casey submit to my ideas. 29.00 (.60)* 
I should plan on doing this project according to my ideas.  
 
31.05 (.59)* 
χ²(34, N = 346) = 47.66, p = .06, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .03, CFI = .98. H = .638. 
 
Importance of Support Goals 
I care about how Casey feels because I want to maintain a good 
relationship with Casey. 
1.00 (.84)* 
I will be careful not to hurt Casey because I truly care how Casey 
feels. 
0.70 (.91)* 
It is important for me to let Casey feel my affection and care. 0.10 (.70)* 
It is important for me to protect Casey’s feelings.  
 
0.11 (.73)* 
χ²(34, N = 346) = 125.93, p < .01, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .03, CFI = .94. H = .903. 
 
Importance of Instrumental Cooperative Goals  
 
I should avoid words or actions that might make our 
communication break down because I need to work with Casey 
again. 
1.00 (.89)* 
I need to keep good communication with Casey because we have 
to work together. 
6.63 (.67)* 
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Importance of Goals, Indicator Loadings and Measurement Model Indices 
Importance of Goals and Indicators Unstandardized 
Loadings 
(standardized) 
Importance of Instrumental Cooperative Goals  
 
I should plan on keeping the communication going just for the 
sake of future teamwork with Casey. 
14.43 (.52)* 
I should be careful with word choice because I need to work with 
Casey again in the future. 
 
0.93 (.58)* 
χ²(34, N = 346) = 72.01, p < .001, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .03, CFI = .96. H = .846. 
 
* p < .01. 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients resulted from the analyses of relevant covariance 
matrix, controlling for group membership (i.e., the 11 dummies in Table 10 were 
entered as independent variables which all lead to the dependent variable). Bold 
values represent unstandardized loadings of reference indicators. 
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Likelihoods of Avoidance Strategies, Indicator Loadings and Measurement Model 
Indices 





In the rest of the meeting, I will stop arguing and leave the scene. 1.00 (.58)* 
In the rest of the meeting, I’ll just shut up and stop responding. 1.30 (.79)* 
I’ll just sit there and zip my mouth in the rest of the meeting. 1.35 (.84)* 
If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I will just step out. 0.05 (.43)* 
 




In the rest of the meeting, I will stop arguing with Casey but start doing 
what I want, pretending not to hear Casey’s nagging. 
1.00 (.63)* 
I’ll focus on doing the project as I want and don’t have to argue back. 0.07 (.62)* 
In the rest of the meeting, I’ll play deaf and do the project as I have 
planned. 
1.08 (.74)* 
On the spot, even though I will stop arguing, I will start doing the project 
as I want.   
1.15 (.74)* 
 
χ²(34, N = 346) = 36.25, p = .36, RMSEA = .01, SRMR = .02, CFI = 1.00. H = .787. 
 
Pretending 
If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I will pretend nothing’s 
wrong by talking about something else. 
1.00 (.67)* 
If the argument begins to turn into a breakdown, I’ll switch the topic on 
the spot. 
1.34 (.90)* 
On the spot, I will stop arguing and suggest we say or do something else. 40.28 (.48)* 
In the rest of the meeting, I will try to keep the communication going by 
shifting the topic. 
 
44.18 (.54)* 




After the meeting, I will ask the instructor (boss) to remove me from the 
team. I will also make sure that I won’t have Casey as a friend. 
1.00 (.73)* 
It is fine for me to move on without this project or Casey in my life. 1.01 (.71)* 
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Likelihoods of Avoidance Strategies, Indicator Loadings and Measurement Model 
Indices 




I’ll give up my ideas on this project and maybe never talk to Casey again. 0.79 (.63)* 
After the meeting, I won’t want to be discussing anything, or even talking with 
Casey any more. 
 
1.03 (.72)* 
χ²(34, N = 346) = 69.51, p < .01, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .03, CFI = .96. H = .796. 
 
Outflanking 
After the meeting, I will try to solve the problem indirectly without having to 
discuss it with Casey again. 
1.00 (.42)* 
After the meeting, I will talk to our professor (boss) about my ideas without any 
more discussion with Casey. 
1.75 (.71)* 
After the meeting, I’ll come up with some sideway strategy (talk to our 
professor [boss] or do something else) to actualize my ideas. 
170.12 (.72)* 
After the meeting, I’ll try something else to actualize my plan for the project but 
not through another debate with Casey. 
122.19 (.53)* 




After the meeting, I will restrain myself from arguing about the project with 
Casey in our future conversations. 
1.00 (.18)* 
After the meeting, I’ll give up my ideas and remain Casey’s friend. 0.05 (.60)* 
I want to be, or remain, Casey’s friend and will never mention our different 
ideas about the project again. 
0.05 (.79)* 
After the meeting, I’ll be, or remain, Casey’s friend but I’ll be careful not to 
mention our argument on the project in our conversations. 
6.57 (.77)* 
χ²(34, N = 346) = 48.43, p = .06, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .02, CFI = .98. H = .788. 
* p < .01. 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients resulted from the analyses of relevant covariance 
matrix, controlling for group membership (i.e., the 11 dummies in Table 10 were 
entered as independent variables which all lead to the dependent variable). Bold 
values represent unstandardized loadings of reference indicators. 
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Likelihoods of Accommodation, Domination, Compromise, and Integration, Indicator 
Loadings and Measurement Model Indices 





I will try to satisfy Casey’s needs during the meeting. 1.00 (.62)* 
I will not give in to Casey’s wishes.  16.72 (.48)* 
I will try to satisfy Casey’s expectations. 26.31 (.75)* 
I will not bend over backwards to accommodate Casey’s wishes.  0.12 (.28)* 
I will like going along with Casey’s suggestions.  19.36 (.58)* 
I will accommodate Casey’s needs. 28.27 (.79)* 
 




I will exert pressure on Casey to reach a solution leaning towards my 
ideas. 
1.00 (.72)* 
I will use my power to get my way.  0.01 (.80)* 
I will not use influence to get my ideas accepted.  0.03 (.38)* 
I will use my expertise to make Casey accept my ideas. 
 
0.04 (.59)* 
χ²(34, N = 346) = 29.40, p = .69, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .02, CFI = 1.00. H = .781. 
 
Compromise 
I will try to find a middle course or compromise to solve the problem. 1.00 (.54)* 
If deadlock happens, I will take a moderate position to resolve the conflict. 21.69 (.53)* 
I will bargain with Casey to get a middle ground. 12.65 (.71)* 
I will try to work out a compromise that gives both of us some of what we 
want. 
12.48 (.80)* 
I will try to give and take so that moderate profits can be obtained. 9.75 (.70)* 
 
χ²(48, N = 346) = 90.91, p < .05, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .04, CFI = .94. H = .820. 
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I do not want to collaborate with Casey to make decisions.  1.00 (.54)* 
I will work with Casey to find a solution that satisfies the expectations of 
both of us. 
29.28 (.82)* 
I will work closely with Casey for a proper understanding of what both of 
us want.  
3.49 (.78)* 
I am willing to exchange information openly with Casey to reach the best 
solution. 
60.96 (.80)* 
I will bring all our concerns out in the open to reach an agreement in the 
best possible way. 
 
5.48 (.70)* 
χ²(48, N = 346) = 183.31, p < .01, RMSEA = .10, SRMR = .04, CFI = .92. H = .871. 
* p < .01. 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients resulted from the analyses of relevant covariance 
matrix, controlling for group membership (i.e., the 11 dummies in Table 10 were 
entered as independent variables which all lead to the dependent variable). Bold 
values represent unstandardized loadings of reference indicators. 
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Appendix Q  
Covariance Matrix in LISREL for Models A and B 
 
Covariance Matrix        
 
Item        E1             E2            E3           E4           IPE1            IPE2    
 --------       --------      --------     --------    --------        -------- 
 E1       891.64        
 E2       389.57     712.66 
 E3       174.79     226.18      419.90 
 E4       492.52     384.81      242.83     714.17 
 IPE1       216.46       94.31        60.53     146.57     385.41 
 IPE2          95.94       96.72        66.43      81.89      137.57      490.98 
 IPE3       214.99     200.63      148.84     201.80     135.38      145.77 
 IPE4       278.94     396.20      217.41     290.60     132.08      161.53 
 S1     -451.79    -297.76    -153.58    -378.34    -147.33    -101.21 
 S2     -540.75    -338.97    -130.09    -438.85    -176.21    -113.38 
 S3     -385.60    -183.99      -57.42    -301.15      -80.20      -20.10 
 S4     -526.33    -253.28      -75.32    -391.86    -179.98      -42.00 
 IOP1     -289.89    -234.08    -113.00    -264.72      -98.49      -54.64 
 IOP2     -126.39      -99.36      -73.34    -154.65      -24.69        -0.88 
 IOP3        -76.82    -116.54      -64.59      -97.49       -35.31       23.60 
 IOP4     -268.21    -254.20    -114.04    -253.24      -65.17      -47.59 
 W1          39.53        89.92     101.27     104.82       11.93        -6.03 
 W2          10.12        74.28       48.75       58.77      -18.71        -4.24 
 W3        -10.76        18.64       37.33       26.86      -37.66      -19.34 
 W4        -18.90          2.52      -10.02       -8.32      -24.59     -32.51 
 PC1       111.58      163.42      128.87    140.92       47.58       26.92 
 PC2       150.46      231.64      184.35    191.84       68.10       89.98 
 PC3          78.19      116.81      113.03    115.07       17.71       15.44 
 PC4       150.23      180.54      126.35    155.71       58.81       64.28 
 P1        -70.41        -6.00         46.23    -11.93      -57.47       15.84 
 P2        -26.30        34.91        27.32      -8.27      -24.86       39.56 
 P3     -116.49       -38.35        44.17    -38.89      -55.84       23.91 
 P4     -129.79       -52.05         -4.88    -49.06     -14.87         7.36 
 EX1       165.38       130.96      125.44   170.39       41.13       24.47 
 EX2       204.32       207.40      113.30   238.62       57.57       56.57 
 EX3          64.89         69.46        61.58     91.19        -0.16         4.74 
 EX4       377.21       269.00      152.68   315.31      155.88     107.50 
 O1       137.25       144.32      101.37   162.47        48.83       53.18 
 O2        200.03       245.66      169.19   235.27        59.37     119.08 
 O3       181.20       153.05      111.10   156.39      119.03     147.63 
 O4       133.30       120.57      118.78   114.84      129.20     161.57 
 G1         -63.22        -40.43      -63.87    -82.60        36.71       18.53 
 G2     -225.86      -101.15      -59.16  -124.28    -154.04      -79.82 
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Item        E1             E2            E3           E4             IPE1        IPE2    
 --------       --------      --------     --------      --------     -------- 
 
G3     -271.06      -87.79      -41.44    -194.79     -99.99    -101.57 
 G4     -375.13    -193.44    -105.66    -279.28     -89.10      -31.85 
 DUMMY1       -1.65        -0.44        -0.27        -0.83       -0.50        -0.13 
 DUMMY2        0.90         0.56          0.23         0.38        0.42          0.00 
 DUMMY3       -1.20        -0.87        -0.38        -0.39        0.26          0.01 
 DUMMY4        2.40         2.09          1.68         1.69        0.65          1.01 
 DUMMY5       -1.02        -0.61        -0.23        -0.74      -0.23         -0.19 
 DUMMY6        0.09         0.18        -0.16          0.44      -0.08          0.22 
 DUMMY7       -1.23        -0.46        -0.57        -1.02      -0.31         -0.35 
 DUMMY9        0.14         0.25        -0.33          0.51      -0.18         -0.18 
 DUMMY10       0.06        -0.30        -0.27        -0.28      -0.18         -0.70 
 DUMMY11       0.68        -0.22        -0.37        -0.60      -0.01         -0.11 
 DUMMY12      -0.34        -0.56         0.01        -0.54      -0.51         -0.15 
 
Covariance Matrix        
 
IPE3        IPE4            S1            S2            S3           S4    
 --------     --------         --------      --------     --------     -------- 
 IPE3       594.37 
 IPE4       254.84       700.73 
 S1     -143.62     -265.62      848.58 
 S2     -116.90     -208.81      680.66      951.74 
 S3      -54.39       -153.30      489.70      587.13     965.57 
 S4     -118.21     -159.29      511.25      653.05     585.82     945.97 
 IOP1        -99.15      -201.43     468.04      404.29     278.35     338.15 
 IOP2        -67.19     -126.50      188.99      143.22     149.38     123.76 
 IOP3        -51.81     -123.78      232.00        98.44     131.64     171.22 
 IOP4        -85.03     -205.98      475.79      390.48     247.28     296.88 
 W1          45.95         99.06       -14.47        -0.47       48.43         2.75 
 W2          38.01         65.23       -65.46       -62.82        6.12         1.45 
 W3             8.25           7.01       -30.43       -18.03      26.22       27.84 
 W4        -29.43         10.99        -5.18         43.14      76.64         7.38 
 PC1          85.33        163.01    -115.55     -107.68      15.53    -103.34 
 PC2       142.98        284.15    -197.66     -211.74     -64.97    -115.22 
 PC3          52.61        130.12    -100.74       -93.71        1.14       -59.63 
 PC4          89.31        186.64    -148.30     -207.25     -76.99       -84.99 
 P1          14.14         -17.73       20.03        59.09       91.06      113.38 
 P2           -4.59          39.18      -60.16        -2.07       69.15        20.01 
 P3             4.37         -80.88        30.53       61.03     109.04        35.14 
 P4     -109.68         -80.38        47.45       88.44       84.74      102.36 
 EX1          62.69         160.46    -276.79    -250.59    -130.11    -160.38 
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IPE3        IPE4        S1            S2            S3           S4    
 --------     --------     --------      --------     --------     -------- 
 
EX2           78.69     175.96    -266.69    -343.44    -186.91    -186.22 
 EX3           22.58       71.82      -75.76      -79.58      -15.21      -21.90 
 EX4        148.37     274.31    -481.54    -504.69    -328.46    -344.58 
 O1        112.99     157.76    -150.01    -123.11      -93.72      -72.92 
 O2        169.89     247.80    -235.50    -238.24      -83.60    -162.12 
 O3        166.67     218.34    -171.42    -152.50       42.40      -96.83 
 O4        193.02     201.82    -128.10    -116.48        -1.75    -139.83 
 G1           -7.06        -8.19       24.82        24.95       54.45       23.42 
 G2        -74.62    -132.13     288.55      296.75     240.19     290.95 
 G3        -14.48    -101.92     391.08      396.53     380.84     287.84 
 G4        -52.29    -157.30     471.54      476.62     431.34     453.11 
 DUMMY1       -0.87        -0.42         1.02          1.61         0.81         1.28 
 DUMMY2        0.31         0.35        -1.44         -1.56       -1.46        -0.63 
 DUMMY3        0.08        -0.98         1.60          1.62         0.94         0.88 
 DUMMY4        1.51         1.76        -3.53         -2.97       -2.36        -2.39 
 DUMMY5        0.47        -0.50         1.43          1.75         1.44         1.44 
 DUMMY6        0.10         0.34         0.08         -1.16        -0.84       -0.77 
 DUMMY7       -0.89       -0.89         1.55          1.20          1.55        1.40 
 DUMMY9       -0.30        0.25        -0.66         -1.25        -1.63       -1.01 
 DUMMY10      -0.06       -0.38         1.60          1.84         2.16         1.19 
 DUMMY11      -0.20        0.04        -0.49         -0.99        -0.72       -0.60 
 DUMMY12      -0.46       -0.45         1.49          1.63          0.72        0.47 
 
Covariance Matrix        
 
IOP1       IOP2         IOP3        IOP4        W1         W2    
 --------       --------     --------     --------      --------    -------- 
 IOP1       685.01 
 IOP2       240.81     320.61 
 IOP3       392.32     178.05      868.33 
 IOP4       587.43     213.68      400.44     734.68 
 W1        -24.99     -16.63        24.45      -38.10     419.25 
 W2        -50.63     -12.14        26.83      -82.22     108.23     286.97 
 W3        -27.16     -15.39        31.85      -44.37       59.41     161.80 
 W4          17.56        -1.61       20.47       14.19      181.32       97.02 
 PC1     -113.34      -86.91      10.17    -109.00      212.73     102.50 
 PC2     -200.03    -137.09     -78.06    -166.69      142.17       98.53 
 PC3        -79.67      -34.68     -27.75    -102.94      102.64       91.18 
 PC4      -134.33     -66.91     -32.04    -165.34      113.03     124.16 
 P1           38.23      13.37       86.02        21.53       96.27       99.94 
 P2                18.76         5.95       83.00        -2.70      106.83       81.52 
 P3           89.85       66.35     140.25       59.95      105.39     121.89 
 P4        133.91       36.34     123.20     103.48        66.24       43.55 
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IOP1       IOP2         IOP3        IOP4        W1         W2    
 --------       --------     --------     --------      --------    -------- 
 
EX1     -168.14      -47.53      -39.60    -178.40     134.52     139.06 
 EX2     -176.28      -82.55      -53.28    -154.01     118.51     128.02 
 EX3        -36.46      -21.71       30.65      -55.71       65.03       96.17 
 EX4     -302.20    -121.88    -132.51    -352.17       74.92     135.21 
 O1    -113.40      -43.48       40.92      -95.58     169.44     134.45 
 O2     -142.75      -70.85         0.16    -142.85     113.25     127.23 
 O3        -76.02        -8.96     102.91      -31.62     143.19       88.97 
 O4        -85.43      -47.88       44.87      -38.33     118.45       61.48 
 G1          61.58        42.08     109.23       70.98        -8.62     -42.45 
 G2       128.58        61.79       59.97     126.17       76.62      42.91 
 G3       210.22        82.14       47.78     225.44       45.96      31.71 
 G4       295.84      126.97     129.37     313.84       28.58      -2.60 
 DUMMY1        0.39         -0.06       -0.52         0.40         0.00       0.23 
 DUMMY2        0.11         -0.16        0.70         0.37         0.16      -0.09 
 DUMMY3        0.40          0.34       -0.60         0.55        -0.15      -0.22 
 DUMMY4      -3.16         -0.72       -1.95        -3.50        -0.05       0.52 
 DUMMY5       0.76           0.45        0.28         0.92         0.06      -0.05 
 DUMMY6       0.48         -0.09        1.36          0.36         0.42       0.31 
 DUMMY7       0.94          0.58         0.43         0.59         0.15      -0.34 
 DUMMY9       0.50          0.12         1.16         0.90        -0.66       0.09 
 DUMMY10      0.47          0.13        -0.07         0.53         0.14      -0.02 
 DUMMY11      0.76          0.25         1.14         0.73         0.16      -0.02 
 DUMMY12      0.91          0.05         0.03         0.82        -0.47      -0.41 
 
Covariance Matrix        
 
W3            W4         PC1        PC2           PC3        PC4    
 --------      --------    --------     --------      --------      -------- 
 W3      255.22 
 W4      113.33     686.11 
 PC1       43.58       122.92     572.19 
 PC2       52.27         89.02     275.06     785.21 
 PC3       52.15         62.25     145.64     189.25     239.26 
 PC4       70.60         84.67     188.58     290.28     145.18     490.11 
 P1      115.47     164.73     139.07       63.69       73.78       39.52 
 P2       70.97       172.83     171.83       79.77       80.08       82.99 
 P3      111.03     158.26     119.80     -41.35       23.20      -34.51 
 P4       75.07       182.86       39.29     -27.23       34.16        24.01 
 EX1       68.15         93.70     124.93     120.48     101.42     146.17 
 EX2       66.76         83.69     125.35     252.09     111.51     211.62 
 EX3       63.13         74.37       81.42     104.71       89.39     119.69 
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W3            W4          PC1          PC2          PC3         PC4    
 --------      --------     --------      --------      --------      -------- 
 
EX4         62.01       72.79     161.63      212.63     148.61     231.10 
 O1      106.30     116.22     128.18      242.61     114.48     126.03 
 O2         58.07       88.98     245.36      306.99     102.21     161.73 
 O3         47.87     107.42     187.57      256.40     102.49     142.38 
 O4         32.50     139.79     179.66      375.95       97.01     170.67 
 G1       -20.27       32.91         5.23      -30.71     -54.76        19.37 
 G2         84.11       88.43      -21.80      -30.11     -13.89       -16.82 
 G3         45.68       79.64       91.30        -2.86       -1.10       -14.79 
 G4         27.18       55.19      -54.25    -119.93     -58.12       -40.95 
 DUMMY1       0.23        -0.27         0.09        -0.30       -0.13         -0.16 
 DUMMY2       0.02        -0.43         0.08         0.04         0.15        -0.06 
 DUMMY3      -0.32        -0.17       -0.05        -0.64       -0.18         -0.40 
 DUMMY4       0.33        -0.32         0.28         1.13        0.47           1.13 
 DUMMY5       0.01         0.27        -0.05        -0.59       -0.24        -0.46 
 DUMMY6      -0.17       -0.06          0.48         0.76        0.11          0.20 
 DUMMY7      -0.28        0.35          0.24        -0.07       -0.20        -0.09 
 DUMMY9      -0.05       -0.30        -0.63        -0.28       -0.07        -0.16 
 DUMMY10       0.40        0.25         0.13        -0.52       -0.35        -0.01 
 DUMMY11       0.00        0.05        -0.29         0.46        0.03         0.00 
 DUMMY12      -0.09       0.76        -0.52        -0.67       -0.20        -0.45 
 
Covariance Matrix        
 
P1            P2            P3            P4           EX1          EX2    
 --------      --------     --------      --------    --------      -------- 
 P1     652.14 
 P2      388.72     665.41 
 P3      293.65     343.67    1030.32 
 P4      286.89     385.27      307.00     916.26 
 EX1         61.81       93.62        48.67         9.77     413.79 
 EX2         78.42       73.72          6.69     141.76     241.39     818.07 
 EX3         99.49       58.28        48.03       30.09     135.61     149.17 
 EX4         14.35       77.46      -44.57      -26.04     331.08     338.28 
 O1      147.21     171.18     106.61      118.52     100.03     125.23 
 O2      138.65     176.45     121.05        47.60     187.78     230.96 
 O3      107.36     219.35     173.11        23.21     198.95     171.96 
 O4         54.66     139.69      95.80         51.43       99.80     147.80 
 G1         46.95       47.79     104.96      124.99      -17.21       17.05 
 G2         97.38       72.14       58.10      186.07      -57.29      -29.40 
 G3      149.89       87.28     170.76      164.23    -140.71      -79.68 
 G4      124.35       56.22     134.10      146.72    -219.79    -159.49 
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P1           P2         P3         P4        EX1        EX2    
 --------   --------   --------   --------   --------   -------- 
 DUMMY1       -0.14      -0.06       -0.52        0.28      -0.61      -0.73 
 DUMMY2       -0.14      -0.21       -0.76      -0.09       0.46        0.79 
 DUMMY3        0.14        0.01       -0.20      -0.46      -0.55      -1.00 
 DUMMY4       -0.01       0.18         0.43      -0.66       1.06        0.99 
 DUMMY5        0.40      -0.24         0.59      -0.62      -0.70      -1.03 
 DUMMY6        0.10        0.71        0.19        0.34       0.62        0.74 
 DUMMY7       -0.43      -0.06        0.44        0.50      -0.70      -1.04 
 DUMMY9       -0.25      -0.47       -0.04        0.40       0.16        0.53 
 DUMMY10      -0.33      -0.17        0.06       -0.06      -0.67      -0.99 
 DUMMY11       0.05      -0.02        0.13       -0.11        0.71       1.31 
 DUMMY12       0.48      -0.26       -0.29        0.34      -0.78      -1.19 
 
Covariance Matrix        
 
EX3           EX4         O1         O2             O3           O4    
 --------      --------      --------     --------      --------     -------- 
 EX3      210.43 
 EX4      160.41     901.42 
 O1         60.88     215.78      876.17 
 O2         59.42     247.35      292.49     929.23 
 O3         65.57     190.99      251.80     476.50     985.98 
 O4           58.80     140.98      190.02     316.06     409.11     951.82 
 G1          -9.62     -69.59          5.88        -2.77     100.00       99.29 
 G2         34.45    -192.05       42.02    -110.27      -67.74      -71.01 
 G3          -9.74    -301.02       34.39         1.07      -74.26       10.47 
 G4       -52.30    -481.85     -27.98    -125.45      -68.12       29.21 
 DUMMY1      -0.34        -1.25       -0.89        -0.97        -0.33        -0.51 
 DUMMY2       0.26          0.72        0.28        -0.27         0.30        -0.63 
 DUMMY3       0.02        -1.28       -0.44        -0.58        -0.73        -0.38 
 DUMMY4       0.22          2.67        1.22         1.79         0.51         0.44 
 DUMMY5      -0.45        -1.04       -0.54        -0.57       -0.82        -0.38 
 DUMMY6       0.21          0.99        0.44         1.20         0.94         0.31 
 DUMMY7      -0.30        -1.00        0.15        -0.77       -0.95        -0.09 
 DUMMY9       0.22        -0.06       -0.38        -0.24       -0.18         0.33 
 DUMMY10     -0.36        -1.23       -0.59        -0.21        0.22        -0.35 
 DUMMY11      0.36          1.13        0.18         0.39        0.98         0.72 
 DUMMY12     -0.21        -1.23        0.15        -0.79       -0.60        -0.93 
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Covariance Matrix        
 
G1           G2             G3          G4         DUMMY1   DUMMY2    
 --------     --------       --------     --------   --------    -------- 
 G1      635.52 
 G2         26.51     875.03 
 G3      143.58     477.01    1126.33 
 G4      167.67     404.17      670.10    1122.99 
 DUMMY1      -0.15         0.75          1.03         1.12       0.08 
 DUMMY2       0.46        -0.43         -0.82       -0.69      -0.01       0.08 
 DUMMY3      -0.70         0.77          0.33         0.63      -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY4      -0.05        -1.24         -1.97      -2.44       -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY5      -0.05         0.14          1.01        1.23       -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY6       0.18        -1.13         -1.37       -1.50      -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY7      -0.22         1.45          1.37        1.78       -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY9      -0.41        -0.35        -0.99       -0.67       -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY10      0.34         1.00          2.04        1.71       -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY11      0.33        -0.45        -0.48       -0.99       -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY12     -0.25         0.73         1.10         1.22       -0.01      -0.01 
 
Covariance Matrix        
 
DUMMY3  DUMMY4     DUMMY5     DUMMY6     DUMMY7     DUMMY9    
 --------      --------         --------       --------         --------         -------- 
 DUMMY3       0.08 
 DUMMY4      -0.01       0.08 
 DUMMY5      -0.01      -0.01       0.08 
 DUMMY6      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01       0.08 
 DUMMY7      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01       0.08 
 DUMMY9      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01       0.08 
 DUMMY10     -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY11     -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01 
 DUMMY12     -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01      -0.01 
 
Covariance Matrix        
 
DUMMY10   DUMMY11    DUMMY12    
 --------         --------        -------- 
 DUMMY10       0.08 
 DUMMY11      -0.01       0.08 
 DUMMY12      -0.01      -0.01       0.08 
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[See the table below for item label used in the study and indicator label used in 
LISREL program. Note that all the indicators are found in Appendix J. The 
transformation formulas are found in Appendix L. The descriptives of the indicators 
after transformation are found in Appendix M. The dummy variables are found in 
Table 10.] 
 
Indicator Label used in LISREL Item Label used in the Study 
E1 Enmity1 
E2 New Enmity2 
E3 New Enmity3 
E4 New Enmity4 
IPE1 New Instrumental Competition1 
IPE2 New Instrumental Competition2 
IPE3 Instrumental Competition3 
IPE4 Instrumental Competition4 
S1 New Support1 
S2 New Support2 
S3 Support3 
S4 Support4 
IOP1 New Instrumental Cooperation1 
IOP2 New Instrumental Cooperation2 
IOP3 New Instrumental Cooperation3 
IOP4 New Instrumental Cooperation4 
W1 New Withdraw1 
W2 New Withdraw2 
W3 New Withdraw3 
W4 New Withdraw4 
PC1 New Passive Compete1 
PC2 New Passive Compete2 
PC3 New Passive Compete3 
PC4 New Passive Compete4 
P1 New Pretend1 
P2 New Pretend2 
P3 Pretend3 
P4 Pretend4 
EX1 New Exit1 
EX2 New Exit2 
EX3 New Exit3 
EX4 New Exit4 
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Indicator Label used in LISREL Item Label used in the Study 
O1 New Outflank1 
O2 New Outflank2 
O3 Outflank3 
O4 Outflank4 
G1 New Yield1 
G2 New Yield2 
G3 New Yield3 
G4 New Yield4 
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